Vulnerabilidades de Opener Project

OpENer 2.3.0 (commit 76b95cf) has an out-of-bounds read issue in CIP message parsing when handling malformed explicit requests with a forged EPath size. An attacker can send a valid ENIP SendRRData frame carrying a very short CIP payload whose path_size field claims that many more path words are present than are actually available. Because the parser trusts the attacker-controlled path_size and continues decoding path segments without a remaining-length boundary, it reads beyond the end of the stack receive buffer.

OpENer 2.3.0 (master branch up to commit 76b95cf) is vulnerable to a severe memory corruption issue caused by an integer underflow in the processing of connected explicit messages (SendUnitData).

EIPStackGroup OpENer 2.3.0 (commit 76b95cf) suffers from an Incorrect Access Control vulnerability in its handling of encapsulation sessions. When the server processes critical encapsulation commands, it verifies whether the provided session_handle exists in the global session list, but it fails to verify whether that handle belongs to the specific TCP connection issuing the request. Because there is no strong binding between a session handle and its originating socket, any attacker on the network can use a valid session handle created by another legitimate client to bypass access controls.

EIPStackGroup OpENer 2.3.0 (commit 76b95cf) has an out-of-bounds read issue in Connection Manager handling of ForwardOpen requests when processing short malformed packets. An attacker can send a valid ENIP outer frame carrying a malformed CIP ForwardOpen/LargeForwardOpen request, causing the parser to continue reading fields even when request data is insufficient. This issue is remotely triggerable via network traffic and does not require authentication.

In OpENer 2.3.0 (commit 76b95cf) when parsing incoming CIP (Common Industrial Protocol) network packets, the length parameter is inconsistently typed across the call stack. Specifically, an upstream length calculated as an int is passed to a downstream function that expects an EipInt16 (a 16-bit signed integer). If a maliciously crafted packet with specific length fields is processed, the length parameter can overflow or be truncated into a negative value. This negative length bypasses subsequent bounds checking (due to signed/unsigned comparison issues) and is ultimately used in memory operations, leading to a Stack Buffer Overflow when reading data in DecodePaddedEPath.