Vulnerabilidades do Wazuh Wazuh

Wazuh is an open-source security platform providing unified XDR and SIEM protection for endpoints and cloud workloads. From 3.8.0 until 4.14.7, the _getattributes() function in src/os_xml/os_xml.c recursively processes every XML attribute without a depth limit while allocating two large local buffers in each stack frame. An enrolled agent can submit a Windows EventChannel event containing an element with enough attributes to exhaust the analysisd worker-thread stack, trigger a segmentation fault, and interrupt log ingestion. The element-depth limit in _ReadElem() does not constrain the number of attributes on one element, so it does not prevent this condition. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.7.

Wazuh is an open-source security platform providing unified XDR and SIEM protection for endpoints and cloud workloads. In versions 4.14.0 through 4.14.6, a low-privilege API user can read the cleartext cluster key from a configuration endpoint that fails to redact it. The REST API provides a masking control, mask_sensitive_config, that redacts sensitive fields such as authd.pass and cluster.key from configuration responses for users who lack update-config permission, and every config-read endpoint carries this decorator except GET /cluster/local/config. That endpoint, backed by read_config_wrapper, is gated only by cluster:read and returns the local node's cluster configuration including the cleartext key, whereas its siblings return the same value masked. As a result, any account with the default readonly or cluster_readonly role, which is explicitly denied update-config precisely so it cannot view secrets, receives the real cluster key. Because the cluster key authenticates and encrypts traffic between cluster nodes, disclosing it to an unprivileged account provides the authentication precondition for the cluster-peer remote code execution chains established by prior advisories. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.

Wazuh is an open-source security platform providing unified XDR and SIEM protection for endpoints and cloud workloads. In versions 4.14.0 through 4.14.6, an authenticated low-privilege user can read the cluster secret from the manager configuration because the logic that masks sensitive values is disabled by any update-config RBAC rule, including an explicit deny. The mask_sensitive_config() decorator applies masking only when _has_update_permissions() returns false, but that gate treats a user as able to update the config whenever a  manager:update_config  or  cluster:update_config  rule exists, without ever checking whether the rule's effect is allow or deny. Because a deny rule is stored as a real entry, a read-only account that is hardened by explicitly denying config edits is counted as having update permission, which turns masking off. A single authenticated GET request to the configuration endpoint with  raw=true  then returns the verbatim ossec.conf XML with  cluster.key  in clear, whereas an otherwise identical account without the deny rule sees the value masked. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.7.

Wazuh is an open-source security platform providing unified XDR and SIEM protection for endpoints and cloud workloads. In versions 4.0.0 through 4.14.6, a malicious or man-in-the-middle enrollment manager can crash a Wazuh agent during enrollment by returning a malformed key response with fewer than four fields, causing a NULL pointer dereference. The  w_enrollment_process_agent_key()  routine splits the manager-provided key into four space-separated fields but does not verify that all fields are present before passing them to validators. Because OS_StrBreak() leaves missing trailing entries as NULL and OS_IsValidName() calls strlen() on its argument without a NULL check, a response such as  OSSEC K:'1'  reaches OS_IsValidName(NULL) and terminates the agent process. Since Wazuh permits enrollment against an unverified manager when no CA certificate is configured, an attacker operating a rogue manager or intercepting the enrollment flow can deterministically crash agents, resulting in denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.7.

Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. From 4.6.0 until 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta3, DB::getFile() and DB::searchFile() in src/syscheckd/src/db/src/file.cpp concatenate a monitored file path into SQLite row filters. On non-Windows systems, FIMDBCreator::encodeString() does not escape the value. A local user who can create a filename in a File Integrity Monitoring directory can inject a UNION SELECT expression when wazuh-syscheckd processes or deletes that path. The confirmed primitive manipulates SELECT result sets consumed by the FIM code; stacked statements and remote code execution were not demonstrated. This issue is fixed in versions 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta3.

Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. From 4.4.0 until 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta2, api/api/middlewares.py decodes the Basic authentication username before credential validation and passes it to the access logger without neutralizing control characters. api/api/alogging.py interpolates that value into the plain-text API log. An unauthenticated attacker can include carriage returns or line feeds in the username to forge entries, obscure activity, or poison systems that consume the plain-text audit log. The JSON log format is not affected because JSON serialization escapes these characters. This issue is fixed in versions 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta2.

Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. From 4.0.0 until 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta2, AuthenticationManager.check_user() in framework/wazuh/rbac/orm.py performs check_password_hash() only when the supplied username exists. A nonexistent username returns immediately, while a valid username causes an expensive bcrypt calculation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can compare authentication response times to enumerate valid Wazuh usernames and use that information in subsequent credential attacks. This issue is fixed in versions 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta2.

Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. From 1.0.0 until 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta2, HandleSecureMessage() in src/remoted/secure.c passes a pointer inside its stack buffer to ReadSecMSG(), and src/os_crypto/shared/msgs.c decompresses up to OS_MAXSTR bytes at that offset. For an encrypted agent message on TCP port 1514 that expands to 65,536 bytes, os_zlib_uncompress() writes a terminating null byte beyond the end of the destination buffer. The resulting stack out-of-bounds write in the root-level remoted daemon can crash message processing and disrupt agent communications. This issue is fixed in versions 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta2.

Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. From 3.9.0 until 4.14.5 and 5.0.0-beta2, the Wazuh cluster protocol in framework/wazuh/core/cluster/common.py allows an authenticated cluster node to exhaust memory on the master. The receive_str() method accepts an attacker-controlled total for InBuffer without a maximum, so a new_str command can request a multi-gigabyte bytearray and repeated requests accumulate in in_str. The divided-message path also retains flag_divided fragments under unique counters in div_msg_box without a count, aggregate-size, or expiration limit. Exploitation can disrupt agent connectivity and alert processing across the monitored environment. This issue is fixed in versions 4.14.5 and 5.0.0-beta2.

Wazuh 4.4.0 before 4.14.7 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the fdecompress_files() function within cluster.py that allows authenticated cluster peers to exhaust memory by supplying a malicious synchronization archive without decompressed size limits. Attackers holding a valid cluster Fernet key can upload a small, highly compressed zip bomb archive that forces wazuh-clusterd on the master node to decompress the full payload into memory, causing memory exhaustion and service disruption.

Wazuh 4.0.0 before 4.14.6 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows authenticated cluster peers to delete arbitrary directory contents by supplying a traversal-shaped node name in the cluster hello payload without validation. Attackers holding a valid cluster Fernet key can craft a malicious node name and disconnect, triggering the master's peer cleanup routine to remove the contents of arbitrary directories within the Wazuh installation path writable by the wazuh user.

Wazuh 4.0.0 before 4.14.7 and 5.0.0-beta2 contain a denial of service vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers with allow_run_as enabled to exhaust CPU resources by submitting arbitrarily deeply nested JSON structures to the POST /security/user/authenticate/run_as endpoint. Attackers can repeatedly submit malformed auth_context bodies with unlimited nesting depth to cause the API framework to consume excessive CPU, denying service to all other API consumers.