Base de CVEs

Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection') vulnerability in Apache IoTDB. The pipe processor reads a fully qualified Java class name and instantiates it using Class.forName().newInstance() without any validation or allowlisting. This issue affects Apache IoTDB: from 1.0.0 before 2.0.10. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.10, which fixes the issue.

IBM WebSphere Extreme Scale 8.6.1.0 até 8.6.1.6 — o mecanismo Object Query Language resolve nomes de classes fornecidos pelo atacante via Class.forName() e invoca seus construtores sem lista de permissão em três pontos distintos (SELECT NEW, literais de enum e comparadores baseados em reflexão); um atacante remoto autenticado que possa influenciar uma string de consulta OQL montada pela aplicação pode executar construtores arbitrários na JVM do WAS, e uma variante SELECT DISTINCT que usa valores plantados na grade dispara o mesmo gadget após readObject, de forma que sobrevive aos filtros de serialização JEP-290 através das fronteiras dos nós da grade

Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader Versions Affected: before 1.9.5, before 2.5.9, before 3.0.0-M3 Description:  The ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(Class, String) method loads a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invokes its no-arg constructor, with the class name sourced from the manifest.properties entry of a model archive. The existing isAssignableFrom check correctly rejects classes that are not subtypes of the expected extension interface (BaseToolFactory for factory=, ArtifactSerializer for serializer-class-*), but the check runs after Class.forName() has already loaded and initialized the named class. Class.forName() with default initialization semantics executes the target class's static initializer before returning, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive can cause the static initializer of any class on the classpath to run during model loading, regardless of whether that class passes the subsequent type check. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer (for example, JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, or filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not a drop-in remote code execution; however, the attack surface grows as third-party model distribution becomes more common (community model repositories, Hugging Face-style sharing), where users routinely load model files from origins they do not control. A secondary, narrower vector affects deployments that ship legitimate BaseToolFactory or ArtifactSerializer subclasses with side-effecting no-arg constructors: a malicious manifest can name such a class and force its constructor to run during model load. Mitigation:  * 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9. * 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3. Note: The fix introduces a package-prefix allowlist that is consulted before Class.forName() is invoked, so the static initializer of a disallowed class is never executed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing factories or serializers outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that all model files are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors, particularly any that perform JNDI lookups, network requests, or filesystem operations during class initialization.

Barracuda Service Center, as implemented in the RMM solution, in versions prior to 2025.1.1, does not correctly verify the name of an attacker-controlled WSDL service, leading to insecure reflection. This can result in remote code execution through either invocation of arbitrary methods or deserialization of untrusted types.

In pig-mesh Pig versions 3.8.2 and below, when setting up scheduled tasks in the Quartz management function under the system management module, it is possible to execute any Java class with a parameterless constructor and its methods with parameter type String through reflection. At this time, the eval method in Tomcat's built-in class jakarta.el.ELProcessor can be used to execute commands, leading to a remote code execution vulnerability.