Base de CVEs

IBM Controller 11.0.0 through 11.0.1 FP7, and 11.1.0 through 11.1.3 FP1 could allow an authenticated user to bypass input validation due to improper validation of client-side input of file size.

An issue was discovered in the buffer queue driver in Samsung Automotive Processor Exynos Auto 8890, V7, V9, and V920. Lack of a length check leads to a Denial of Service in the kernel.

An issue was discovered in the mirage-crypto-pk package before 2.3.0 for OCaml. There is an undocumented exception for a small message during RSA decryption or encryption.

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an attacker to store a value of arbitrary size in an attribute whose length constraint should bound it. Ash measures string length with Elixir's String.length/1, which counts Unicode graphemes, in the max_length and min_length constraints of Ash.Type.String (apply_constraints/2 in lib/ash/type/string.ex), in Ash.Resource.Validation.StringLength, and in the string_length expression function. A grapheme carries an unbounded number of combining marks, so a base character followed by a million combining acute accents is one grapheme and megabytes of data, and satisfies max_length: 2. Where the data layer imposes no independent limit (ETS, Mnesia, or a Postgres text column) the whole value is persisted, so an attacker can write an entire request body into an attribute declared with a small maximum and grow storage without bound. The counting unit also disagrees with the storage layer, which counts codepoints rather than graphemes, so a value accepted by the constraint can still be rejected or truncated by the column. A Postgres varchar(n) column bounds the value itself and is not exposed. This issue affects ash: from 0.10.0 before 3.33.0.

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP inets httpc allows a malicious or compromised HTTP server to degrade availability by returning a numeric header whose value is a very long run of digits. httpc_handler.erl converts the server-supplied Content-Length with list_to_integer/1 before comparing it against max_body_size, so the size check cannot protect the conversion, and the option defaults to nolimit in any case. The same unbounded conversion appears in httpc_response:format_response/1 for Content-Length and in httpc_response:get_ms_from_retry_after/1 for Retry-After, which is guarded only by a check that the first character is a digit. A value of up to roughly 1.26 million digits converts successfully and costs the requesting process hundreds of milliseconds of arbitrary-precision arithmetic per response. The conversion function is documented to accept integers of any size, so bounding the input is the caller's responsibility. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.3.2.7, from 9.4 before 9.6.2.3, and from 9.7 before 9.7.2. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to inets before 5.10, is affected is unknown.

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP eldap allows a malicious or compromised LDAP server to degrade availability by returning a referral URL whose port component is a very long run of digits. eldap:parse_port/2 passes the port substring straight to list_to_integer/1 with no length bound. The surrounding try ... catch only rejects a value that fails to parse, so a syntactically valid port of up to roughly 1.26 million digits converts successfully and costs the caller hundreds of milliseconds of arbitrary-precision arithmetic per referral. The conversion function itself is documented to accept integers of any size, so bounding the input is the caller's responsibility. Reaching the flaw requires the application to pass a server-supplied referral to eldap:parse_ldap_url/1, which eldap never calls itself: referral strings are returned to the caller unparsed. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to eldap from 1.0.3 before 1.2.14.2, from 1.2.15 before 1.2.16.1, and from 1.3 before 1.3.1.

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP snmp allows a remote attacker to degrade availability by sending an SNMP message containing a BER INTEGER whose length field is arbitrarily large. snmp_pdus:dec_integer_notag/1 defaults its size limit to infinity, and do_dec_integer_notag/2 then accumulates the value across every declared byte with a recursive shift and bitwise or. Work grows superlinearly in the declared length because each operation acts on a progressively larger bignum. The size-limited variant dec_integer_notag/2 exists but is reached from only one call site, dec_snmp_version/1, which bounds the version field to ten bytes; the request identifier, error status and index, generic and specific trap fields, engine boots and time, and every varbind value decoded by dec_value/1 all use the unbounded form. The decode runs before the PDU is processed, so no valid request is required beyond what the deployment demands to accept the message at all. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to snmp from 4.25.1 before 5.18.2.1, from 5.19 before 5.20.2.2, and from 5.20.3 before 5.20.5. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to snmp before 4.25.1, is affected is unknown.

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP stdlib allows a remote attacker to degrade availability by supplying a URI whose port component is a very long run of digits. uri_string:get_port/1 passes the port substring to binary_to_integer/1 with no length bound, catching only error:badarg, so a syntactically valid port of up to roughly 1.26 million digits converts successfully and costs the calling process hundreds of milliseconds of arbitrary-precision arithmetic. The conversion is reached from every authority-parsing path in uri_string:parse/1, including the host, registered-name, and IPv4 and IPv6 forms. parse/1 is the documented interface for parsing URIs, so any application that parses an attacker-supplied URI is exposed without further configuration. The conversion function is documented to accept integers of any size, so bounding the input is the caller's responsibility. This issue affects OTP from OTP 21.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to stdlib from 3.5 before 6.2.2.5, from 7.0 before 7.3.0.2, and from 8.0 before 8.0.4.

DeadLetterPublishingRecovererFactory reads the retry_topic-original-timestamp header from an inbound ConsumerRecord and passes its raw bytes directly to new BigInteger(header.value()) with no length or format validation. Spring for Apache Kafka 4.1.0 Spring for Apache Kafka 4.0.0 - 4.0.6 Spring for Apache Kafka 3.0.0 - 3.3.16 Spring for Apache Kafka 2.9.0 - 2.9.14 Spring for Apache Kafka 2.8.12 and earlier

tor before 0.4.9.9 was prone to an infinite loop when decompressing a truncated zlib/gzip stream with done=1. A truncated stream never reaches Z_STREAM_END, causing zlib to return Z_BUF_ERROR with no input remaining, which buf_add_compress() mistook for a full output buffer and retried forever. Fixed by returning TOR_COMPRESS_ERROR in that case so the caller can abort cleanly. This is TROVE-2026-021.