Vulnerabilidades de Openclaw

OpenClaw before 2026.5.4 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the bundled device-pair plugin that allows non-owner authorized chat senders to issue device-pairing bootstrap codes without proper scope validation. Attackers with chat command access can create setup codes to enroll devices with operator/node capabilities, granting persistent credentials until manual removal.

Crabbox prior to v0.12.0 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows users with shared visibility-only access to obtain Code, WebVNC, and Egress agent tickets by sending POST requests to ticket endpoints. Attackers can exploit insufficient access control checks on the /v1/leases/:id/code/ticket, /v1/leases/:id/webvnc/ticket, and /v1/leases/:id/egress/ticket endpoints to obtain bridge-agent tickets and impersonate trusted lease-side bridges despite having only visibility permissions.

Crabbox prior to v0.12.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows non-admin shared-token callers to impersonate other owners or organizations by spoofing identity headers. Attackers can inject malicious X-Crabbox-Owner and X-Crabbox-Org headers in requests authenticated with a shared token to bypass authorization checks and access owner/org-scoped lease operations belonging to victim accounts.

Crabbox before 0.9.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the coordinator user-token verification path where the verifyUserToken() function fails to reject payloads containing an admin claim, allowing attackers to escalate privileges. An attacker with access to the shared non-admin token can craft a user-token payload with admin: true, sign it using HMAC-SHA256, and present it to admin-only coordinator routes to gain full coordinator admin access including lease visibility, pool state management, and forced release operations.

Crabbox before 0.9.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the Islo provider's workspace path resolution that allows attackers to supply absolute or relative paths that resolve outside the intended /workspace directory. Attackers can craft a malicious .crabbox.yaml or crabbox.yaml file with traversal sequences to cause arbitrary file deletion and overwrite when sync.delete is enabled, as the workspace preparation logic executes rm -rf and mkdir -p operations on the resolved path without proper validation.

OpenClaw before 2026.4.23 contains an improper access control vulnerability in the gateway tool's config.apply and config.patch operations that allows compromised models to write unsafe configuration changes by bypassing an incomplete denylist protection. Attackers can persist malicious config modifications affecting command execution, network behavior, credentials, and operator policies that survive restart.

OpenClaw before 2026.4.23 contains an arbitrary code execution vulnerability in the bundled plugin setup resolver that loads setup-api.js from process.cwd() during provider setup metadata resolution. Attackers can execute arbitrary JavaScript under the current user account by placing a malicious extensions/<plugin>/setup-api.js file in a repository and convincing a user to run OpenClaw commands from that directory.

OpenClaw before 2026.4.20 contains a guard bypass vulnerability in the agent-facing gateway config.patch and config.apply endpoints that fails to protect operator-trusted settings including sandbox policy, plugin enablement, gateway auth/TLS, hook routing, MCP server configuration, SSRF policy, and filesystem hardening. A prompt-injected model with access to the owner-only gateway tool can persist unauthorized changes to protected operator settings.

OpenClaw before 2026.4.20 contains an improper environment variable validation vulnerability in MCP stdio server configuration that allows attackers to execute arbitrary code. Malicious workspace configurations can pass dangerous startup variables like NODE_OPTIONS, LD_PRELOAD, or BASH_ENV to spawned MCP server processes, enabling code injection when operators start sessions using those servers.

OpenClaw before 2026.4.22 derives loopback MCP owner context from spoofable server-issued bearer tokens in request headers. Non-owner loopback clients can present themselves as owner to bypass owner-gated operations by manipulating the sender-owner header metadata.