Vulnerabilidades de OpenStack

In OpenStack Mistral through 23.0.0, several of the v2 API write paths resolve the target object with a query that can return another project's resource, then write to it. An authenticated project member can use this to rewrite and un-publish another project's public action definitions and environments. A project administrator can create a workbook whose embedded ad-hoc action or workflow name collides with a resource of another project, which moves that resource into the caller's project and causes the original owner's subsequent updates of it to fail with server errors. Only deployments exposing the Mistral API are affected.

In OpenStack Mistral through 23.0.0, the /v2/maintenance API controller clears the request context and calls the maintenance service directly without any policy enforcement. Any holder of a valid Mistral token, regardless of assigned role, can read and change the service's cluster-wide maintenance state. Setting the state to PAUSED stops processing of new workflow and execution objects across all tenant projects until an operator restores it.

In OpenStack Mistral through 23.0.0, the std.ssh_proxied action passes a caller-supplied proxy_command value directly to paramiko.ProxyCommand() before any SSH connection to a gateway or target host is attempted. An authenticated project member can use the standard action-execution API to submit an arbitrary local command as proxy_command; paramiko starts that command as a subprocess on the executor host under the executor's own service account, independent of whether the SSH connection itself ever succeeds. Only Mistral deployments that permit the std.ssh_proxied action, the default configuration, are affected.

An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.

In OpenStack Ironic before 37.0.1, an Ironic user with the ability to deploy nodes using the IPMI management interface can maliciously use the send_raw step to send arbitrary IPMI commands to a node, bypassing Ironic's access control.

In OpenStack Nova before 33.0.2, the server create API does not strip certain hint data. The resulting instance has no Placement allocation.

In OpenStack Ironic 32 before 37.0.0, an unauthenticated malicious user could submit a crafted JSON string to some endpoints on the API or JSON-RPC service and effect a service crash.

OpenStack Ironic through before 35.0.2 allows file overwrite via directory traversal during deployment with a crafted ISO image.

OpenStack Ironic before 35.0.2 allows Boot Script Injection of an iPXE script if the attacker can set node.driver_info or node.instance_info.

An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.2. The Keystone federated token rescoping mechanism does not propagate the original token's expiry to the newly issued token. When a federated user rescopes a token via POST /v3/auth/tokens, the handle_scoped_token() function in the mapped authentication plugin returns response data without an expires_at value. The token provider falls back to issuing a token with a fresh default TTL. By rescoping repeatedly before each token expires, a user can maintain access indefinitely, bypassing operator-configured token lifetime policies. This is a variant of CVE-2012-3426. Only deployments using federated identity (SAML2, OpenID Connect) are affected.

An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.2. When combined with an application credential impersonation vulnerability, an attacker with the member role on a project can escalate to admin by chaining unrestricted application credentials with Keystone trusts. The impersonated token carries the victim's identity, which passes the trustor validation check. Keystone then validates the delegated roles against the victim's actual role assignments in the database, not the roles on the requesting token. This allows the attacker to create a trust delegating the victim's admin role to themselves. The trust persists independently, and additional trusts and application credentials can be created to maintain access. All actions are logged under the victim's identity.

An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.2. The Keystone RBAC policy enforcer in enforce_call unconditionally merges the raw JSON request body into the policy enforcement dictionary via policy_dict.update(json_input.copy()), overwriting trusted target data that was previously set from database lookups. Because flask.request.get_json is called with force=True, this works regardless of Content-Type or HTTP method. Any authenticated user can inject arbitrary policy target attributes (e.g., user_id, project_id) into the request body to bypass RBAC checks and perform unauthorized operations on resources belonging to other users or projects. This was introduced in commit 5ea59f52 (Rocky/14.0.0).

An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.2. The Keystone application credential authentication plugin does not verify that the user supplied in the authentication request matches the owner of the application credential. An attacker can authenticate with their own application credential ID and secret while specifying a different user's name and domain in the request body. Keystone issues a token attributed to the victim user. The impersonated token is project-scoped and carries the intersection of the application credential's roles and the victim's actual roles on the project. This enables audit evasion, reading the victim's credentials, and acting as the victim within shared projects.