Vulnerabilidades do Red Hat Build Of Keycloak

A flaw was found in the role-users endpoint of the keycloak-services library, which is the core component of the Keycloak identity and access management solution. The issue occurs because the system fails to check if an administrator has permission to view individual users when listing members of a role. This allows a restricted administrator to see private information, such as names and email addresses, for users they should not be able to access.

A flaw was found in the Keycloak Admin REST API, which is used to manage security realms and clients. The issue occurs when the system processes requests for rotated client secrets that are stored in a secure vault. Due to improper boundary enforcement, a delegated administrator with view-only permissions can retrieve the actual resolved secret instead of the vault placeholder, leading to the exposure of sensitive credentials.

A flaw was found in the default-groups REST endpoint and realm representation of Keycloak. This component is responsible for managing groups that are automatically assigned to new users within a realm. The issue allows a delegated administrator with realm-viewing permissions to see the names and identifiers of hidden default groups, even if they lack the specific permissions to view those groups. This can lead to the exposure of sensitive organizational structures or internal group names.

A flaw was found in the admin REST API of Keycloak, a solution for identity and access management. The issue occurs when a delegated administrator attempts to remove a child role from a composite role. Due to missing authorization checks, an attacker with limited administrative permissions can remove privileged roles they are not authorized to manage, leading to a loss of access for other users and administrators.

A flaw was found in the authentication configuration endpoint of the keycloak-services component, which is the core engine for Red Hat Build of Keycloak identity and access management. The issue occurs because the system fails to mask sensitive configuration values, such as reCAPTCHA secret keys, when they are requested by administrators with view-only permissions. This can lead to the exposure of third-party service credentials to unauthorized personnel or through administrative logs.

A flaw was found in the keycloak-services component of Keycloak. This issue is an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-9798, where brute-force protection checks were added to the Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication (CIBA) initiation handler but were omitted from the token redemption handler. This allows an attacker with valid client credentials to obtain access and refresh tokens for a user account that has been locked due to brute-force protection, provided the authentication request was started before the lockout occurred and was approved by the user.

Keycloak provides a mechanism called Client Policies to enforce security requirements on clients, such as requiring them to use signed JWTs for authentication. A flaw was discovered where this enforcement can be bypassed. An attacker with valid client credentials can provide a fake, unsigned assertion header that tricks the system into thinking the policy requirements have been met. This allows the attacker to authenticate using simpler methods like a client secret even when the administrator has mandated more secure, signed assertions.

A flaw was found in the keycloak-services component of Red Hat Build of Keycloak. The issue occurs because OAuth 2.0 authorization codes are not properly bound to the client that originally requested them. An attacker who can intercept an authorization code can modify it to be redeemed by their own client, potentially allowing them to obtain access tokens for a victim's identity.

A flaw was found in the organization management component of Keycloak. A delegated administrator with permission to manage organizations can create an invitation for a non-existent email address and then retrieve the secret registration link directly through the application programming interface. By using this link, the administrator can create new user accounts and add them to the organization without having the required user management permissions or access to the invited email account. This allows an administrator to bypass security boundaries and add unauthorized members to an organization.

A flaw was found in the Keycloak keycloak-services component, which handles the management of identity providers. The issue occurs when a delegated administrator updates an OIDC identity provider using a masked client secret sentinel value. Due to improper validation, Keycloak reuses the existing real secret even if security-sensitive fields like the token URL have been changed, allowing an attacker to redirect and capture the secret.

A flaw exists in the org.keycloak.broker.oidc package where the OIDC broker incorrectly synchronizes the email_verified claim. When an OIDC identity provider is configured with trustEmail=true and the userinfo endpoint is enabled, Keycloak retrieves the email address from the userinfo response but retrieves the email_verified status exclusively from the id_token. The root cause is a lack of validation ensuring that the email_verified claim in the id_token actually refers to the email address returned by the userinfo endpoint. If these two sources return different email addresses, the id_token's email_verified=true claim is blindly applied to the userinfo email. Exploitation Conditions: The OIDC identity provider must have trustEmail set to true (non-default). The userinfo endpoint must be enabled (default). The attacker must control or have compromised the upstream OIDC provider. Concrete Impact: Mark arbitrary email addresses as verified in the Keycloak database. Bypass email-based security controls or verification workflows. Potential account takeover if the application relies solely on the email_verified flag from the IdP to link accounts.

A flaw was found in the ClientResource component of Keycloak's admin services when Fine-Grained Admin Permissions (FGAP) v2 is enabled. This issue allows a delegated administrator, who should only have limited control over specific clients, to attach or remove hidden client scopes that they are not authorized to see or manage. As a result, an attacker could inject unauthorized data or permissions into the security tokens issued to end-users, potentially tricking other applications into granting higher levels of access than intended.

A vulnerability was discovered in Keycloak's administrative interface that allows certain administrators to see information about groups they shouldn't have access to. When the new Fine-Grained Admin Permissions (FGAP v2) are turned on, an administrator who is allowed to see a specific "role" can also see a list of all groups assigned to that role. The system fails to check if the administrator has permission to see those specific groups. This could allow a restricted administrator to discover "hidden" groups and see their details, such as internal names and custom settings, which might contain sensitive deployment information.

A flaw was found in Keycloak. A highly privileged user with `manage-clients` permission can exploit this vulnerability by injecting a hardcoded role mapper into any client. This action allows the user to bypass existing scope restrictions and inject the `realm-admin` role into generated tokens, resulting in privilege escalation and full administrative access to the realm.

A vulnerability was discovered in Keycloak's Admin UI extension that allows certain administrative users to bypass security restrictions. When Fine-Grained Admin Permissions (FGAPv2) are enabled, an administrator who should only be able to search for users (but not view their full details) can use a specific "brute-force-user" endpoint to access a user's full profile. This includes sensitive information and security metadata. The issue occurs because the system fails to check if the administrator has the required "view" permission for that specific user when using this particular search path.

A flaw was found in the Identity Provider (IdP) mapper component of Keycloak, which is used to manage how user information from external services is mapped to Keycloak users. An administrator with limited permissions to manage identity providers can exploit this flaw by creating a "Hardcoded Role" mapper that assigns high-level administrative roles (like realm-admin) to themselves or others. This allows a restricted administrator to bypass security checks and gain full control over the entire realm.

A flaw was found in org.keycloak.authorization. An authenticated user with a granted User-Managed Access (UMA) permission ticket for one resource can exploit this by using a specific permission request prefix to bypass per-resource access control. This allows the user to gain unauthorized access to all resources of that type within the same resource server, even if they do not have a ticket for those specific resources. This vulnerability requires the resource server to be configured in PERMISSIVE policy enforcement mode and affects typed resources with ownerManagedAccess enabled, where no explicit policy protects the resource type. The primary consequence is unauthorized information disclosure or modification of resources.

A flaw was found in Keycloak's client registration service. A remote attacker, possessing a previously issued Registration Access Token (RAT), could exploit this vulnerability to re-enable a client that an administrator had explicitly disabled. This bypasses security controls, allowing the attacker to reset the client's secret and potentially regain privileged API access. The primary impact includes unauthorized information disclosure and potential integrity compromise.