CVE-2026-115825 — HTTP::Server::PSGI versions before 1.0056 for Perl allow a single request to crash the server by declaring a large Content-Length
HTTP::Server::PSGI versions before 1.0056 for Perl allow a single request to crash the server by declaring a large Content-Length. The request body is read with sysread() calls sized by the remaining Content-Length. Perl grows the read buffer to the requested length before any data arrives, so the server tries to allocate as much memory as the client declares. A remote attacker can send one request with a large Content-Length and a few body bytes, and perl exits with an out-of-memory error before the application is called. HTTP::Server::PSGI runs as a single process, so the server stays down until restarted.
Who exploits it and how urgent it is
A 0–100 score combining confirmed exploitation, ransomware and APT use, public exploits, EPSS and severity.
How the score was calculated
- EPSS 0.3% (30-day exploitation probability)+4
The score orders the patch queue; it does not replace your asset context (internet exposure, criticality, compensating controls).
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the sources call it.
Remediation
Fixes and mitigations documented by the sources — linked to the original advisory.
No fix documented by the sources we poll. That does not mean none exists: check the vendor advisory.
First 24 hours
Ordered from the record’s own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found. A rule-generated starting point.
- Affected products have not been identified by the sources yet: follow the vendor advisory and map candidate assets by component name.
- No fix documented in the sources: reduce exposure and monitor the vendor advisory.
- Search available logs for exploit probes, errors and authentication anomalies.
Affected scope
Vendor, product and versions as the sources word them.
Affected products not yet identified by the sources.
Weakness MITRE
Weakness class according to MITRE’s CWE catalog.
EPSS over time FIRST
Oct 26, 2026 → Oct 29, 2026 · 4 reading(s) · max 0.33%
Detection
Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not tested rules.
- Not enough vector or weakness data: use the affected application’s logs as a starting point.
Timeline
What happened to this CVE, newest first.
- 2026
- Source status changed · Received → Awaiting Analysis
- Record published
- Source status changed · Published → Received
- Source status changed · → Published
- Record created in this database
- CVE published
Source activity
Repeated readings are counted rather than listed.
- 2× References added · Oct 25, 2026 – Oct 25, 2026
- 1× Official description updated · Oct 25, 2026 – Oct 25, 2026
References
5 on the record
Elsewhere on this site
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No CVSS score published by NVD, the CNA, CISA or GitHub so far.
- No affected product/version with evidence in the sources.
- No fixed version, patch or mitigation documented.
- No CISA SSVC assessment.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record
Text assembled only from the fields above — no additional claims.
What should defenders know first?
CVE-2026-115825 is "HTTP::Server::PSGI versions before 1.0056 for Perl allow a single request to crash the server by declaring a large Content-Length", rated Unknown. Affected products have not been identified by the sources yet. It is not in CISA KEV, which does not rule out exploitation. EPSS 0.33% estimates the probability of exploitation in 30 days; neither replaces your asset context. First verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run the affected versions, apply vendor fixes or mitigations, and preserve logs for review.
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