CVE-2026-63894 — usb: gadget: f_fs: serialize DMABUF cancel against request completion
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: serialize DMABUF cancel against request completion ffs_epfile_dmabuf_io_complete() calls usb_ep_free_request() on the completed request but leaves priv->req, the back-pointer that ffs_dmabuf_transfer() set on submission, pointing at the freed memory. A later FUNCTIONFS_DMABUF_DETACH ioctl or ffs_epfile_release() on the close path still sees priv->req non-NULL under ffs->eps_lock: if (priv->ep && priv->req) usb_ep_dequeue(priv->ep, priv->req); so usb_ep_dequeue() is called on a freed usb_request. On dummy_hcd the dequeue path only walks a live queue and pointer-compares, so the freed pointer reads without faulting and KASAN requires an explicit check at the FunctionFS call site to surface the use-after-free. On SG-capable in-tree UDCs the dequeue path dereferences the supplied request immediately: * chipidea's ep_dequeue() does container_of(req, struct ci_hw_req, req) and reads hwreq->req.status before acquiring its own lock. * cdnsp's cdnsp_gadget_ep_dequeue() reads request->status first. The narrower option of clearing priv->req via cmpxchg() in the completion does not close the race: the completion runs without eps_lock, so a cancel path holding eps_lock can still observe priv->req non-NULL, race a concurrent completion that clears and frees, and pass the freed pointer to usb_ep_dequeue(). A slightly longer fix that moves the free into the cleanup work is needed. Same class of lifetime race as the recent usbip-vudc timer fix [1]. Take eps_lock in the sole place that mutates priv->req from the callback direction by moving usb_ep_free_request() out of the completion into ffs_dmabuf_cleanup(), the existing work handler scheduled by ffs_dmabuf_signal_done() on ffs->io_completion_wq. Clear priv->req there under eps_lock before freeing, and only clear if priv->req still names our request (a subsequent ffs_dmabuf_transfer() on the same attachment may have queued a new one). This keeps the existing dummy_hcd sync-dequeue invariant: the completion callback is still invoked by the UDC without eps_lock held (dummy_hcd drops its own lock before calling the callback), and the callback now takes no f_fs lock at all. Serialization against the cancel path happens in cleanup, which runs from the workqueue with no f_fs lock held on entry. The priv ref count protects the containing ffs_dmabuf_priv: ffs_dmabuf_transfer() takes a ref via ffs_dmabuf_get(), cleanup drops it via ffs_dmabuf_put(), so priv stays live for the cleanup even after the cancel path's list_del + ffs_dmabuf_put. The ffs_dmabuf_transfer() error path no longer frees usb_req inline: fence->req and fence->ep are set before usb_ep_queue(), so ffs_dmabuf_cleanup() (scheduled by the error-path ffs_dmabuf_signal_done()) owns the free regardless of whether the queue succeeded. Reproduced under KASAN on both detach and close paths against dummy_hcd with an observability hook (kasan_check_byte(priv->req) immediately before usb_ep_dequeue) at the two FunctionFS cancel sites to surface the stale-pointer access; the hook is not part of this patch. The KASAN allocator / free stacks in the captured splats identify the same request: alloc in dummy_alloc_request, free in dummy_timer, fault reached from ffs_epfile_release (close) and from the FUNCTIONFS_DMABUF_DETACH ioctl (detach). With the patch applied, both paths are silent under the same hook. The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon (adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not reachable from unprivileged userspace or from a USB host on the cable. FunctionFS mounts default to GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, but the filesystem supports uid=, gid=, and fmode= delegation to a non-root gadget daemon, so on real deployments the attacker may be a less-privileged service rather than root.
Who exploits it and how urgent it is
A 0–100 score combining confirmed exploitation, ransomware and APT use, public exploits, EPSS and severity.
How the score was calculated
- Technical severity (high)+6
The score orders the patch queue; it does not replace your asset context (internet exposure, criticality, compensating controls).
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the sources call it.
Remediation
Fixes and mitigations documented by the sources — linked to the original advisory.
No fix documented by the sources we poll. That does not mean none exists: check the vendor advisory.
First 24 hours
Ordered from the record’s own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found. A rule-generated starting point.
- Identify exposed assets running the affected vendor/product/version combinations (Linux Linux).
- No fix documented in the sources: reduce exposure and monitor the vendor advisory.
- Search available logs for exploit probes, errors and authentication anomalies.
Affected scope
Vendor, product and versions as the sources word them.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux | ≥ 7b07a2a7ca02a20124b552be96c5a56910795488 and < c872d8a065b3b499ce4c3ad168b5d34b68524f66≥ 7b07a2a7ca02a20124b552be96c5a56910795488 and < c7d421123b98d5e9c1c84bd9957aba36f1cbb4ca≥ 7b07a2a7ca02a20124b552be96c5a56910795488 and < 552dae28dbeb5f7c4fafcda43962dc46569f58a0≥ 7b07a2a7ca02a20124b552be96c5a56910795488 and < 2796646f6d892c1eb6818c7ca41fdfa12568e8d1version 6.9 | Vulnerable | CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
Attack characteristics
The CVSS vector, decoded. It describes the attack, not your exposure to it.
Every base score collected
Sources score independently and may disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.
| Score | Version | Severity | Expl. | Impact | Scored by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7.8 | CVSS 3.1 | High | 1.8 | 5.9 | 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 via NIST National Vulnerability Database |
| 7.8 | CVSS 3.1 | High | — | — | Linux via CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (score shown at the top: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67) Detection
Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not tested rules.
- Local/physical vector: focus on endpoint telemetry (EDR) from affected hosts.
Timeline
What happened to this CVE, newest first.
- 2026
- Affected products added · linux/linux
- Record published
- CVSS changed · 7.8
- Source status changed · → Awaiting Analysis
- Record created in this database
- CVE published
Source activity
Repeated readings are counted rather than listed.
- 1× Official description updated · Oct 15, 2026 – Oct 15, 2026
References
4 on the record
Elsewhere on this site
Related CVEs (same products)
- Critical CVE-2026-99999 ipv4: validate checksum_start before completing checksum 14h
- Unknown CVE-2026-98432 ipv4: free inet_opt and ireq_opt after an RCU grace period 14h
- Unknown CVE-2026-98424 wifi: cfg80211: undo netns switch if renaming the wiphy fails 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98425 wifi: mac80211: don't warn when an IBSS has no channel to scan 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98426 wifi: mwifiex: fix IRQ leak using wrong index in MSI-X error path 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98427 net/sched: codel: bound the dropping loop per dequeue call 1d
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No FIRST EPSS score.
- No fixed version, patch or mitigation documented.
- No CISA SSVC assessment.
- No CWE classification.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record
Text assembled only from the fields above — no additional claims.
What should defenders know first?
CVE-2026-63894 is "usb: gadget: f_fs: serialize DMABUF cancel against request completion", rated High. It affects Linux (Linux); versions are in the scope table. It is not in CISA KEV, which does not rule out exploitation. CVSS 7.8 describes technical severity. First verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run the affected versions, apply vendor fixes or mitigations, and preserve logs for review.
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