CVE-2026-23394 — af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened. Igor Ushakov reported that GC purged the receive queue of an alive socket due to a race with MSG_PEEK with a nice repro. This is the exact same issue previously fixed by commit cbcf01128d0a ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK"). After GC was replaced with the current algorithm, the cited commit removed the locking dance in unix_peek_fds() and reintroduced the same issue. The problem is that MSG_PEEK bumps a file refcount without interacting with GC. Consider an SCC containing sk-A and sk-B, where sk-A is close()d but can be recv()ed via sk-B. The bad thing happens if sk-A is recv()ed with MSG_PEEK from sk-B and sk-B is close()d while GC is checking unix_vertex_dead() for sk-A and sk-B. GC thread User thread --------- ----------- unix_vertex_dead(sk-A) -> true <------. \ `------ recv(sk-B, MSG_PEEK) invalidate !! -> sk-A's file refcount : 1 -> 2 close(sk-B) -> sk-B's file refcount : 2 -> 1 unix_vertex_dead(sk-B) -> true Initially, sk-A's file refcount is 1 by the inflight fd in sk-B recvq. GC thinks sk-A is dead because the file refcount is the same as the number of its inflight fds. However, sk-A's file refcount is bumped silently by MSG_PEEK, which invalidates the previous evaluation. At this moment, sk-B's file refcount is 2; one by the open fd, and one by the inflight fd in sk-A. The subsequent close() releases one refcount by the former. Finally, GC incorrectly concludes that both sk-A and sk-B are dead. One option is to restore the locking dance in unix_peek_fds(), but we can resolve this more elegantly thanks to the new algorithm. The point is that the issue does not occur without the subsequent close() and we actually do not need to synchronise MSG_PEEK with the dead SCC detection. When the issue occurs, close() and GC touch the same file refcount. If GC sees the refcount being decremented by close(), it can just give up garbage-collecting the SCC. Therefore, we only need to signal the race during MSG_PEEK with a proper memory barrier to make it visible to the GC. Let's use seqcount_t to notify GC when MSG_PEEK occurs and let it defer the SCC to the next run. This way no locking is needed on the MSG_PEEK side, and we can avoid imposing a penalty on every MSG_PEEK unnecessarily. Note that we can retry within unix_scc_dead() if MSG_PEEK is detected, but we do not do so to avoid hung task splat from abusive MSG_PEEK calls.
Who exploits it and how urgent it is
A 0–100 score combining confirmed exploitation, ransomware and APT use, public exploits, EPSS and severity.
How the score was calculated
- EPSS 0.1% (30-day exploitation probability)+0
- Technical severity (medium)+3
The score orders the patch queue; it does not replace your asset context (internet exposure, criticality, compensating controls).
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the sources call it.
Remediation
Fixes and mitigations documented by the sources — linked to the original advisory.
- Documented patch — git.kernel.org (NIST National Vulnerability Database)
- Documented patch — git.kernel.org (NIST National Vulnerability Database)
- Documented patch — git.kernel.org (NIST National Vulnerability Database)
First 24 hours
Ordered from the record’s own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found. A rule-generated starting point.
- Identify exposed assets running the affected vendor/product/version combinations (Linux Linux, Linux Linux Kernel).
- Apply the fixed version or the patch documented under Remediation.
- Search available logs for exploit probes matching the vulnerability class (logic error), errors and authentication anomalies.
Affected scope
Vendor, product and versions as the sources word them.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
version 6.10≥ 6.6.93 and < 6.6.142≥ 6.1.141 and < 6.1.183≥ 118f457da9ed58a79e24b73c2ef0aa1987241f0e and < e5b31d988a41549037b8d8721a3c3cae893d8670≥ 118f457da9ed58a79e24b73c2ef0aa1987241f0e and < 37dd7ab332396eb8dd80b2dc7ea4b61abf767436≥ 118f457da9ed58a79e24b73c2ef0aa1987241f0e and < 72cf49ad50c16270b52bc512d9c2df5743922968≥ 118f457da9ed58a79e24b73c2ef0aa1987241f0e and < e3dd56fb5683ba80bf8d7a2f9aa21cfa53f05202≥ 7b1ffbd3b22e755d481d49647dcb7c5cfbde5844 and < 3106f326f67c03dd9da4ca64663d11e40138cf40 and 1 more≥ 61a75360dca93c945ef6bd757f8b8a96f39b77cb and < 980999a96e1ad043f1197606e5d637219cb102b9 |
Vulnerable | CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
| Linux | Linux Kernel |
version 7.0-rc6version 7.0-rc7≥ 6.1.141 and < 6.2version 7.0-rc5version 7.0-rc4version 7.0-rc3version 7.0-rc2version 7.0-rc1 and 4 moreversion 6.10≥ 6.19 and < 6.19.10≥ 6.10.1 and < 6.18.23≥ 6.6.93 and < 6.7 |
Vulnerable | NIST National Vulnerability Database |
Attack characteristics
The CVSS vector, decoded. It describes the attack, not your exposure to it.
Every base score collected
Sources score independently and may disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.
| Score | Version | Severity | Expl. | Impact | Scored by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.7 | CVSS 3.1 | Medium | 1.0 | 3.6 | nvd@nist.gov via NIST National Vulnerability Database |
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (score shown at the top: nvd@nist.gov) Weakness MITRE
Weakness class according to MITRE’s CWE catalog.
EPSS over time FIRST
Oct 13, 2026 → Oct 14, 2026 · 2 reading(s) · max 0.09%
Detection
Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not tested rules.
- Local/physical vector: focus on endpoint telemetry (EDR) from affected hosts.
Timeline
What happened to this CVE, newest first.
- 2026
- Affected products added · linux/linux
- Record published
- Fix documented
- CVSS changed · 4.7
- Source status changed · → Modified
- Record created in this database
- CVE published
Source activity
Repeated readings are counted rather than listed.
- 1× Official description updated · Oct 13, 2026 – Oct 13, 2026
References
6 on the record
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/37dd7ab332396eb8dd80b2dc7ea4b61abf767436
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/72cf49ad50c16270b52bc512d9c2df5743922968
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5b31d988a41549037b8d8721a3c3cae893d8670
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3dd56fb5683ba80bf8d7a2f9aa21cfa53f05202
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/3106f326f67c03dd9da4ca64663d11e40138cf40
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/980999a96e1ad043f1197606e5d637219cb102b9
Elsewhere on this site
Related CVEs (same products)
- Critical CVE-2026-99999 ipv4: validate checksum_start before completing checksum 8h
- Unknown CVE-2026-98432 ipv4: free inet_opt and ireq_opt after an RCU grace period 8h
- Unknown CVE-2026-98424 wifi: cfg80211: undo netns switch if renaming the wiphy fails 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98425 wifi: mac80211: don't warn when an IBSS has no channel to scan 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98426 wifi: mwifiex: fix IRQ leak using wrong index in MSI-X error path 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98427 net/sched: codel: bound the dropping loop per dequeue call 1d
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No CISA SSVC assessment.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record
Text assembled only from the fields above — no additional claims.
What should defenders know first?
CVE-2026-23394 is "af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened.", rated Medium. It affects Linux (Linux); versions are in the scope table. It is not in CISA KEV, which does not rule out exploitation. CVSS 4.7 describes technical severity. EPSS 0.09% estimates the probability of exploitation in 30 days; neither replaces your asset context. First verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run the affected versions, apply vendor fixes or mitigations, and preserve logs for review.
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