Base de CVEs

n8n before 1.123.83 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows authenticated members to spoof workflow identity by supplying a trusted identifier in Execute Sub-workflow inline JSON mode. Attackers can set this identifier to resolve credentials from projects they do not belong to and modify another workflow's static data and error-workflow dispatch.

In Omada Controller MSP mode, the user-confirmation endpoint fails to enforce the required permission check. An authenticated user can supply a caller-controlled Identifier parameter to validate credentials for another account and receive responses that distinguish nonexistent users, invalid passwords, and successful authentication.  Successful exploitation may allow user enumeration, credential verification, and unauthorized access to MSP resources or compromise of targeted accounts.

InvoiceShelf is an open-source web & mobile app that helps track expenses, payments and create professional invoices and estimates. Prior to version 2.4.0, InvoiceShelf NotesController::show, NotesController::update, and NotesController::destroy authorize only the generic view notes or manage notes ability and do not pass the route-bound Note to NotePolicy::viewNotes or NotePolicy::manageNotes, so neither method checks the target note's company_id. Because the Note model has no global company scope, an authenticated staff user with ordinary note abilities can select another company's sequential note identifier and read, modify, or delete its reusable invoice, estimate, and payment note templates. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.

InvoiceShelf is an open-source web & mobile app that helps track expenses, payments and create professional invoices and estimates. Prior to version 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/estimates/{estimate}/convert-to-invoice in ConvertEstimateController authorizes only the caller's create-invoice ability and does not authorize access to the route-bound Estimate. Because route-model binding can resolve an estimate from any company, an authenticated user with create-invoice ability can copy another company's line items, prices, totals, taxes, notes, currency, and customer data into an invoice in the attacker's company. The victim company's configured conversion action reaches checkForEstimateConvertAction and can also change or delete the original estimate. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.

Plane is an open-source project management tool. In 1.3.1 and earlier, EntityAssetEndpoint at the public project asset endpoint /api/public/assets/v2/anchor/{anchor}/ requires authentication for write operations but does not verify workspace or project membership. An authenticated user who knows a published project's public DeployBoard.anchor can create FileAsset records in that project and soft-delete existing assets by identifier, allowing cross-workspace file injection, storage abuse, and data loss. The issue is fixed in version 1.4.0.

ServiceNext contains an insecure direct object reference (IDOR) in the /api/Usuario/GetUsuarios endpoint, which accepts a user-controlled numeric ID in the request body without verifying that the authenticated token belongs to the requested account (CWE-639). Any authenticated user can iterate the ID parameter to retrieve the full profile record of every other user, including passwords stored in cleartext (CWE-256), enabling account takeover and credential-stuffing attacks.

The Appointment Booking Plugin – LatePoint | Calendar & Scheduling for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 5.7.3 via the `booking[id]` and `cart[id]` parameters on the `steps__reload_booking_form_summary_panel` and `steps__start` public routes (reachable through wp_ajax_nopriv_latepoint_route_call). This is due to `OsStepsHelper::set_required_objects()` feeding raw request parameters into `set_booking_object()` and `set_cart_object()`, which call `OsModel::set_data()` and load an arbitrary booking or cart row by primary key with no ownership check — the ownership guard the vendor added for the earlier disclosure lives only inside `OsStepsHelper::load_step()` and does not cover the sibling routes or `cart[id]` at all. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to enumerate sequential booking / cart identifiers and read other customers' appointment details (service name, agent, date/time, duration, price breakdown, status) and other shoppers' pending checkout contents directly from the JSON responses.