Base de CVEs

A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability affects certain NETGEAR models allowing an authenticated admin user to make unauthorized modification to router software and functionality.

Tesseract is an open source OCR engine. Prior to 5.5.3, a crafted .traineddata LSTM model component loaded through Tesseract's deserializer can cause an unchecked signed integer multiplication in Convolve::DeSerialize in src/lstm/convolve.cpp to wrap the convolution output-channel count, undersizing the forward-pass output buffer while writes use the unwrapped element count and causing a heap out-of-bounds write during OCR recognition. This issue is fixed in version 5.5.3.

The USB device-side CDC NCM class control-to-host handler usbd_cdc_ncm_cth in subsys/usb/device_next/class/usbd_cdc_ncm.c builds a fixed-size response for the GET_NTB_PARAMETERS (28-byte struct ntb_parameters) and GET_NTB_INPUT_SIZE (8-byte struct ntb_input_size) class requests and copies the whole structure into the control DATA IN buffer with net_buf_add_mem(buf, ..., sizeof(...)), ignoring the host-supplied wLength. The control DATA IN buffer is allocated by the USB stack with a capacity of exactly wLength bytes (usbd_ep_ctrl_data_in_alloc -> udc_ctrl_data_alloc -> net_buf_alloc_len(&udc_ep_pool, wLength); no round-up is applied for the IN endpoint). Because net_buf_add_mem/net_buf_simple_add only bounds the copy with an __ASSERT_NO_MSG, which is compiled out in production builds, a host that issues one of these standard CDC NCM control requests with a wLength smaller than the response structure (e.g. wLength = 1) causes the handler to memcpy up to 27 bytes past the end of the allocated pool buffer. The request fields come straight from the USB SETUP packet, so any host (or USB interposer) the Zephyr device enumerates against can trigger the overflow with no authentication once an image built with the device_next USB stack and the CDC NCM class is connected. The out-of-bounds write corrupts adjacent allocations and metadata in the shared udc_ep_pool, primarily causing memory corruption and denial of service of the USB stack; the overflow length is bounded (<= 27 bytes) and the written content is fixed device constants, and the bug reads nothing back so there is no information disclosure. The fix clamps the copy with MIN(sizeof(...), setup->wLength), matching the existing CDC ACM handler.

Opening a crafted DICOM file containing malicious JPEG-compressed pixel data triggers an attacker-controlled heap out-of-bounds write, which may allow an attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code.