Vulnerabilidades de Erudika

Scoold is a Q&A and a knowledge sharing platform for teams. Prior to 1.69.1, checkApiAuth() in src/main/java/com/erudika/scoold/utils/ScooldUtils.java accepts a JWT signed with app_secret_key or para_secret_key for /api/config and /api/stats without requiring a registered API-key jti, and maps the request to the hardcoded administrative API_USER. The special endpoint checks run even when scoold.api_enabled is false. An attacker who obtains either signing secret can forge a token that reads sensitive configuration and server logs and reaches privileged configuration functionality, while an ordinary login-session token is not sufficient. This issue is fixed in version 1.69.1.

Scoold is a Q&A and a knowledge sharing platform for teams. Prior to 1.69.1, the getBackToUrl() method in src/main/java/com/erudika/scoold/utils/HttpUtils.java validates the backto and returnto parameters with Strings.CI.startsWith against the configured server URL. An attacker can supply an absolute URL whose hostname begins with the legitimate hostname, causing URI.resolve() to retain the attacker URL and the prefix check to accept it. A victim who follows the crafted sign-in link can be redirected to an attacker-controlled domain after authentication, enabling phishing and possible credential or token theft. This issue is fixed in version 1.69.1.

Scoold is a Q&A and a knowledge sharing platform for teams. Prior to 1.69.1, the apiCorsConfiguration() method in src/main/java/com/erudika/scoold/ScooldServer.java combines addAllowedOriginPattern("*") with setAllowCredentials(true), causing Spring to reflect any requesting origin while allowing cookies or session tokens. A malicious website visited by a logged-in Scoold user can therefore issue authenticated API requests, read user data, questions, and configuration, and trigger state-changing operations on the user's behalf. This issue is fixed in version 1.69.1.

Scoold is a Q&A and a knowledge sharing platform for teams. Prior to version 1.67.0, Scoold allows the admins configuration value to be modified through /api/config/set/admins with a forged Bearer token that is accepted as an admin API token. Once that setting is changed, the target email address is written to the application configuration file. The change does not become active immediately in the current process, because the ADMINS set is loaded once at startup. After a Scoold restart, though, the selected user is recognized as an administrator and gains access to the admin panel. This issue gives an attacker a reliable persistence path: write their own email into scoold.admins, wait for a restart or trigger one operationally, and the account comes back as admin. This issue has been patched in version 1.67.0.

Scoold is a Q&A and a knowledge sharing platform for teams. Prior to 1.66.2, an authenticated authorization flaw in Scoold allows any logged-in, low-privilege user to overwrite another user's existing question by supplying that question's public ID as the postId parameter to POST /questions/ask. Because question IDs are exposed in normal question URLs, a low-privilege attacker can take a victim question ID from a public page and cause attacker-controlled content to be stored under that existing question object. This causes direct integrity loss of user-generated content and corrupts the integrity of the existing discussion thread. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.66.2.

Scoold is a Q&A and a knowledge sharing platform for teams. Prior to version 1.66.1, Scoold contains an authenticated authorization flaw in feedback deletion that allows any logged-in, low-privilege user to delete another user's feedback post by submitting its ID to POST /feedback/{id}/delete. The handler enforces authentication but does not enforce object ownership (or moderator/admin authorization) before deletion. In verification, a second non-privileged account successfully deleted a victim account's feedback item, and the item immediately disappeared from the feedback listing/detail views. This issue has been patched in version 1.66.1.