Base de CVEs

A vulnerability has been identified in Simcenter Femap (All versions < V2512), Simcenter Nastran (All versions < V2512). The affected applications contains an out of bounds write vulnerability while parsing specially crafted XDB files. This could allow an attacker to execute code in the context of the current process.

iccDEV provides a set of libraries and tools that allow for the interaction, manipulation, and application of ICC color management profiles. Prior to 2.3.1.4, SrcPixel and DestPixel stack buffers overlap in CIccTagMultiProcessElement::Apply() int IccTagMPE.cpp. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.3.1.4.

A security vulnerability has been detected in happyfish100 libfastcommon up to 1.0.84. Affected by this vulnerability is the function base64_decode of the file src/base64.c. The manipulation leads to stack-based buffer overflow. Local access is required to approach this attack. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The identifier of the patch is 82f66af3e252e3e137dba0c3891570f085e79adf. Applying a patch is the recommended action to fix this issue.

UltraVNC Launcher 1.2.4.0 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the Repeater Host configuration field that allows attackers to crash the application. Attackers can paste an overly long string of 300 characters into the Repeater Host property to trigger an application crash.

A security flaw has been discovered in Open5GS up to 2.7.6. Affected by this vulnerability is the function hss_ogs_diam_cx_mar_cb of the file src/hss/hss-cx-path.c of the component VoLTE Cx-Test. The manipulation of the argument OGS_KEY_LEN results in stack-based buffer overflow. The attack may be launched remotely. The patch is identified as 54dda041211098730221d0ae20a2f9f9173e7a21. A patch should be applied to remediate this issue.

A maliciously crafted GIF file, when parsed through Autodesk 3ds Max, can cause a Stack-Based Buffer Overflow vulnerability. A malicious actor can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current process.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: dac: ad3552r-hs: fix out-of-bound write in ad3552r_hs_write_data_source When simple_write_to_buffer() succeeds, it returns the number of bytes actually copied to the buffer. The code incorrectly uses 'count' as the index for null termination instead of the actual bytes copied. If count exceeds the buffer size, this leads to out-of-bounds write. Add a check for the count and use the return value as the index. The bug was validated using a demo module that mirrors the original code and was tested under QEMU. Pattern of the bug: - A fixed 64-byte stack buffer is filled using count. - If count > 64, the code still does buf[count] = '\0', causing an - out-of-bounds write on the stack. Steps for reproduce: - Opens the device node. - Writes 128 bytes of A to it. - This overflows the 64-byte stack buffer and KASAN reports the OOB. Found via static analysis. This is similar to the commit da9374819eb3 ("iio: backend: fix out-of-bound write")

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: scarlett2: Fix buffer overflow in config retrieval The scarlett2_usb_get_config() function has a logic error in the endianness conversion code that can cause buffer overflows when count > 1. The code checks `if (size == 2)` where `size` is the total buffer size in bytes, then loops `count` times treating each element as u16 (2 bytes). This causes the loop to access `count * 2` bytes when the buffer only has `size` bytes allocated. Fix by checking the element size (config_item->size) instead of the total buffer size. This ensures the endianness conversion matches the actual element type.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rsi: Fix memory corruption due to not set vif driver data size The struct ieee80211_vif contains trailing space for vif driver data, when struct ieee80211_vif is allocated, the total memory size that is allocated is sizeof(struct ieee80211_vif) + size of vif driver data. The size of vif driver data is set by each WiFi driver as needed. The RSI911x driver does not set vif driver data size, no trailing space for vif driver data is therefore allocated past struct ieee80211_vif . The RSI911x driver does however use the vif driver data to store its vif driver data structure "struct vif_priv". An access to vif->drv_priv leads to access out of struct ieee80211_vif bounds and corruption of some memory. In case of the failure observed locally, rsi_mac80211_add_interface() would write struct vif_priv *vif_info = (struct vif_priv *)vif->drv_priv; vif_info->vap_id = vap_idx. This write corrupts struct fq_tin member struct list_head new_flows . The flow = list_first_entry(head, struct fq_flow, flowchain); in fq_tin_reset() then reports non-NULL bogus address, which when accessed causes a crash. The trigger is very simple, boot the machine with init=/bin/sh , mount devtmpfs, sysfs, procfs, and then do "ip link set wlan0 up", "sleep 1", "ip link set wlan0 down" and the crash occurs. Fix this by setting the correct size of vif driver data, which is the size of "struct vif_priv", so that memory is allocated and the driver can store its driver data in it, instead of corrupting memory around it.

A maliciously crafted RGB file, when parsed through Autodesk 3ds Max, can force a Memory Corruption vulnerability. A malicious actor can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current process.

A maliciously crafted USD file, when loaded or imported into Autodesk Arnold or Autodesk 3ds Max, can force an Out-of-Bounds Write vulnerability. A malicious actor can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current process.