Base de CVEs

JuggleIM im-server through 1.8.16 contains a weak password hashing vulnerability that stores admin console passwords as unsalted SHA-1 digests via tools.SHA1 in services/accountservice.go. Attackers who obtain the accounts table through database access or backups can crack console passwords using precomputed tables or GPU brute force.

Xxyopen novel through 3.5.0 contains a weak password hashing vulnerability that allows attackers to recover plaintext passwords because UserServiceImpl.register() stores unsalted MD5 digests in user_info.password. Attackers who obtain the password column through a database leak or backup exposure can crack hashes with precomputed tables or GPU brute force and reuse credentials.

Jivejdon through 5.0 contains a weak password storage vulnerability that stores account passwords as unsalted MD5 digests via ToolsUtil.hash() in AccountDaoSql. Attackers who obtain the user table through database access or SQL injection can crack passwords with precomputed tables or GPU attacks.

Payload is a free and open source headless content management system. Payload versions from 3.0.0 before 3.90.0 and canary versions from 4.0.0-canary.0 before 4.0.0-canary.34 use a lower-than-recommended PBKDF2 work factor for password hashing, reducing the computational effort required to test recovered password hashes. This issue is fixed in versions 3.90.0 and 4.0.0-canary.34.

Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort vulnerability in danielberkompas cloak_ecto and danielberkompas cloak allows an attacker who holds the hashed values and the configured secret to brute-force low-entropy plaintexts much faster than configured. The dump/1 callback that Cloak.Ecto.PBKDF2 (Cloak.Fields.PBKDF2 in cloak before the Ecto code moved to cloak_ecto) injects into a field module calls :pbkdf2.pbkdf2/4 with config[:size] in the iteration-count position. The :iterations setting is validated but never used. With the cloak_ecto defaults (iterations: 600_000, size: 32) each hash runs 32 PBKDF2 rounds instead of 600,000, so offline guessing of values such as email addresses costs about 18,750 times less than configured. This issue affects cloak_ecto: from 1.0.0-alpha.0 onward; cloak: from 0.7.0 before 1.0.0-alpha.0.

admin3 through 3.0.0 stores account passwords using single-round MD5 with only the username as salt and no key derivation function. Attackers with database access can recover plaintext passwords through offline dictionary or brute-force attacks due to negligible computational effort.

The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.

FrontAccounting through 2.4.20 stores and verifies user passwords as unsalted MD5 digests. admin/users.php passes md5($_POST['password']) to add_user() and update_user_password(), admin/change_current_user_password.php does the same when a user changes their own password, the forgotten-password path in includes/current_user.inc hashes the newly generated password the same way, and authentication calls get_user_auth($loginname, md5($password)). The codebase applies no per-password salt and contains no call to password_hash(), password_verify() or any other adaptive hash, so identical passwords yield identical digests and an attacker who obtains the user table can recover plaintext passwords with precomputed lookup tables or high-rate GPU cracking.

VeraCrypt provides disk encryption with strong security based on TrueCrypt. Prior to 1.26.29, non-default builds created with WOLFCRYPT=1 and WOLFCRYPT_BACKEND route SHA-256 and SHA-512 volume-header key derivation through derive_key_sha256 and derive_key_sha512 in src/Crypto/wolfCrypt.c, where the configured iterations value is discarded and wc_HKDF is used instead of PBKDF2-HMAC. Changing the PIM or iteration count therefore does not increase derivation cost, allowing an attacker with an affected container, disk image, or volume header to perform substantially cheaper offline password guesses. Official precompiled VeraCrypt binaries and normal distribution packages use the standard PBKDF2 backend and are not affected. Volumes created by an affected WOLFCRYPT=1 build require backup and recreation because corrected builds derive different keys. This issue is fixed in version 1.26.29.

A security issue exists within OTTO® Fleet Manager. The vulnerability stems from the use of an insufficient work factor in the bcrypt password hashing implementation, which could reduce the computational cost required for an attacker to perform offline brute-force attacks against stored password hashes. If an attacker gains access to an unencrypted system backup, the weakly hashed credentials could be more easily compromised.

openssl_encrypt versions before 1.4.6 contain a key derivation flaw in sequential XOR composition mode where the last stage cancels out during key generation. When configured with a single KDF and no prior hashing stage, attackers can bypass memory-hard key derivation and perform offline password cracking at SHA-256 speed instead of the configured KDF cost.

Windu CMS uses hashing algorithm based on MD5 and SHA1 with static salt to store user passwords. This allows an attacker who obtain password hash to decode user credentials. Because vendor contact attempts were unsuccessful, the vulnerability has only been confirmed in version 4.1 but may also affect other versions.

TP-Link Deco M5 v1 uses a weak password hashing mechanism to store user credentials. An attacker who obtains the password hash through system compromise or privileged access could perform brute-force or dictionary attacks. Successful exploitation may result in disclosure of authentication credentials, enabling unauthorized access to device management functions, depending on the privileges associated with the recovered password. The primary security impact is loss of confidentiality.

Flowise before 3.0.13 uses bcrypt with default salt rounds of 5, providing only 32 iterations instead of the OWASP-recommended minimum of 10 rounds. Attackers can crack password hashes approximately 30 times faster with modern GPU hardware, potentially compromising all user accounts in a database breach scenario.

Crypt::PBKDF2 versions before 0.261630 for Perl have a weak default algorithm and number of iterations. The default algorithm is HMAC-SHA1, which should only be used for legacy systems. These versions default to using 1000 iterations. Depending on the chosen algorithm, 220,000 to 1,400,000 iterations should be used.

QloApps through 1.7.0, fixed in commit 64e9722, contains a weak cryptographic algorithm vulnerability that allows attackers to compromise user credentials by exploiting the use of MD5 for password hashing in the Tools::encrypt() function within classes/Tools.php, which concatenates a static cookie key with the supplied password. Attackers can perform offline brute-force attacks against the MD5 hashes, with the risk compounded by auto-generated 8-character passwords assigned during guest-to-customer account conversion in classes/Customer.php, making credential recovery trivial.

Danelec MacGregor Voyage Data Recorder passwords are stored with a hashing method which limits password length and is susceptible to brute force attacks.

Use of a Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in Mesalvo MEONA (MEONA Server and MEONA Client) for user accounts whose password was last set under a version before MEONA 2024.10. MEONA versions before 2024.10 protected stored passwords with SHA-1 (versions from October 2015) or stored them without protection (earlier versions). Since MEONA 2024.10 (June 2024) Argon2 is the default method and every password that is set or changed is stored with Argon2; passwords last set under an earlier version keep the earlier method until they are changed. An administrator could in addition select the storage method per account. A MEONA super administrator can read the stored value of such accounts in the user administration of the MEONA Client or export it through administrative database functions. Only accounts managed locally in MEONA are affected; accounts authenticated through the operating hospital's directory service (Active Directory / Entra ID) have no password stored in MEONA. In typical installations end users authenticate through the directory service and local accounts are limited to emergency and technical accounts. Exploitation requires super administrator permissions in MEONA (or direct access to the MEONA database) from within the operating hospital's network; MEONA is operated exclusively within closed hospital networks without exposure to the public Internet, and where a hospital permits remote access to that network at all, it is only through the hospital's own remote-access infrastructure (e.g. VPN) under the hospital's control. Installations in which every password has been set or changed under MEONA 2024.10 or later are not affected. Mesalvo is not aware of any exploitation outside the reported security test. This issue affects MEONA Server and MEONA Client in versions 2024.10, 2025.04 and 2026.03 (for accounts with passwords last set under earlier versions). MEONA 2025.04.24 and 2026.03.02 (planned Q4 2026) remove the legacy storage methods, require every affected account to set a new Argon2-protected password at next logon, and no longer display stored credential values in the user administration. See Mesalvo Security Advisory MSA-2026-002.

RiteCMS v3.1.0 was discovered to use insecure encryption to store passwords.