Base de CVEs

NVIDIA GPU Display Driver for Windows and Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer where an attacker could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering.

NVIDIA vGPU Virtual GPU Manager for Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer where an attacker could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering.

NVIDIA vGPU Virtual GPU Manager for Linux contains a vulnerability in the firmware where an attacker could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering.

NVIDIA vGPU Virtual GPU Manager for Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer where an attacker could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering.

NVIDIA vGPU Virtual GPU Manager for Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer where an attacker could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering.

NVIDIA vGPU Virtual GPU Manager for Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer where an attacker could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering.

NVIDIA GPU Display Driver for Windows and Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer, where a user could cause an out-of-bounds read from kernel heap memory. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering.

NVIDIA GPU Display Driver for Windows and Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer, where a user could cause an out-of-bounds read leading to kernel information disclosure. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering.

NVIDIA vGPU Virtual GPU Manager for Windows and Linux contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer where a guest could cause an out-of-bounds read. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering.

MQTT WebSocket setter ABI mismatch may disclose memory or cause a crash

An unprivileged, memory-protected ThreadX module can have the kernel read and write memory at addresses of its choosing, in privileged mode, and can use that to clear the MPU enable bit and remove its own isolation boundary. The Module Manager decided whether a privileged service could dereference an object address a module named by asking only whether that address fell outside the module. The manager's object pool is outside every module, so the test was satisfied by an address shifted into the interior of one of the module's own privileged allocations, which denotes no object at all. The bytes such an address presents as a control block are bytes the module put there through ordinary create and set services, so the control block ID at the front of them could be made to read as any type the module chose, and the `_txe_` layer's ID test then agreed. The reported chain uses that to reach a privileged `memset` across an attacker-chosen range.

hey, `_nx_snmp_utility_object_id_get` in the NetX Duo SNMP addon does not validate the claimed OID data length against the actual buffer size when the OID uses BER multibyte length encoding, so a remote attacker can send a crafted SNMP packet with a multibyte OID length larger than the available buffer, causing the parser to read past the packet buffer boundary into adjacent heap memory. the OOB bytes are decoded as OID component values and written into the agents internal OID string buffer, corrupting agent state. on systems with memory protection the OOB read poses the risk of crashing the SNMP agent thread, causing denial of service. on bare metal embedded systems without memory protection the read silently succeeds and corrupts the agents internal state with heap data.

`_nx_icmpv6_validate_options()` scans the option area with `while (length > 2)` (`common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79`). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is not negative, so the function returns `NX_SUCCESS`. Its zero-length rejection never sees those bytes. Every consumer then re-walks the same area, reading a two-byte option header at the residue and subtracting `nx_icmpv6_option_length << 3` with no zero check and no remaining-length check. Three outcomes follow, selected by bytes the attacker controls. **Zero length byte.** The walker subtracts zero and advances zero. All four handlers loop forever — `_nx_icmpv6_process_ra` (`nx_icmpv6_process_ra.c:245, :528`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_ns` (`:251, :329`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_na` (`:147, :156`) and `_nx_icmpv6_process_redirect` (`:247, :350`). The walk runs in the IP thread, which is the highest-priority thread and does not yield inside the loop, so the system stops until a watchdog reset and the frame can be replayed after each one. **Non-zero length byte on a short residue.** The three unsigned counters underflow — `2 - 8` becomes `0xFFFFFFFA` — and the walk continues past the packet buffer, reading until it faults or meets a zero length byte and freezes. The Router Advertisement counter is signed and exits cleanly in this case. **One-byte residue.** The walker reads a two-byte option header, over-reading one byte. During a runaway walk, stray bytes parsing as a link-layer address option are copied into the neighbor cache (`nx_icmpv6_process_ns.c:280, :293`) and subsequently used as the destination MAC for frames to that neighbour, placing off-packet memory on the link. Confirmed by inspection, not reproduced.

The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than four bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not against the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one missing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none. The handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX: ```c /* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */ status = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, &temp_ptr, server_ptr -> nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER); ... fx_file_write(&(client_request_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_request_file), packet_ptr -> nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4, packet_ptr -> nx_packet_length - 4); ``` `nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the end of the first packet: ``` ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5 #0 __interceptor_memcpy #1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78 0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region ``` Those bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them back, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel. The same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs ceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the attacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never returns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and the server thread suspended, and no later client is served. Reject `nx_packet_length > 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call, and use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy.

On the first DTLS ClientHello, the parser copies a device-claimed session_id length and validates the ciphersuite-list length against the total record length instead of the remaining bytes. An unauthenticated peer drives an OOB source read of up to 255 bytes, and those bytes are echoed verbatim into the outgoing ServerHello, disclosing adjacent process memory over the network. The crash variant fires on the first packet.