Vulnerabilidades de Bitnami
CVEs publicadas que afetam produtos de Bitnami: 3 registro(s), com severidade, exploração e correções.
CVE-2026-47847
Média · 5.3
CWE-798 18/06/2026
Use of Hard-coded Credentials em Bitnami Bitnami/mariadb-galera
Bitnami MariaDB Galera container images and Helm chart are affected by a hardcoded default credential vulnerability in the Galera replication health-check user. The MARIADB_REPLICATION_USER and MARIADB_REPLICATION_PASSWORD environment variables defaulted to monitor and monitor respectively. This user is granted REPLICATION CLIENT privileges from any host ('%'). The Bitnami Helm chart for MariaDB Galera did not expose parameters to configure this user's credentials, resulting in all chart deployments using this publicly known credential by default.
Affected versions — Container image: 10.6.x prior to 10.6.27-photon-5-r0; 10.11.x prior to 10.11.17-photon-5-r1; 11.4.x prior to 11.4.12-photon-5-r0; 11.8.x prior to 11.8.7-photon-5-r1; 12.3.x prior to 12.3.2-photon-5-r0 / 12.3.2-debian-12-r0. Helm chart: prior to 18.3.0.
CVE-2026-47846
Crítica · 9.8
CWE-798 18/06/2026
Imagens de contêiner Bitnami Cassandra mantêm superusuário padrão ativo
As imagens de contêiner Bitnami Cassandra são afetadas por uma vulnerabilidade de retenção do superusuário padrão. Quando uma conta de administrador personalizada é configurada por meio da variável de ambiente CASSANDRA_USER, o script de inicialização do contêiner cria a nova conta de superusuário, mas falha em remover a conta embutida cassandra em determinados cenários. Isso deixa o superusuário padrão cassandra:cassandra ativo como um caminho de acesso não intencional.
Versões afetadas — Imagem de contêiner: 4.0.x anteriores a 4.0.20-photon-5-r7; 4.1.x anteriores a 4.1.11-photon-5-r7; 5.0.x anteriores a 5.0.8-photon-5-r4 / 5.0.8-debian-12-r3.
CVE-2026-22728
Média · 4.9
CWE-284 25/02/2026
sealed-secrets /v1/rotate can widen sealing scope to cluster-wide via attacker-controlled template annotations
Bitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during
the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the
sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted
spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret.
By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the
annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the
template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the
secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original "strict" or
"namespace-wide" constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal
the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext
credentials.