Base de CVEs

The WP Travel Engine – Tour Booking Plugin – Tour Operator Software plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 6.8.4. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to view private booking billing details — including the victim customer's first name, last name, email address, street address, city, and phone number — rendered as default values in checkout form fields by binding an arbitrary booking ID to the attacker's session. The only access control on the endpoint is a frontend nonce that is publicly emitted to all visitors via the wteL10n global on trip pages, meaning it provides CSRF protection only and does not restrict unauthenticated access.

The Extra Product Options Builder for WooCommerce WordPress plugin before 1.2.176 does not verify that the requester is entitled to a customer-uploaded file before serving it, allowing unauthenticated users who obtain a file's stored name to retrieve it. The Extra Product Options Builder for WooCommerce WordPress plugin before 1.2.176 writes a deny-all rule into its upload directories, so the disclosure only crosses a boundary on web servers that honour it, such as Apache. Where it is ignored, as on a default nginx setup, the same files are already served at their direct URL and the endpoint exposes nothing further.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: sit: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink ipip6_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net. Gate ipip6_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top, before any attribute is parsed. sit was the one tunnel type not covered by the recent series that added this check to the other changelink() handlers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ip6_vti: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink vti6_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net. Gate vti6_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top, before any attribute is parsed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ip_vti: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink vti_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net. Gate vti_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top, before any attribute is parsed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ipip: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink ipip_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net. Gate ipip_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top, before any attribute is parsed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ip6_gre: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink ip6gre_changelink() and ip6erspan_changelink() operate on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net. Gate both ops on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at their top, before any attribute is parsed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ip6_tunnel: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink ip6_tnl_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net. Gate ip6_tnl_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top, before any attribute is parsed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ieee802154: admin-gate legacy LLSEC dump operations In net/ieee802154/netlink.c, the legacy IEEE802154_NL family ops table builds the LLSEC dump entries (LLSEC_LIST_KEY, LLSEC_LIST_DEV, LLSEC_LIST_DEVKEY, LLSEC_LIST_SECLEVEL) with IEEE802154_DUMP() which sets no .flags, so generic netlink runs them ungated. The modern nl802154 family admin-gates the equivalent reads via NL802154_CMD_GET_SEC_KEY and friends with .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM. Any local uid that can open AF_NETLINK / NETLINK_GENERIC can resolve the "802.15.4 MAC" family and dump LLSEC_LIST_KEY on any wpan netdev that has an LLSEC key installed; the dump handler writes the raw 16-byte AES-128 key bytes (IEEE802154_ATTR_LLSEC_KEY_BYTES, copied verbatim from struct ieee802154_llsec_key.key) into the reply. Recovering the AES key compromises 802.15.4 LLSEC link confidentiality and authenticity, since LLSEC uses CCM* and the same key authenticates and encrypts frames. Impact: any local uid with no capabilities can read the raw 16-byte AES-128 LLSEC key from the kernel keytable on any wpan netdev that has an administrator-installed LLSEC key, by issuing an LLSEC_LIST_KEY dump on the legacy IEEE802154_NL generic-netlink family. Introduce IEEE802154_DUMP_PRIV() mirroring IEEE802154_DUMP() but setting .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, and use it for the four LLSEC dump entries. LIST_PHY and LIST_IFACE retain IEEE802154_DUMP() because the modern nl802154 family exposes their equivalents to unprivileged readers by design (NL802154_CMD_GET_WPAN_PHY and NL802154_CMD_GET_INTERFACE carry "can be retrieved by unprivileged users" annotations).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-af: cn10k: restrict VF LMTLINE sharing to its own PF rvu_mbox_handler_lmtst_tbl_setup() uses req->base_pcifunc as a direct index into the LMT map table to read another function's LMTLINE physical base address and copy it into the caller's own LMT map table entry. The mailbox dispatcher authenticates req->hdr.pcifunc from the IRQ source, but req->base_pcifunc is a separate payload field and is not sanitized. Reject the request with -EPERM when a VF caller's base_pcifunc is not a valid function under its own PF. is_pf_func_valid() bounds the FUNC field to the PF's configured VF count, keeping the computed index inside the caller's own slot block.

The getgrav/grav-plugin-api plugin before 1.0.13 contains an API-key scope cap bypass in the POST /reports/twig-content/allowlist endpoint (ReportsController). The endpoint enforces requirePermission('api.config.write') followed by a bare isSuperAdmin() check instead of requireSuper(). Because isSuperAdmin() reads access.api.super directly and never consults api_key_scopes, a least-privilege API key scoped to api.config.write minted on a super account passes the gate, allowing an attacker to append attacker-chosen tokens to the security.twig_sandbox allowlist (persisted to user/config/security.yaml). Widening the allowlist turns any subsequent Twig-in-content render into an SSTI/RCE sink.

The Grav API plugin (getgrav/grav-plugin-api) before 1.0.13 contains an API key scope-cap bypass in PagesController::guardTwigContent(). The Twig-toggle check uses a bare isSuperAdmin() gate that does not consult api_key_scopes, so a least-privilege API key scoped only to api.pages.write and minted on a super account can enable process.twig on a page save even though admin.pages_twig is intentionally outside the api.pages scope. When security.twig_content.process_enabled=true and editor_enabled=false, this allows Twig-in-content to execute server-side, resulting in server-side template injection (SSTI) and remote code execution.

SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 contain a publish-boundary bypass vulnerability in WebSocket broadcast sessions that allows anonymous readers to receive unfiltered edits. Attackers can establish a WebSocket connection to the publish surface and passively receive real-time content events including password-protected and forbidden documents without authentication.

Kibana Agent Builder does not correctly verify that the requesting user holds the privileges required by a separate Kibana feature before it creates and runs a tool that invokes that feature's functionality. This allows privilege escalation and could lead to disclosure of sensitive information that the user is not authorized to read.

Missing Authorization (CWE-862) in Kibana can lead to cross-space information disclosure and unauthorized data modification via Privilege Abuse (CAPEC-122). Kibana Machine Learning carries out its Elasticsearch operations with elevated internal permissions and relies on a per-request space filter to keep the machine learning data of one space separated from another. Part of the Machine Learning functionality did not apply that filter, so operations issued from one space were carried out against the machine learning data of every space in the deployment.