Base de CVEs

Tautulli is a Python based monitoring and tracking tool for Plex Media Server. Versions prior to 2.17.1 expose `configUpdate` as a state-changing administrator endpoint, but the route does not enforce `POST` and does not use any anti-CSRF token. In the default form and JWT-based authentication mode, the administrator session cookie is issued with `SameSite=Lax`, which still permits top-level cross-site navigation requests. An attacker can exploit this by luring a logged-in administrator to a malicious page that submits a cross-site request to `/configUpdate` and overwrites the local administrator username and password. The attacker can then sign in directly with the chosen credentials and take over the Tautulli administrative interface. Version 2.17.1 patches the issue.

The Media Library Assistant plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in versions up to, and including, 3.35 This is due to missing nonce verification on the bulk action handlers in the settings tab handlers. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to trick an administrator into performing bulk delete, edit, or purge operations on plugin settings and attachment metadata via a forged request.

The WP Contact Form 7 DB Handler plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery leading to Arbitrary File Deletion via SQL Injection and PHP Object Injection in versions up to and including 3.0. This is due to a missing nonce verification in the process_bulk_action() function, the nonce check is only executed when _wpnonce is present in the POST body, allowing it to be trivially bypassed by omitting the field, combined with the use of an unsanitized, unparameterized user-supplied value in a numeric SQL context (WHERE ID = $ID) and the unsafe deserialization of the query result's post_content field. An attacker can craft a CSRF page that tricks a logged-in administrator into triggering a UNION-based SQL injection payload (using CHAR() to avoid esc_sql quote-escaping) that returns a malicious serialized PHP array as post_content; upon deserialization, array values associated with keys containing 'ys_cfdbh_file' are used as file paths appended to the uploads directory path without any path traversal validation, and then passed to wp_delete_file(), allowing the attacker to delete arbitrary files on the server (e.g., wp-config.php, system files).