Vulnerabilidades do Wpchill Modula Image Gallery – Photo Grid & Video Gallery

The Modula Image Gallery – Photo Grid & Video Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 3.0.11 via the 'id (post ID in /wp-json/wp/v2/modula-gallery/{id}) or none for collection route' parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to extract the plaintext Password Protect password and username for every published gallery from the modulaSettings REST field. The plugin's own /wp-json/modula/v2/gallery/{id}/settings endpoint correctly redacts the password for unauthenticated callers via redact_settings_for_public(), but no equivalent redaction is applied on the core /wp-json/wp/v2/modula-gallery path exposed by show_in_rest=true CPT registration.

The Modula Image Gallery – Photo Grid & Video Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the upload_image function in all versions up to, and including, 3.0.2. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with author-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server. The path restriction to wp-content/uploads is not an effective ownership boundary, as all user attachment files reside within that tree, and Authors trivially satisfy the edit_post check on their own galleries.

The Modula Image Gallery – Photo Grid & Video Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure of private gallery contents in versions up to, and including, 3.0.1. This is due to the Modula_Meta::add_metas() function being hooked to wp_head on every frontend request and looking up any post via get_post( $_GET['modula_gallery_id'] ) without verifying the gallery's post_status or the requester's capability to read it — the gallery-side input guard is bugged (empty('modula_gallery_id') tests a nonempty string literal instead of the GET parameter, so it is always false), the only object validation is a post_type === 'modula-gallery' check, and no is_user_logged_in()/current_user_can('read_post', $gallery_id) check is performed. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to enumerate private modula-gallery posts and their member attachments and recover the image's title, description, dimensions, and original upload URL via Open Graph/Twitter meta tags emitted in the response, which then allows direct unauthenticated download of the original private image bytes.