Base de CVEs

A vulnerability in MISP's email-based one-time password (OTP) authentication flow allowed an attacker to perform an unrestricted number of OTP verification attempts. The email_otp() endpoint did not apply brute-force protection when validating submitted OTP values. An attacker who had reached the OTP verification stage, for example after successfully providing a user's primary authentication credentials, could repeatedly submit candidate OTP values while the same OTP remained valid. This significantly increased the feasibility of guessing the OTP and bypassing the additional authentication factor, potentially resulting in unauthorized access to the affected user's account. The issue was exacerbated by the fact that the OTP is associated with the user rather than with an individual pending login session, allowing multiple concurrent sessions to attempt guesses against the same valid OTP. The patch integrates the existing MISP brute-force protection mechanism into the email OTP flow. Failed OTP attempts are now counted against the user, further attempts are rejected once the configured threshold is reached, and the active OTP is invalidated when the attempt budget is exhausted. Blocklisted users are also prevented from requesting the generation of a fresh OTP. In addition, OTP comparison now uses hash_equals() and validates that the submitted value is a string.

A privilege escalation security issue exists within FactoryTalk® Activation Manager. The security issue stems from custom actions in the installer that spawn visible console windows running with SYSTEM privileges during installation or repair operations. An authenticated attacker with Windows credentials could hijack these console windows to obtain a SYSTEM-level command prompt, allowing full access to all files, processes, and system resources.

WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) contains a brute-force rate limiting bypass in enforceRateLimit(), which protects login.json.php and 13 other endpoints. The function stores its attempt counter via a cache layer (ObjectYPT::setCacheGlobal) that silently discards writes for any client identified as a bot by isBot(). Because isBot() treats a missing User-Agent header as a bot by default — and also matches common bot identifiers such as 'curl', 'bot', 'crawler', and 'spider' — the counter never increments for such clients, so the rate limit never fires. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore submit unlimited login attempts (e.g., by omitting the User-Agent header or using curl's default User-Agent), enabling unrestricted password-guessing attacks.

The affected Ebyte device does not restrict repeated authentication attempts through rate limiting or account lockout mechanisms. This could allow an attacker to perform automated authentication attacks against deployments that rely on password based authentication.

RansomLook contains multiple weaknesses in its authentication endpoint that allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to enumerate valid usernames, perform unrestricted password-guessing attacks, and potentially exhaust application worker resources. For local authentication, the login implementation previously checked whether a submitted username existed before invoking the password hash verification function. Requests containing a nonexistent username therefore returned significantly faster than requests for valid accounts, for which the computationally expensive password verification routine was executed. A remote attacker could measure these response-time differences to determine which usernames correspond to valid RansomLook accounts. In addition, the /login endpoint did not restrict the number or frequency of failed authentication attempts. An attacker could consequently perform password brute-force, dictionary, password-spraying, or credential-stuffing attacks against known accounts without server-side throttling. For valid usernames, each authentication attempt also invokes the password key-derivation function, which consumes a significant amount of CPU time. A sufficiently high rate of login attempts could therefore occupy the application's synchronous Gunicorn workers and cause a denial of service affecting the entire application. The issue has been addressed by always performing password verification using a randomly generated dummy password hash when the supplied username does not exist, eliminating the username-dependent timing discrepancy. Failed authentication attempts are additionally rate-limited per client IP address using Valkey/Redis, with five failed attempts within five minutes resulting in a one-hour block. The reverse-proxy configuration was also updated so that the application derives the client address from a trusted X-Forwarded-For value that cannot be overridden by a client-supplied header.

phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7 contains a brute-force vulnerability in the two-factor authentication step where the failure counter is session-scoped and reset on each successful password re-authentication. Attackers with a valid password can bypass the five-attempt limit by obtaining a fresh session cookie and repeatedly re-authenticating to reset the counter, enabling unbounded TOTP code guessing.

SiYuan versions before 3.7.4 contain an unthrottled brute-force vulnerability in the Publish Service Basic Auth implementation (PublishServiceTransport.RoundTrip() in kernel/server/proxy/publish.go). The Publish Service runs on a separate, unauthenticated-by-default listener (default TCP port 6808) and gates named publish-viewer accounts (Conf.Publish.Auth.Accounts) with Basic Auth that has no rate limiting, per-account lockout, or backoff. Unauthenticated remote attackers can submit unlimited password guesses against named accounts to gain access to published notes/notebooks.

SiYuan before 3.7.4 contains an improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts vulnerability in the authFilePublishAccess endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to brute-force per-notebook publish passwords. Attackers can submit unbounded password guesses without rate limiting or CAPTCHA to gain access to password-protected published notebooks.