Vulnerabilidades do Eclipse Foundation NetX Duo

The NetX Secure DTLS server sends a HelloVerifyRequest carrying a freshly generated cookie, but never checks the cookie a client returns. The ClientHello parser copies the client's cookie bytes over the value the server issued, and the server then decides whether the client has been verified from the cookie's length alone. A peer that puts any single cookie byte in its first ClientHello skips the verification exchange entirely, so the server has no return-routability check and completes handshakes for forged source addresses.

`_nx_secure_x509_parse_signature_data` computes the certificate signature's length as `tlv_length - 1` without first checking that `tlv_length` is non-zero. A certificate whose signature is an empty ASN.1 BIT STRING therefore parses successfully and leaves the certificate holding a signature length of `0xFFFFFFFF` and a signature pointer one byte past the end of the buffer. Certificates are parsed from the peer during the TLS handshake, so the input is remote and unauthenticated.

In NextX Duo before 6.4.4, in the HTTP client module, the network support code for Eclipse Foundation ThreadX, the parsing of HTTP header fields was missing bounds verification. A crafted server response could cause undefined behavior.

In NetX Duo before 6.4.4, the networking support module for Eclipse Foundation ThreadX, there was a potential out of bound read issue in _nx_icmpv6_validate_options() when handling a packet with ICMP6 options.