Base de CVEs

In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.19422 doS attack was possible via crafted PSD attachments

urllib3 is an HTTP client library for Python. From 2.6.2 until 2.8.0, HTTPResponse.stream and HTTPResponse.read_chunked can enter an infinite loop because the Deflate decoder retains trailing bytes as unconsumed input after reaching end-of-stream and repeatedly decodes them without progress. The issue occurs when an untrusted server sends a chunked Deflate response whose decoded body exceeds a positive finite chunk size and whose encoded body has trailing bytes, specifically a response with Transfer-Encoding: chunked and Content-Encoding: deflate, content decoding enabled, and the positive finite amt=N streaming chunk size. The attack mechanism is that a malicious server returns a compressed chunked response with trailing bytes after the Deflate stream. The impact is excessive CPU usage and a request that does not complete, and network read timeouts do not interrupt the loop because no further socket read occurs. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.0.

TIFF protocol dissector infinite loop in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service

TTL file parser infinite loop in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 allows denial of service

AsyncSSH is a Python package which provides an asynchronous client and server implementation of the SSHv2 protocol on top of the Python asyncio framework. Prior to 2.24.0, _process_channel_open and _process_channel_open_confirmation in asyncssh/connection.py accept a peer-supplied send_pktsize value of zero. When channel data reaches SSHChannel._flush_send_buf in asyncssh/channel.py, the zero value causes each loop iteration to slice and remove zero bytes without reducing the send window, leaving the synchronous loop permanently true with no await point. A malicious SSH server can trigger the client path through SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION before the first channel write, while an authenticated client can trigger the server path through SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN and freeze every current and future connection handled by the process. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.24.0.

FreeRDP versions before 3.31.0 contain an infinite-loop denial of service in the pool_decode_rect function when decoding AVC444 metablocks with more region rectangles than preallocated worker array size. A malicious RDP server can send crafted AVC444 graphics updates causing the threaded decode path to loop indefinitely, consuming CPU and preventing normal client operation.

Converting crafted EUC_JISX0213 input to UCS-4 or the internal wide character encoding, for example with iconv, in the GNU C Library version 2.3 to 2.44 may result in the converter making no progress, causing the calling application to hang. Some EUC_JISX0213 sequences decode to two code points. If the output buffer has room for only the first one, the converter stores the second in the conversion state and returns E2BIG, but it never clears that pending character after emitting it on the next call. The converter then keeps emitting the pending character without consuming further input, so an application that retries the conversion loops forever. The input must be attacker controlled and the application must convert it with an output buffer small enough to split the two code points. Only the EUC_JISX0213 character set is affected, which is not commonly used. The related defect in SHIFT_JISX0213 converter is tracked separately as CVE-2026-77117.

Converting crafted SHIFT_JISX0213 input to UCS-4 or the internal wide character encoding, for example with iconv, in the GNU C Library version 2.3 to 2.44 may result in the converter making no progress, causing the calling application to hang. Some SHIFT_JISX0213 sequences decode to two code points. If the output buffer has room for only the first one, the converter stores the second in the conversion state and returns E2BIG, but it never clears that pending character after emitting it on the next call. The converter then keeps emitting the pending character without consuming further input, so an application that retries the conversion loops forever. The input must be attacker controlled and the application must convert it with an output buffer small enough to split the two code points. Only the SHIFT_JISX0213 character set is affected, which is not commonly used. The related defect in the EUC_JISX0213 converter is tracked separately as CVE-2026-80489.

The Zephyr SDIO subsystem function sdio_io_rw_extended_helper() in subsys/sd/sdio.c finishes transfers with a byte-I/O loop that uses size = MIN(remaining, func->cis.max_blk_size) as the per-iteration step. The value func->cis.max_blk_size is decoded directly from the SDIO card's CIS FUNCE tuple in sdio_decode_cis() and is not validated. When a card reports a maximum block size of zero, size is always 0, remaining never decreases, and the loop spins forever. The loop is reached from the public SDIO client API used by drivers, including sdio_read_fifo(), sdio_write_fifo(), and the incrementing register read/write helpers, each of which enters the loop while holding the per-card mutex func->card->lock. A card advertising max_blk_size == 0 therefore hangs the calling thread permanently on its first non-block-aligned transfer and never releases the mutex, denying service to the SDIO peripheral (and any subsystem such as Wi-Fi that depends on it) until the device is reset. The malicious value must come from the SDIO card itself, so the defect is exploitable where a removable SDIO/combo card slot lets an attacker insert a crafted or malfunctioning card (a physical attack vector); on boards with a soldered SDIO peripheral it is not attacker-influenceable. There is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity impact — only a permanent availability loss. The fix returns -EIO when func->cis.max_blk_size is zero, before the loop is entered.

strongSwan 4.6.2 through 6.0.7 has an infinite loop in PKCS#5 decryption.