Vulnerabilidades de Azuracast

AzuraCast before 0.23.4 contains a code injection vulnerability in the ConfigWriter::cleanUpString() method that fails to sanitize Liquidsoap string interpolation sequences, allowing authenticated users with Media or Profile permissions to inject arbitrary Liquidsoap code into station configuration. Attackers can inject #{process.run()} expressions into playlist URLs or station metadata fields that execute shell commands as the azuracast user when the station restarts.

AzuraCast before 0.23.6 contains a code injection vulnerability in the remote relay password field due to incomplete migration from the vulnerable cleanUpString method to toRawString. Attackers with RemoteRelays station permission can inject nested Liquidsoap interpolation syntax to execute arbitrary code in the Liquidsoap process, disclose internal API keys, or disrupt station operation.

AzuraCast exposes the Liquidsoap custom configuration fields through an endpoint that does not require the permission guarding them. The backend_config property in backend/src/Entity/Station.php is annotated with GROUP_GENERAL, and PUT /api/station/{station_id}/profile/edit in backend/src/Controller/Api/Stations/ProfileEditController.php deserializes with that group while requiring only StationPermissions::Profile. AbstractArrayEntity::fromArray() then assigns every public property with no field-level permission check, so custom_config_top, custom_config, custom_config_pre_playlists, custom_config_pre_live, custom_config_pre_fade and custom_config_bottom are writable through it. ConfigWriter::writeCustomConfigurationSection() emits those values verbatim into the generated Liquidsoap .liq script, where the process.run() and process.exec() built-ins execute operating system commands when the backend restarts, which the built-in sync task triggers automatically once needs_restart is set. The dedicated endpoint for the same data, PUT /api/station/{id}/liquidsoap-config, requires StationPermissions::Broadcasting, so a station manager holding only the profile permission reaches configuration that the intended boundary reserves for broadcasting operators.

AzuraCast is a self-hosted, all-in-one web radio management suite. Prior to version 0.23.6, the ApplyXForwarded middleware unconditionally trusts the client-supplied X-Forwarded-Host HTTP header with no trusted proxy allowlist. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the password reset URL sent to any user by injecting this header when triggering the forgot-password flow. When the victim clicks the poisoned link, their reset token is exfiltrated to the attacker's server. The attacker then uses the token on the real instance to reset the victim's password and destroy their 2FA configuration, achieving full account takeover. This issue has been patched in version 0.23.6.

AzuraCast is a self-hosted, all-in-one web radio management suite. Prior to version 0.23.6, the currentDirectory request parameter in the Flow.js media upload endpoint (POST /api/station/{station_id}/files/upload) is not sanitized for path traversal sequences. When combined with a local filesystem storage backend (the default), an authenticated user with media management permissions can write arbitrary files outside the station's media storage directory, achieving remote code execution by writing a PHP webshell to the web root. This issue has been patched in version 0.23.6.