CVE-2026-34068 — nimiq-transaction: UpdateValidator transactions allows voting key change without proof-of-knowledge
nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, the staking contract accepts `UpdateValidator` transactions that set `new_voting_key=Some(...)` while omitting `new_proof_of_knowledge`. this skips the proof-of-knowledge requirement that is needed to prevent BLS rogue-key attacks when public keys are aggregated. Because tendermint macro block justification verification aggregates validator voting keys and verifies a single aggregated BLS signature against that aggregate public key, a rogue-key voting key in the validator set can allow an attacker to forge a quorum-looking justification while only producing a single signature. While the impact is critical, the exploitability is low: The voting keys are fixed for the epoch, so the attacker would need to know the next epoch validator set (chosen through VRF), which is unlikely. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.
Who exploits it and how urgent it is
A 0–100 score combining confirmed exploitation, ransomware and APT use, public exploits, EPSS and severity.
How the score was calculated
- EPSS 0.3% (30-day exploitation probability)+3
- Technical severity (medium)+3
The score orders the patch queue; it does not replace your asset context (internet exposure, criticality, compensating controls).
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the sources call it.
CISA SSVC assessment CISA
Three decision points CISA publishes for the CVEs it assesses (SSVC 2.0.3). A stakeholder decision, not a severity score.
Remediation
Fixes and mitigations documented by the sources — linked to the original advisory.
- Documented patch — github.com (NIST National Vulnerability Database)
- Documented patch — github.com (NIST National Vulnerability Database)
- Documented patch — github.com (NIST National Vulnerability Database)
First 24 hours
Ordered from the record’s own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found. A rule-generated starting point.
- Identify exposed assets running the affected vendor/product/version combinations (Nimiq Nimiq Proof-of-stake, Nimiq Nimiq-transaction).
- The attack is network-based and needs no privileges: restrict exposure (ACLs, VPN, WAF) until patched.
- Apply the fixed version or the patch documented under Remediation.
- Search available logs for exploit probes matching the vulnerability class (cryptography), errors and authentication anomalies.
Affected scope
Vendor, product and versions as the sources word them.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nimiq | Nimiq Proof-of-stake | < 1.3.0 | Vulnerable | NIST National Vulnerability Database |
| Nimiq | Nimiq-transaction | version < 1.3.0 | Vulnerable | CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
Attack characteristics
The CVSS vector, decoded. It describes the attack, not your exposure to it.
Every base score collected
Sources score independently and may disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.
| Score | Version | Severity | Expl. | Impact | Scored by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6.8 | CVSS 3.1 | Medium | 2.2 | 4.0 | security-advisories@github.com via NIST National Vulnerability Database |
| 6.8 | CVSS 3.1 | Medium | — | — | GitHub_M via CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N (score shown at the top: security-advisories@github.com) Weakness MITRE
Weakness class according to MITRE’s CWE catalog.
EPSS over time FIRST
Oct 13, 2026 → Oct 14, 2026 · 2 reading(s) · max 0.26%
Detection
Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not tested rules.
- Prioritize edge telemetry for the network-reachable component (proxy, WAF, IDS/IPS).
- Check TLS negotiations and unexpected certificates in the component’s traffic.
Timeline
What happened to this CVE, newest first.
- 2026
- Affected products added · nimiq/nimiq-transaction
- SSVC assessment updated
- Record published
- Fix documented
- CVSS changed · 6.8
- Source status changed · → Analyzed
- Record created in this database
- CVE published
Source activity
Repeated readings are counted rather than listed.
- 1× Official description updated · Oct 13, 2026 – Oct 13, 2026
References
4 on the record
Elsewhere on this site
Related CVEs (same products)
- Medium CVE-2026-34067 nimiq-transaction vulnerable to panic via `HistoryTreeProof` length mismatch Apr 22, 2026
- High CVE-2026-34065 nimiq-primitives: Node crash due to missing interlink validation in election macro block proposals Apr 22, 2026
- Medium CVE-2026-34066 nimiq-blockchain: Peer-triggerable panic during history sync Apr 22, 2026
- High CVE-2026-34064 nimiq-account: Vesting insufficient funds error can panic Apr 22, 2026
- Medium CVE-2026-34062 Nimiq has Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in its libp2p request/response Apr 22, 2026
- High CVE-2026-34063 network-libp2p: Peer can crash the node by opening discovery protocol substream twice Apr 22, 2026
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record
Text assembled only from the fields above — no additional claims.
What should defenders know first?
CVE-2026-34068 is "nimiq-transaction: UpdateValidator transactions allows voting key change without proof-of-knowledge", rated Medium. It affects Nimiq Proof-of-stake (Nimiq); versions are in the scope table. It is not in CISA KEV, which does not rule out exploitation. CVSS 6.8 describes technical severity. EPSS 0.26% estimates the probability of exploitation in 30 days; neither replaces your asset context. First verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run the affected versions, apply vendor fixes or mitigations, and preserve logs for review.
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