Vulnerabilidades do Flytohub Flyto-core

Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.3, validate_url_ssrf and is_private_ip in src/core/utils.py compare resolved addresses only against native private IPv4 and IPv6 ranges and do not unwrap IPv4-mapped, IPv4-compatible, 6to4, or NAT64 transition addresses. An authenticated workflow author can provide a transition-form literal URL through the Execution API POST /v1/execute route, http.get, or sibling guarded outbound-request modules, causing the guard to accept an address whose embedded IPv4 points to loopback, RFC 1918, or cloud metadata services. On a host that routes the selected transition form, the outbound request reaches the internal destination and returns the response body to the workflow caller, enabling read SSRF and disclosure of internal-service data or cloud credentials. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.3.

Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. From 2.26.2 until 2.26.4, the HTTP MCP POST /mcp route accepts unauthenticated JSON-RPC tools/call requests and forwards execute_module arguments to the module registry without the require_auth dependency used by the REST execution routes. An unauthenticated caller can select sandbox.execute_shell and supply its command parameter, which reaches asyncio.create_subprocess_shell with the privileges of the flyto-core server process. The endpoint is reachable locally under the default loopback binding and becomes network reachable when an operator binds the server to a non-loopback interface, allowing arbitrary OS command execution and potential full host compromise. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.4.

Flyto2 Core before 2.28.0 contains a server-side request forgery guard bypass vulnerability that allows attackers to reach internal services by supplying URLs using the unblocked IPv6 address `::` which the kernel routes to loopback identically to `0.0.0.0`. Attackers can submit requests or trigger 302 redirects to ` to bypass the private IP range and blocked hostname checks in `is_private_ip()`, reaching services bound to IPv6 loopback across the `http.get`, `http.request`, and `http.batch` modules.

Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.7, HTTP-emitting modules including src/core/modules/third_party/developer/http/requests.py, core.api.http_get, core.api.http_post, graphql.query, graphql.mutation, monitor.http_check, communication.slack_send, notification.discord.send_message, notification.slack.send_message, notification.teams.send_message, ai.vision_analyze, verify.visual_diff, browser.proxy_rotate, and the agent and llm inline base_url branch fetch caller-controlled URLs without validate_url_with_env_config, allowing SSRF to internal or metadata endpoints. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.7.

Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.6, the workflow engine variable resolver expands ${env.VAR} for any host environment variable without an allowlist or capability policy check, allowing a workflow parameter to bypass the default capability policy denylist for env.get and env.load_dotenv and exfiltrate secrets through allowed modules. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.6.

Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.6, llm.chat reads provider keys such as OPENAI_API_KEY and ANTHROPIC_API_KEY from the environment and sends them in the Authorization: Bearer header to caller-controlled base_url, allowing an attacker to receive the operator's key on a public host that passes the SSRF guard. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.6.