CVE-2025-38472 — netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix crash due to removal of uninitialised entry
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix crash due to removal of uninitialised entry A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack entry from the hash bucket list: [exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172] [..] #7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack] #8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack] #9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack] [..] The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in a partially initialised state: ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value (hence crash). ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected. Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry. If we ignore ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly allocated but not yet inserted into the hash: - ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash - ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value. If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED, __nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry. Theory is that we did hit following race: cpu x cpu y cpu z found entry E found entry E E is expired <preemption> nf_ct_delete() return E to rcu slab init_conntrack E is re-inited, ct->status set to 0 reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev stores hash value. cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x. E is now re-inited on cpu z. cpu y was preempted before checking for expiry and/or confirm bit. ->refcnt set to 1 E now owned by skb ->timeout set to 30000 If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit. nf_conntrack_confirm gets called sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED This is wrong: E is not yet added to hashtable. cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED: <resumes> nf_ct_expired() -> yes (ct->timeout is 30s) confirmed bit set. cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable: nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit __nf_ct_delete_from_lists Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash: cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks: wait for spinlock held by z CONFIRMED is set but there is no guarantee ct will be added to hash: "chaintoolong" or "clash resolution" logic both skip the insert step. reply hnnode.pprev still stores the hash value. unlocks spinlock return NF_DROP <unblocks, then crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev> In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink E again right away but no crash occurs. Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence: ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy. To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table insertion but before the unlock. Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this. It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right before the CONFIRMED bit was set: Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation" case: the entry will be skipped. Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit. The gc sequence is: 1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry 2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1. nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check pas ---truncated---
Who exploits it and how urgent it is
A 0–100 score combining confirmed exploitation, ransomware and APT use, public exploits, EPSS and severity.
How the score was calculated
- EPSS 0.4% (30-day exploitation probability)+5
- Technical severity (medium)+3
- Automatable exploitation (SSVC)+3
The score orders the patch queue; it does not replace your asset context (internet exposure, criticality, compensating controls).
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the sources call it.
CISA SSVC assessment CISA
Three decision points CISA publishes for the CVEs it assesses (SSVC 2.0.3). A stakeholder decision, not a severity score.
Remediation
Fixes and mitigations documented by the sources — linked to the original advisory.
- Documented patch — git.kernel.org (NIST National Vulnerability Database)
- Documented patch — git.kernel.org (NIST National Vulnerability Database)
- Documented patch — git.kernel.org (NIST National Vulnerability Database)
- Documented patch — git.kernel.org (NIST National Vulnerability Database)
- Documented patch — git.kernel.org (NIST National Vulnerability Database)
First 24 hours
Ordered from the record’s own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found. A rule-generated starting point.
- Identify exposed assets running the affected vendor/product/version combinations (Debian Debian Linux, Linux Linux, Linux Linux Kernel).
- Apply the fixed version or the patch documented under Remediation.
- Search available logs for exploit probes matching the vulnerability class (memory corruption), errors and authentication anomalies.
Affected scope
Vendor, product and versions as the sources word them.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debian | Debian Linux | version 11.0 | Vulnerable | NIST National Vulnerability Database |
| Linux | Linux | version 5.19≥ 5.18.13 and < 5.19version 594cea2c09f7cd440d1ee1c4547d5bc6a646b0e4≥ 1397af5bfd7d32b0cf2adb70a78c9a9e8f11d912 and < 2d72afb340657f03f7261e9243b44457a9228ac7≥ 1397af5bfd7d32b0cf2adb70a78c9a9e8f11d912 and < 938ce0e8422d3793fe30df2ed0e37f6bc0598379≥ 1397af5bfd7d32b0cf2adb70a78c9a9e8f11d912 and < fc38c249c622ff5e3011b8845fd49dbfd9289afc≥ 1397af5bfd7d32b0cf2adb70a78c9a9e8f11d912 and < 76179961c423cd698080b5e4d5583cf7f4fcdde9≥ 1397af5bfd7d32b0cf2adb70a78c9a9e8f11d912 and < a47ef874189d47f934d0809ae738886307c0ea22 | Vulnerable | CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
| Linux | Linux Kernel |
version 6.16-rc5version 6.16-rc6version 6.16-rc4version 6.16-rc3version 6.16-rc2version 6.16-rc1≥ 6.13 and < 6.15.8≥ 6.7 and < 6.12.40 and 2 more≥ 6.2 and < 6.6.100≥ 5.18.13 and < 6.1.147 |
Vulnerable | NIST National Vulnerability Database |
Attack characteristics
The CVSS vector, decoded. It describes the attack, not your exposure to it.
Every base score collected
Sources score independently and may disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.
| Score | Version | Severity | Expl. | Impact | Scored by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9.8 | CVSS 3.1 | Critical | 3.9 | 5.9 | 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 via NIST National Vulnerability Database |
| 9.8 | CVSS 3.1 | Critical | — | — | Linux via CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
| 5.5 | CVSS 3.1 | Medium | 1.8 | 3.6 | nvd@nist.gov via NIST National Vulnerability Database |
| 5.5 | CVSS 3.1 | Medium | — | — | GitHub, Inc. via GitHub Security Advisories |
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (score shown at the top: nvd@nist.gov) Weakness MITRE
Weakness class according to MITRE’s CWE catalog.
Detection
Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not tested rules.
- Local/physical vector: focus on endpoint telemetry (EDR) from affected hosts.
- Correlate service crashes/restarts with inbound traffic; repeated crashes may indicate attempts.
Timeline
What happened to this CVE, newest first.
- 2026
- Affected products added · linux/linux
- SSVC assessment updated
- Record published
- Fix documented
- Affected products added · linux/linux kernel, debian/debian linux
- CVSS changed · 5.5
- Source status changed · → Modified
- Record created in this database
- 2025
- CVE published
Source activity
Repeated readings are counted rather than listed.
- 2× References added · Oct 15, 2026 – Oct 15, 2026
- 1× Official description updated · Oct 15, 2026 – Oct 15, 2026
References
8 on the record
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/76179961c423cd698080b5e4d5583cf7f4fcdde9
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc38c249c622ff5e3011b8845fd49dbfd9289afc
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/938ce0e8422d3793fe30df2ed0e37f6bc0598379
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d72afb340657f03f7261e9243b44457a9228ac7
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/a47ef874189d47f934d0809ae738886307c0ea22
- lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00008.html
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38472
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-979q-6jjc-29jh
Elsewhere on this site
Related CVEs (same products)
- Critical CVE-2026-99999 ipv4: validate checksum_start before completing checksum 12h
- Unknown CVE-2026-98432 ipv4: free inet_opt and ireq_opt after an RCU grace period 12h
- Unknown CVE-2026-98424 wifi: cfg80211: undo netns switch if renaming the wiphy fails 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98425 wifi: mac80211: don't warn when an IBSS has no channel to scan 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98426 wifi: mwifiex: fix IRQ leak using wrong index in MSI-X error path 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98427 net/sched: codel: bound the dropping loop per dequeue call 1d
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record
Text assembled only from the fields above — no additional claims.
What should defenders know first?
CVE-2025-38472 is "netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix crash due to removal of uninitialised entry", rated Medium. It affects Debian Linux (Debian); versions are in the scope table. It is not in CISA KEV, which does not rule out exploitation. CVSS 5.5 describes technical severity. EPSS 0.41% estimates the probability of exploitation in 30 days; neither replaces your asset context. First verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run the affected versions, apply vendor fixes or mitigations, and preserve logs for review.
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