Vulnerabilidades do Paoltaia GeoDirectory – WP Business Directory Plugin and Classified Listings Directory

The GeoDirectory – WP Business Directory Plugin and Classified Listings Directory plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 2.8.187 via the 'design_type' parameter parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to include and execute arbitrary .php files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where .php file types can be uploaded and included. The required nonce is trivially obtainable by any anonymous visitor, as the geodir_basic_nonce value is localized to every public frontend page via the geodir_params script object, meaning no authentication, user interaction, or specific site content is required to exploit this vulnerability.

The GeoDirectory plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the stored latitude/longitude coordinates of a listing in versions up to, and including, 2.8.186. This is due to insufficient escaping and the absence of numeric validation on coordinate values when a listing is saved, combined with the direct string interpolation of those values into a distance sub-expression in geodir_gps_query_part() that is later executed by the public wp_ajax_nopriv_geodir_widget_listings handler when a caller supplies set_post=<pending-listing-id> and sort_by=distance_asc. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.

The GeoDirectory – WP Business Directory Plugin and Classified Listings Directory plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the delete_revision function in all versions up to, and including, 2.8.169. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php). By placing post_type=attachment exclusively in the query string to bypass the consistency check, an attacker can convert an auto-draft GeoDirectory listing into a WordPress attachment with attacker-controlled file paths injected into attachment metadata, which the delete_revision handler then dereferences and unlinks without any post-type or path validation.