CVE-2026-64527 — drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg->vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host wrote into hv->recv_buf. The completion path then runs memcpy(hv->init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload. Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on msg->vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped. SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted. Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bounded by VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE only on a successful receive; on -ENOBUFS vmbus_recvpacket() instead reports the required length, which can exceed hv->recv_buf, so copying bytes_recvd would read and write past the 16 KiB buffers. Gating on the success return keeps the copy bounded. The nonzero-return path is itself a malformed-message case and is now logged rather than silently skipped; channel recovery is not attempted. Rejected packets are reported via drm_err_ratelimited() rather than silently dropped, matching the CoCo-hardened pattern in hv_kvp_onchannelcallback().
Who exploits it and how urgent it is
A 0–100 score combining confirmed exploitation, ransomware and APT use, public exploits, EPSS and severity.
How the score was calculated
- EPSS 0.2% (30-day exploitation probability)+1
The score orders the patch queue; it does not replace your asset context (internet exposure, criticality, compensating controls).
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the sources call it.
Remediation
Fixes and mitigations documented by the sources — linked to the original advisory.
No fix documented by the sources we poll. That does not mean none exists: check the vendor advisory.
First 24 hours
Ordered from the record’s own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found. A rule-generated starting point.
- Identify exposed assets running the affected vendor/product/version combinations (Linux Linux).
- No fix documented in the sources: reduce exposure and monitor the vendor advisory.
- Search available logs for exploit probes, errors and authentication anomalies.
Affected scope
Vendor, product and versions as the sources word them.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux | ≥ 76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0 and < 57d5d697642e05d5dd2d40660817765943dd709f≥ 76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0 and < f5251226551bfec98c4705641b6f94ff1f238d91≥ 76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0 and < 049a6b474823049fe60212f25f26e4b30f44ee8f≥ 76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0 and < 588c84b461393ff1998ac7b97b04f953f642e0df≥ 76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0 and < 164dc7bf17609340233c6bf4f66bb7c7008a0511≥ 76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0 and < c8974d96b6a5496f33dc69a3ce28a7bf5078def4≥ 76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0 and < 7f87763f47a3c22fb50265a00619ef10f2394b18version 5.14 | Vulnerable | CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
Detection
Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not tested rules.
- Not enough vector or weakness data: use the affected application’s logs as a starting point.
Timeline
What happened to this CVE, newest first.
- 2026
- Record published
- Affected products added · linux/linux
- Source status changed · → Received
- Record created in this database
- CVE published
Source activity
Repeated readings are counted rather than listed.
- 1× Official description updated · Oct 15, 2026 – Oct 15, 2026
References
7 on the record
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/049a6b474823049fe60212f25f26e4b30f44ee8f
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/164dc7bf17609340233c6bf4f66bb7c7008a0511
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f87763f47a3c22fb50265a00619ef10f2394b18
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/588c84b461393ff1998ac7b97b04f953f642e0df
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8974d96b6a5496f33dc69a3ce28a7bf5078def4
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5251226551bfec98c4705641b6f94ff1f238d91
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/57d5d697642e05d5dd2d40660817765943dd709f
Elsewhere on this site
Related CVEs (same products)
- Critical CVE-2026-99999 ipv4: validate checksum_start before completing checksum 16h
- Unknown CVE-2026-98432 ipv4: free inet_opt and ireq_opt after an RCU grace period 16h
- Unknown CVE-2026-98426 wifi: mwifiex: fix IRQ leak using wrong index in MSI-X error path 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98424 wifi: cfg80211: undo netns switch if renaming the wiphy fails 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98425 wifi: mac80211: don't warn when an IBSS has no channel to scan 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98427 net/sched: codel: bound the dropping loop per dequeue call 1d
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No CVSS score published by NVD, the CNA, CISA or GitHub so far.
- No fixed version, patch or mitigation documented.
- No CISA SSVC assessment.
- No CWE classification.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record
Text assembled only from the fields above — no additional claims.
What should defenders know first?
CVE-2026-64527 is "drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback", rated Unknown. It affects Linux (Linux); versions are in the scope table. It is not in CISA KEV, which does not rule out exploitation. EPSS 0.16% estimates the probability of exploitation in 30 days; neither replaces your asset context. First verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run the affected versions, apply vendor fixes or mitigations, and preserve logs for review.
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