Vulnerabilidades do Codename065 Premium Packages – Sell Digital Products Securely

The Premium Packages – Sell Digital Products Securely plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'note' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 7.2.8 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. The exploit bypasses tag-based filtering because the payload is stored as a hex-escaped sequence (e.g., \x3cimg onerror=...\x3e) that sanitize_textarea_field does not strip, and is only decoded back into a live HTML tag by stripcslashes() during admin rendering — after all sanitization has occurred.

The Premium Packages – Sell Digital Products Securely plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'checkout[billing][phone] (and state / taxid / email)' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 7.2.6 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.

The Premium Packages – Sell Digital Products Securely plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to generic SQL Injection via the 'orderby' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 7.0.4 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with admin-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.

The Premium Packages – Sell Digital Products Securely plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 7.0.4 via the `wpdmppdl` parameter. This is due to the `download()` function — hooked to the unauthenticated WordPress `wp` action — decoding the attacker-controlled `wpdmppdl` parameter using only `base64_decode()` and `json_decode()` with no HMAC, cryptographic signature, or nonce verification, and then issuing WordPress authentication cookies after a domain check that is trivially bypassed because both sides of the comparison are attacker-supplied values. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to authenticate as any non-administrator WordPress user, including subscribers, customers, contributors, authors, editors, and shop managers, who owns an order, gaining full session-level access to that account.