Vulnerabilidades de Openprinting

OpenPrinting CUPS is an open source printing system for Linux and other Unix-like operating systems. Prior to 2.4.20, the cupsdCreateJob option-string builder in scheduler/job.c maps attacker-controlled destination-uri and pre-dial-string values from a configured fax queue to the phone and faxPrefix options. Unlike ordinary IPP job attributes, these mapped fax values bypass the control-character sanitizer and are copied directly into the filter options argument. A user permitted to submit a job can therefore inject control characters into the downstream option stream. The reporter states that a downstream fax filter passing these values to a shell or modem command could execute code as lp, while the maintainer states that CUPS has no confidentiality or integrity impact because the only known code-executing filter is optional Foomatic and addressed separately, leaving possible disruption of the affected queue. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.20.

OpenPrinting CUPS is an open source printing system for Linux and other Unix-like operating systems. Prior to 2.4.20, the backend/ipp.c quote_string() function preserves carriage-return and line-feed characters in a remote printer-controlled marker-message before report_attr() writes the value to the scheduler status stream. The scheduler can parse an injected newline as a separate PPD: control line and persist an attacker-selected PPD keyword. The reporter demonstrated that a later print job on a Foomatic-backed queue could consume an injected FoomaticRIPCommandLine value and execute in the filter context as lp. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.20.

OpenPrinting CUPS before 2.4.20 contains a NULL pointer dereference caused by repeated IPP group tags in job-creation requests. IPP parsing creates unnamed separator attributes with IPP_TAG_ZERO, but add_job() converts these separators to IPP_TAG_JOB. During job startup, get_options()/ipp_length() subsequently calls strlen() on a NULL attribute name, terminating cupsd and disrupting all queues. A single crafted Print-Job request can trigger the crash when the client can reach the scheduler and submit jobs to an accepting, enabled queue supporting the submitted document format. Anonymous submission is possible when permitted by listener and access-control configuration.

OpenPrinting CUPS before 2.4.20 contains a double-free in printer-class management. When CUPS-Add-Modify-Class replaces an existing class member list, add_class() frees pclass->printers without clearing the pointer. If subsequent validation fails, the class retains the dangling pointer; CUPS-Delete-Class subsequently frees the same allocation in cupsdDeletePrinter(). A client authorized to modify and delete classes can cause scheduler-wide denial of service. The default policy requires @SYSTEM privileges.

OpenPrinting CUPS through 2.4.20 contains a resource-exhaustion vulnerability in the submission-timeout handling of cupsdCheckJobs(). The scheduler suppresses timeout processing for all pending jobs whenever any client connection has an in-flight Send-Document operation, without matching that connection to the job being examined. A client allowed to reach the IPP service can hold an incomplete HTTP request containing parsed Send-Document headers before operation authorization, preventing unrelated incomplete jobs from expiring. Where Create-Job submission is allowed, incomplete jobs can accumulate until MaxJobs is exhausted and further legitimate print submissions are rejected. The suppression ends when the held connection closes.

cups-filters contains backends, filters, and other software required to get the cups printing service working on operating systems other than macos. In cups-filters prior to 1.28.18, by crafting a PDF file with a large `MediaBox` value, an attacker can cause CUPS-Filter 1.x’s `pdftoraster` tool to write beyond the bounds of an array. First, a PDF with a large `MediaBox` width value causes `header.cupsWidth` to become large. Next, the calculation of `bytesPerLine = (header.cupsBitsPerPixel * header.cupsWidth + 7) / 8` overflows, resulting in a small value. Then, `lineBuf` is allocated with the small `bytesPerLine` size. Finally, `convertLineChunked` calls `writePixel8`, which attempts to write to `lineBuf` outside of its buffer size (out of bounds write). In libcupsfilters, the maintainers found the same `bytesPerLine` multiplication without overflow check, but the provided test case does not cause an overflow there, because the values are different. Commit 50d94ca0f2fa6177613c97c59791bde568631865 contains a patch, which is incorporated into cups-filters version 1.28.18.

CUPS is a standards-based, open-source printing system, and `libcupsfilters` contains the code of the filters of the former `cups-filters` package as library functions to be used for the data format conversion tasks needed in Printer Applications. In CUPS-Filters versions up to and including 1.28.17 and libscupsfilters versions 2.0.0 through 2.1.1, CUPS-Filters's `imagetoraster` filter has an out of bounds read/write vulnerability in the processing of TIFF image files. While the pixel buffer is allocated with the number of pixels times a pre-calculated bytes-per-pixel value, the function which processes these pixels is called with a size of the number of pixels times 3. When suitable inputs are passed, the bytes-per-pixel value can be set to 1 and bytes outside of the buffer bounds get processed. In order to trigger the bug, an attacker must issue a print job with a crafted TIFF file, and pass appropriate print job options to control the bytes-per-pixel value of the output format. They must choose a printer configuration under which the `imagetoraster` filter or its C-function equivalent `cfFilterImageToRaster()` gets invoked. The vulnerability exists in both CUPS-Filters 1.x and the successor library libcupsfilters (CUPS-Filters 2.x). In CUPS-Filters 2.x, the vulnerable function is `_cfImageReadTIFF() in libcupsfilters`. When this function is invoked as part of `cfFilterImageToRaster()`, the caller passes a look-up-table during whose processing the out of bounds memory access happens. In CUPS-Filters 1.x, the equivalent functions are all found in the cups-filters repository, which is not split into subprojects yet, and the vulnerable code is in `_cupsImageReadTIFF()`, which is called through `cupsImageOpen()` from the `imagetoraster` tool. A patch is available in commit b69dfacec7f176281782e2f7ac44f04bf9633cfa.