Vulnerabilidades do Aehrc Pathling

Pathling is a set of tools that make it easier to use FHIR and clinical terminology within health data analytics. Prior to version 2.0.0 of Pathling Server, the `$import-pnp` operation in Pathling Server accepts a caller-supplied `exportUrl` and uses it as the remote FHIR Bulk Export endpoint without constraining it to a trusted source. When PNP credentials are configured, Pathling builds a credentialed bulk-export client targeting the caller-chosen host, downloads manifest-selected files, and then reclassifies those staged files as trusted local `file://` imports - bypassing the configured `allowableSources` allowlist that protects the ordinary `$import` operation. This is fixed in Pathling Server 2.0.0. As a workaround, disable the `$import-pnp` operation (`pathling.operations.importPnpEnabled=false`) or do not configure PNP credentials.

Pathling is a set of tools that make it easier to use FHIR and clinical terminology within health data analytics. Prior to version 2.0.0 of Pathling Server, Pathling's typed CRUD/search/batch FHIR surface allows an authenticated caller with only coarse operation authorities to act on attacker-chosen resource families because those entrypoints do not consistently enforce the documented per-resource `read` and `write` authorities. The documented authorization model requires an operation authority (e.g. `pathling:search`) to be paired with the matching per-resource `read` or `write` authority (e.g. `pathling:read:Patient`). Delete and batch are documented to require write authority for all referenced resource types. However, typed search, update, and related handlers are annotated only with `@OperationAccess(...)` and act on the provider-selected resource type without checking the corresponding per-resource authority. This is fixed in Pathling Server 2.0.0.

Pathling is a set of tools that make it easier to use FHIR and clinical terminology within health data analytics. Prior to version 2.0.0 of Pathling Server, Pathling's typed CRUD/search/batch FHIR surface allows an authenticated caller with only coarse operation authorities to act on attacker-chosen resource families because those entrypoints do not consistently enforce the documented per-resource `read` and `write` authorities. The documented authorization model requires an operation authority (e.g. `pathling:search`) to be paired with the matching per-resource `read` or `write` authority (e.g. `pathling:read:Patient`). Delete and batch are documented to require write authority for all referenced resource types. However, typed search, update, and related handlers are annotated only with `@OperationAccess(...)` and act on the provider-selected resource type without checking the corresponding per-resource authority. This is fixed in Pathling Server 2.0.0.

Pathling is a set of tools that make it easier to use FHIR and clinical terminology within health data analytics. Prior to version 2.0.0 of Pathling Server, Pathling's `/$result` endpoint allows a caller who can obtain any valid async export job ID to supply `file` parameter values containing path traversal sequences. The handler verifies only the supplied `job` and never normalises or confines the requested `file` path to that job's `jobs/<jobId>` directory before opening it as a filesystem resource. Because async export scratch space lives under the same warehouse database root as persisted resource tables, an attacker can use their own export job to read other files from the warehouse. This is fixed in Pathling Server 2.0.0. As an interim mitigation, disable the async export operations (`pathling.operations.exportEnabled`, `patientExportEnabled`, `groupExportEnabled`, `bulkSubmitEnabled`) or enable authentication and restrict export capability to trusted callers.

Pathling is a set of tools that make it easier to use FHIR and clinical terminology within health data analytics. Prior to version 2.0.0 of Pathling Server, Pathling's `/$result` endpoint allows a caller who can obtain any valid async export job ID to supply `file` parameter values containing path traversal sequences. The handler verifies only the supplied `job` and never normalises or confines the requested `file` path to that job's `jobs/<jobId>` directory before opening it as a filesystem resource. Because async export scratch space lives under the same warehouse database root as persisted resource tables, an attacker can use their own export job to read other files from the warehouse. This is fixed in Pathling Server 2.0.0. The `$result` handler now resolves and canonicalizes the requested file path and rejects any request that escapes the job's `jobs/<jobId>` directory. As an interim mitigation, disable the async export operations (`pathling.operations.exportEnabled`, `patientExportEnabled`, `groupExportEnabled`, `bulkSubmitEnabled`) or enable authentication and restrict export capability to trusted callers.