Vulnerabilidades do Sigstore Cosign
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CVEs publicadas que afetam Sigstore Cosign: 3 registro(s), com versões afetadas e correções.cpe:2.3:a:sigstore:cosign
CVE-2026-39395
Média · 5.3
CWE-754 07/04/2026
Cosign's verify-blob-attestation reports false positive when payload parsing fails
Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to 3.0.6 and 2.6.3, cosign verify-blob-attestation may erroneously report a "Verified OK" result for attestations with malformed payloads or mismatched predicate types. For old-format bundles and detached signatures, this was due to a logic flaw in the error handling of the predicate type validation. For new-format bundles, the predicate type validation was bypassed completely. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.0.6 and 2.6.3.
CVE-2026-24122
Baixa · 3.7
CWE-295 19/02/2026
Cosign Certificate Chain Expiry Validation Issue Allows Issuing Certificate Expiry to Be Overlooked
Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. In versions 3.0.4 and below, an issuing certificate with a validity that expires before the leaf certificate will be considered valid during verification even if the provided timestamp would mean the issuing certificate should be considered expired. When verifying artifact signatures using a certificate, Cosign first verifies the certificate chain using the leaf certificate's "not before" timestamp and later checks expiry of the leaf certificate using either a signed timestamp provided by the Rekor transparency log or from a timestamp authority, or using the current time. The root and all issuing certificates are assumed to be valid during the leaf certificate's validity. There is no impact to users of the public Sigstore infrastructure. This may affect private deployments with customized PKIs. This issue has been fixed in version 3.0.5.
CVE-2026-22703
Média · 5.5
CWE-345 10/01/2026
Cosign verification accepts any valid Rekor entry under certain conditions
Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4, Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event. This issue has been patched in versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4.