Base de CVEs

rtapi_app in linuxcnc-uspace in LinuxCNC before 2.9.9 allows privilege escalation. It is installed SUID root and loads shared library modules via dlopen() by using a user-supplied module name. Insufficient validation of the module name allows path traversal, enabling an unprivileged local user to load an arbitrary shared library. Because the process retains elevated privileges during module loading, this results in local privilege escalation to root.

Zephyr's HTTP server (subsys/net/lib/http) provides a static-filesystem resource type (HTTP_RESOURCE_TYPE_STATIC_FS, available when CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM is enabled) that serves files from a configured root directory. Before this fix, both the HTTP/1 and HTTP/2 front-ends placed the raw, attacker-controlled request path into client->url_buffer (assembled in on_url() for HTTP/1 and copied verbatim from the :path pseudo-header for HTTP/2) without resolving ./.. segments. The static-FS handler then built the on-disk filename by directly concatenating the configured root with that raw URL (snprintk(fname, ..., "%s%s", static_fs_detail->fs_path, client->url_buffer) at http_server_http1.c:603 and http_server_http2.c:490) and opened it with fs_open(fname, FS_O_READ). Because the handler is reached via wildcard/leading-dir (fnmatch FNM_LEADING_DIR) or fallback resource matching, a request such as GET /<prefix>/../../<file> is dispatched to the handler and, after the underlying filesystem (e.g. LittleFS/FAT) resolves the .. segments, escapes the configured web root, letting an unauthenticated remote client read arbitrary readable files on the mounted volume (information disclosure). The HTTP server requires no TLS or authentication to reach this path. The fix adds http_server_remove_dot_segments(), which canonicalizes the path portion of the URL before resource lookup in both protocol handlers, neutralizing the traversal. Affects releases v4.0.0 through v4.4.0 for deployments that register a static-filesystem resource.

Gigamon GVOS v5.16.1 and below is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in the GVOS H-VUE subsystem.

Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. From 2.1.38 until 2.1.163, Claude Code's worktree handling allowed creation of worktrees named ".git" and navigation to worktrees outside the sandbox context, enabling git directory confusion attacks. By exploiting symlink manipulation and git fsmonitor execution during worktree operations, an attacker could overwrite files in the user's home directory (such as .zshenv), leading to code execution outside of seatbelt sandbox restrictions. Reliably exploiting this required the user to clone a malicious repository containing prompt injection content and run Claude Code against it. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.163.

FrontAccounting before 2.4.20 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the attachment upload handler that allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code by uploading files with traversal sequences in the unique_name parameter. Attackers can supply path traversal sequences ../../../shell.php to write files outside the intended attachments directory into the web root, and by uploading PHP files without extension validation, achieve remote code execution as the web server user.

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Epiphyt Embed Privacy allows Path Traversal. This issue affects Embed Privacy: from n/a through 1.12.3.

A vulnerability was found in YunaiV/zhijiantianya ruoyi-vue-pro up to 2026.04-jdk8-SNAPSHOT. The impacted element is the function generateUploadPath of the file yudao-module-infra/src/main/java/cn/iocoder/yudao/module/infra/service/file/FileServiceImpl.java of the component AppFileController File Upload Endpoint. Performing a manipulation results in path traversal. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The patch is named 4ae3f6b2c9883978837638c14e3d18419819eeb0. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. This product is published by multiple vendors.

Kestra is an open-source, event-driven orchestration platform. Prior to 1.0.45 and 1.3.23, the local internal-storage backend validates user-supplied paths for .. traversal before it converts Windows-style backslashes to forward slashes. An attacker can therefore smuggle a traversal sequence past the guard using backslashes (..\..\..\); the guard sees a harmless string, and the path is only rewritten to ../../../ after validation, immediately before the file is opened. Any authenticated user who can view an execution (the lowest-privilege role) can call GET /api/v1/{tenant}/executions/{executionId}/file?path=… and read any file on the server filesystem readable by the Kestra process, outside the storage sandbox and across every tenant and namespace. This includes the embedded H2 database (all flows, all users, all stored secrets), internal storage of every other tenant/namespace, mounted secret files, and the process environment (/proc/self/environ) which contains configured database and secret-backend credentials. It is a complete breach of Kestra's storage isolation and multi-tenancy boundary. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.45 and 1.3.23.

Kestra is an open-source, event-driven orchestration platform. Prior to 1.0.43 and 1.3.19, several Kestra API endpoints accept a kestra:// URI from the client and pass it through StorageInterface.parentTraversalGuard before reading the underlying file from the local storage backend. The guard only inspects the literal URI.toString(), so a URL-encoded .. written as %2E%2E slips through. The downstream code then calls URI.getPath(), which decodes %2E%2E back to .., and the resulting path is handed to Paths.get(...) without normalization. The OS resolves the .. segments at open(2) time, so an authenticated user with a single execution can read any file the Kestra process has access to on the host filesystem (/etc/passwd, mounted secrets, other tenants' execution outputs, etc.). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.43 and 1.3.19.

RustFS is a distributed object storage system built in Rust. In 1.0.0-beta.4, authenticated users with only PutObject permission on their own bucket can exploit a path traversal vulnerability in the Snowball auto-extract feature to write arbitrary objects into other users' buckets, completely breaking multi-tenant isolation. The vulnerability chains three flaws: No ../ sanitization in tar entry key normalization; IAM wildcard matching uses raw (uncleaned) paths; and Filesystem path cleaning resolves ../ across bucket boundaries.

extract-zip does not validate symlink targets when extracting zip archives. When processing a malicious zip file containing a symlink with a relative path like '../../../../etc/passwd', extract-zip will extract the symlink without validation, allowing it to point outside the extraction directory. Depending on how extract-zip is used, an attacker could read or write to arbitrary files.

Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.15.3 and 5.2.0, Echo's router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving %2F as-is), while StaticDirectoryHandler unescapes %2F to / before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.15.3 and 5.2.0.

Contributor Arbitrary File Deletion in H5P <= 1.17.7 versions.