Vulnerabilidades de Coturn

Coturn is a free open source implementation of TURN and STUN Server. Prior to 4.13.0, coturn rejects loopback peers by default unless allow-loopback-peers is enabled, but the default loopback guard can be bypassed by using the IPv4-mapped IPv6 peer address ::ffff:127.0.0.1 in a TURN XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute. ioa_addr_is_loopback checks for the literal IPv6 loopback shape before IPv4-mapped IPv6 handling, so good_peer_addr does not apply the default loopback rejection and an authenticated TURN client can expose services bound only to localhost on the coturn host through TURN relay traffic. This issue is fixed in version 4.13.0.

Coturn is a free open source implementation of TURN and STUN Server. Prior to 4.12.0, the coturn HTTPS admin panel passes HTTP query parameters directly into SQL queries via snprintf string interpolation without sanitization. The is_secure_string filter that protects the STUN protocol path is not applied to the admin panel's delete-user, delete-secret, and delete-IP operations, so an authenticated admin can inject arbitrary SQL through the du, ds, and dip parameters, gaining full database control and potentially OS-level access via PostgreSQL COPY TO PROGRAM. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.0.

Coturn is a free open source implementation of TURN and STUN Server. Prior to 4.10.0, the STUN/TURN attribute parsing functions in coturn perform unsafe pointer casts from uint8_t * to uint16_t * without alignment checks. When processing a crafted STUN message with odd-aligned attribute boundaries, this results in misaligned memory reads at ns_turn_msg.c. On ARM64 architectures (AArch64) with strict alignment enforcement, this causes a SIGBUS signal that immediately kills the turnserver process. An unauthenticated remote attacker can crash any ARM64 coturn deployment by sending a single crafted UDP packet. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.10.0.

coturn is a free open source implementation of TURN and STUN Server. Versions 4.6.2r5 through 4.7.0-r4 have a bad random number generator for nonces and port randomization after refactoring. Additionally, random numbers aren't generated with openssl's RAND_bytes but libc's random() (if it's not running on Windows). When fetching about 50 sequential nonces (i.e., through sending 50 unauthenticated allocations requests) it is possible to completely reconstruct the current state of the random number generator, thereby predicting the next nonce. This allows authentication while spoofing IPs. An attacker can send authenticated messages without ever receiving the responses, including the nonce (requires knowledge of the credentials, which is e.g., often the case in IoT settings). Since the port randomization is deterministic given the pseudorandom seed, an attacker can exactly reconstruct the ports and, hence predict the randomization of the ports. If an attacker allocates a relay port, they know the current port, and they are able to predict the next relay port (at least if it is not used before). Commit 11fc465f4bba70bb0ad8aae17d6c4a63a29917d9 contains a fix.