CVE-2026-14367 — The I3C IBI subsystem in drivers/i3c/i3c_ibi_workq.c hands out statically-allocated work…
The I3C IBI subsystem in drivers/i3c/i3c_ibi_workq.c hands out statically-allocated work nodes through a free-list i3c_ibi_work_nodes_free implemented as a plain sys_slist_t, which provides no synchronization. The allocation helpers (i3c_ibi_work_enqueue, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_target_irq, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_hotjoin, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_controller_request, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_cb) called sys_slist_get() directly from ISR context, while the workqueue handler i3c_ibi_work_handler() returned nodes with sys_slist_append() from the workqueue thread, with no lock on either side. Because sys_slist_get() and sys_slist_append() are neither atomic nor interrupt-safe, an IBI interrupt that fires while the workqueue thread is mid-append (or a truly parallel access under CONFIG_SMP) races on the shared list. This corrupts the list linkage: a node may be handed to two consumers, a node may be lost, or the head/tail pointers may be left inconsistent so sys_slist_get() returns a stale or garbage pointer. In the double-hand-out case the subsequent memcpy(ibi_node, ibi_work, sizeof(*ibi_node)) overwrites a node still in flight; a garbage pointer turns the same memcpy into an out-of-bounds write. The race is driven by I3C bus traffic — IBIs, hot-joins, and controller-role requests originate from target devices on the bus, and I3C supports hot-joining devices. An attacker controlling an I3C peripheral on the board's chip-to-chip bus can generate high-frequency interrupts timed to collide with the free operation. Exploitation requires physical access to the bus and winning a narrow timing window; the most realistic impact is a crash or hang (denial of service), with memory corruption possible but hard to control. The fix wraps all free-list sys_slist_get()/sys_slist_append() operations in the new ibi_work_alloc()/ibi_work_free() helpers, each guarded by a k_spinlock (ibi_work_lock), closing the race across ISR and thread contexts.
Who exploits it and how urgent it is
A 0–100 score combining confirmed exploitation, ransomware and APT use, public exploits, EPSS and severity.
How the score was calculated
- No scoring signals.
The score orders the patch queue; it does not replace your asset context (internet exposure, criticality, compensating controls).
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the sources call it.
Remediation
Fixes and mitigations documented by the sources — linked to the original advisory.
No fix documented by the sources we poll. That does not mean none exists: check the vendor advisory.
First 24 hours
Ordered from the record’s own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found. A rule-generated starting point.
- Affected products have not been identified by the sources yet: follow the vendor advisory and map candidate assets by component name.
- No fix documented in the sources: reduce exposure and monitor the vendor advisory.
- Search available logs for exploit probes matching the vulnerability class (logic error), errors and authentication anomalies.
Affected scope
Vendor, product and versions as the sources word them.
Affected products not yet identified by the sources.
Attack characteristics
The CVSS vector, decoded. It describes the attack, not your exposure to it.
Every base score collected
Sources score independently and may disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.
| Score | Version | Severity | Expl. | Impact | Scored by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | CVSS 3.1 | Low | 0.5 | 2.5 | vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org via NIST National Vulnerability Database |
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L (score shown at the top: vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org) Weakness MITRE
Weakness class according to MITRE’s CWE catalog.
Detection
Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not tested rules.
- Local/physical vector: focus on endpoint telemetry (EDR) from affected hosts.
Timeline
What happened to this CVE, newest first.
- 2026
- Record published
- CVSS changed · 3.1
- Source status changed · → Awaiting Analysis
- Record created in this database
- CVE published
Source activity
Repeated readings are counted rather than listed.
- 1× Official description updated · Oct 15, 2026 – Oct 15, 2026
References
2 on the record
Elsewhere on this site
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No FIRST EPSS score.
- No affected product/version with evidence in the sources.
- No fixed version, patch or mitigation documented.
- No CISA SSVC assessment.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record
Text assembled only from the fields above — no additional claims.
What should defenders know first?
CVE-2026-14367 is "The I3C IBI subsystem in drivers/i3c/i3c_ibi_workq.c hands out statically-allocated work…", rated Low. Affected products have not been identified by the sources yet. It is not in CISA KEV, which does not rule out exploitation. CVSS 3.1 describes technical severity. First verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run the affected versions, apply vendor fixes or mitigations, and preserve logs for review.
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