Vulnerabilidades do Code16 Sharp

code16 Sharp is a Laravel-based framework for building content-management and administrative interfaces. Versions before 9.22.5 contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in `SharpEditorFormField`: attacker-controlled content bearing the `data-html-content` attribute can bypass HTML sanitization and preserve executable markup, which may execute when another user views the stored content. The vendor identifies version 9.22.5 as patched; applications that intentionally enable `SharpFormEditorField::RAW_HTML` must continue to sanitize editor content themselves. As a workaround, applications should sanitize all editor content before storing or rendering it, for example with Symfony HtmlSanitizer, and disable RAW_HTML functionality where it is not required.

code16 Sharp is a Laravel-based framework for building content-management and administrative interfaces. Versions before 9.22.5 contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the rich-text editor because the HTML sanitizer permits the `srcdoc` attribute on iframe elements. Although markup inside `srcdoc` is HTML-encoded during sanitization, browsers decode attribute entities before interpreting the iframe document, allowing an authenticated user with permission to edit an Editor field to store executable JavaScript that runs when another user views the content. Successful exploitation can result in session hijacking, unauthorized actions, account takeover, privilege escalation, or disclosure of administrative data. Version 9.22.5 patches the vulnerability by removing `srcdoc` from the permitted iframe attributes. As a workaround, applications that cannot upgrade should manually sanitize all Editor field content and remove every iframe `srcdoc` attribute before storing or rendering it.

Sharp is a content management framework built for Laravel as a package. Prior to version 9.22.0, Sharp exposes a generic download endpoint that authorizes access only to the supplied Sharp entity instance, but then reads the target storage disk and path from request parameters. Because the requested storage object is not bound to the authorized entity instance, an authenticated Sharp user who can view one valid record may use that record as an authorization anchor to download unrelated disk-relative objects from configured Laravel Storage disks. The confirmed impact is authenticated disclosure of unrelated objects from configured Laravel Storage disks. This issue does not imply arbitrary host filesystem access outside configured Laravel Storage disk roots. This issue has been patched in version 9.22.0.

Sharp is a content management framework built for Laravel as a package. Versions prior to 9.20.0 contain a vulnerability in the file upload endpoint that allows authenticated users to bypass all file type restrictions. The upload endpoint within the `ApiFormUploadController` accepts a client-controlled `validation_rule` parameter. This parameter is directly passed into the Laravel validator without sufficient server-side enforcement. By intercepting the request and sending `validation_rule[]=file`, an attacker can completely bypass all MIME type and file extension restrictions. This issue has been addressed in version 9.20.0 by removing the client-controlled validation rules and strictly defining upload rules server-side. As a workaround, ensure that the storage disk used for Sharp uploads is strictly private. Under default configurations, an attacker cannot directly execute uploaded PHP files unless a public disk configuration is explicitly used.

Sharp is a content management framework built for Laravel as a package. Versions prior to 9.20.0 have a path traversal vulnerability in the FileUtil class. The application fails to sanitize file extensions properly, allowing path separators to be passed into the storage layer. In `src/Utils/FileUtil.php`, the `FileUtil::explodeExtension()` function extracts a file's extension by splitting the filename at the last dot. This issue has been patched in version 9.20.0 by properly sanitizing the extension using `pathinfo(PATHINFO_EXTENSION)` instead of `strrpos()`, alongside applying strict regex replacements to both the base name and the extension.