Base de CVEs

In Eclipse Jetty, the HTTP/1.1 parser is vulnerable to request smuggling when chunk extensions are used, similar to the "funky chunks" techniques outlined here: * https://w4ke.info/2025/06/18/funky-chunks.html * https://w4ke.info/2025/10/29/funky-chunks-2.html Jetty terminates chunk extension parsing at \r\n inside quoted strings instead of treating this as an error. POST / HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost Transfer-Encoding: chunked 1;ext="val X 0 GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1 ... Note how the chunk extension does not close the double quotes, and it is able to inject a smuggled request.

A flaw was found in Undertow. When Undertow receives an HTTP request where the first header line starts with one or more spaces, it incorrectly processes the request by stripping these leading spaces. This behavior, which violates HTTP standards, can be exploited by a remote attacker to perform request smuggling. Request smuggling allows an attacker to bypass security mechanisms, access restricted information, or manipulate web caches, potentially leading to unauthorized actions or data exposure.

A flaw was found in Undertow. This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to construct specially crafted requests where header names are parsed differently by Undertow compared to upstream proxies. This discrepancy in header interpretation can be exploited to launch request smuggling attacks, potentially bypassing security controls and accessing unauthorized resources.

A flaw was found in Undertow. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending `\r\r\r` as a header block terminator. This can be used for request smuggling with certain proxy servers, such as older versions of Apache Traffic Server and Google Cloud Classic Application Load Balancer, potentially leading to unauthorized access or manipulation of web requests.

Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request Smuggling') vulnerability in Erlang OTP (inets httpd module) allows HTTP Request Smuggling. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/inets/src/http_server/httpd_request.erl and program routines httpd_request:parse_headers/7. The server does not reject or normalize duplicate Content-Length headers. The earliest Content-Length in the request is used for body parsing while common reverse proxies (nginx, Apache httpd, Envoy) honor the last Content-Length value. This violates RFC 9112 Section 6.3 and allows front-end/back-end desynchronization, leaving attacker-controlled bytes queued as the start of the next request. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 28.4.1, OTP 27.3.4.9 and OTP 26.2.5.18, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.6.1, 9.3.2.3 and 9.1.0.5.

Undici allows duplicate HTTP Content-Length headers when they are provided in an array with case-variant names (e.g., Content-Length and content-length). This produces malformed HTTP/1.1 requests with multiple conflicting Content-Length values on the wire. Who is impacted: * Applications using undici.request(), undici.Client, or similar low-level APIs with headers passed as flat arrays * Applications that accept user-controlled header names without case-normalization Potential consequences: * Denial of Service: Strict HTTP parsers (proxies, servers) will reject requests with duplicate Content-Length headers (400 Bad Request) * HTTP Request Smuggling: In deployments where an intermediary and backend interpret duplicate headers inconsistently (e.g., one uses the first value, the other uses the last), this can enable request smuggling attacks leading to ACL bypass, cache poisoning, or credential hijacking

An HTTP Request Smuggling vulnerability (CWE-444) has been found in Pingora's parsing of HTTP/1.0 and Transfer-Encoding requests. The issue occurs due to improperly allowing HTTP/1.0 request bodies to be close-delimited and incorrect handling of multiple Transfer-Encoding values, allowing attackers to send HTTP/1.0 requests in a way that would desync Pingora’s request framing from backend servers’. Impact This vulnerability primarily affects standalone Pingora deployments in front of certain backends that accept HTTP/1.0 requests. An attacker could craft a malicious payload following this request that Pingora forwards to the backend in order to: * Bypass proxy-level ACL controls and WAF logic * Poison caches and upstream connections, causing subsequent requests from legitimate users to receive responses intended for smuggled requests * Perform cross-user attacks by hijacking sessions or smuggling requests that appear to originate from the trusted proxy IP Cloudflare's CDN infrastructure was not affected by this vulnerability, as its ingress proxy layers forwarded HTTP/1.1 requests only, rejected ambiguous framing such as invalid Content-Length values, and forwarded a single Transfer-Encoding: chunked header for chunked requests. Mitigation: Pingora users should upgrade to Pingora v0.8.0 or higher that fixes this issue by correctly parsing message length headers per RFC 9112 and strictly adhering to more RFC guidelines, including that HTTP request bodies are never close-delimited. As a workaround, users can reject certain requests with an error in the request filter logic in order to stop processing bytes on the connection and disable downstream connection reuse. The user should reject any non-HTTP/1.1 request, or a request that has invalid Content-Length, multiple Transfer-Encoding headers, or Transfer-Encoding header that is not an exact “chunked” string match.

An HTTP request smuggling vulnerability (CWE-444) was found in Pingora's handling of HTTP/1.1 connection upgrades. The issue occurs when a Pingora proxy reads a request containing an Upgrade header, causing the proxy to pass through the rest of the bytes on the connection to a backend before the backend has accepted the upgrade. An attacker can thus directly forward a malicious payload after a request with an Upgrade header to that backend in a way that may be interpreted as a subsequent request header, bypassing proxy-level security controls and enabling cross-user session hijacking. Impact This vulnerability primarily affects standalone Pingora deployments where a Pingora proxy is exposed to external traffic. An attacker could exploit this to: * Bypass proxy-level ACL controls and WAF logic * Poison caches and upstream connections, causing subsequent requests from legitimate users to receive responses intended for smuggled requests * Perform cross-user attacks by hijacking sessions or smuggling requests that appear to originate from the trusted proxy IP Cloudflare's CDN infrastructure was not affected by this vulnerability, as ingress proxies in the CDN stack maintain proper HTTP parsing boundaries and do not prematurely switch to upgraded connection forwarding mode. Mitigation: Pingora users should upgrade to Pingora v0.8.0 or higher As a workaround, users may return an error on requests with the Upgrade header present in their request filter logic in order to stop processing bytes beyond the request header and disable downstream connection reuse.