CVE-2026-73419 — NextAuth.js: OAuth state, nonce, and PKCE check cookies are not bound to the provider that created them
NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to@auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks state, nonce, and the PKCE verifier in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity, including the provider ID, issuer, client ID, or redirect URI. In a multi-provider application that permits account linking while logged in, when one provider's authorization request is observable and a target provider callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier, an attacker can lure a victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow and link the attacker's target-provider account to the victim's Auth.js user. The linked provider grants the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account, while cross-site request forgery alone is insufficient. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.
Who exploits it and how urgent it is
A 0–100 score combining confirmed exploitation, ransomware and APT use, public exploits, EPSS and severity.
How the score was calculated
- EPSS 0.2% (30-day exploitation probability)+2
- Technical severity (medium)+3
The score orders the patch queue; it does not replace your asset context (internet exposure, criticality, compensating controls).
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the sources call it.
CISA SSVC assessment CISA
Three decision points CISA publishes for the CVEs it assesses (SSVC 2.0.3). A stakeholder decision, not a severity score.
Remediation
Fixes and mitigations documented by the sources — linked to the original advisory.
No fix documented by the sources we poll. That does not mean none exists: check the vendor advisory.
First 24 hours
Ordered from the record’s own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found. A rule-generated starting point.
- Identify exposed assets running the affected vendor/product/version combinations (@auth Core, Nextauthjs Next-auth).
- The attack is network-based and needs no privileges: restrict exposure (ACLs, VPN, WAF) until patched.
- No fix documented in the sources: reduce exposure and monitor the vendor advisory.
- Exploitation requires user interaction: tighten email/web filtering and warn affected users.
- Search available logs for exploit probes matching the vulnerability class (integrity), errors and authentication anomalies.
Affected scope
Vendor, product and versions as the sources word them.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| @auth | Core | version < 0.41.3 | Vulnerable | CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
| Nextauthjs | Next-auth | version < 4.24.15version >= 5.0.0-beta.4, < 5.0.0-beta.32 | Vulnerable | CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
Attack characteristics
The CVSS vector, decoded. It describes the attack, not your exposure to it.
Every base score collected
Sources score independently and may disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.
| Score | Version | Severity | Expl. | Impact | Scored by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6.8 | CVSS 3.1 | Medium | 1.6 | 5.2 | security-advisories@github.com via NIST National Vulnerability Database |
| 6.8 | CVSS 3.1 | Medium | — | — | GitHub_M via CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N (score shown at the top: security-advisories@github.com) Weakness MITRE
Weakness class according to MITRE’s CWE catalog.
Detection
Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not tested rules.
- Prioritize edge telemetry for the network-reachable component (proxy, WAF, IDS/IPS).
Timeline
What happened to this CVE, newest first.
- 2026
- Affected products added · nextauthjs/next-auth, @auth/core
- SSVC assessment updated
- Record published
- CVSS changed · 6.8
- Source status changed · → Awaiting Analysis
- Record created in this database
- CVE published
Source activity
Repeated readings are counted rather than listed.
- 1× Official description updated · Oct 15, 2026 – Oct 15, 2026
References
7 on the record
- github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/next-auth@4.24.15
- github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/pull/13469
- github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/5bca2399a79ba8d116ca5179b4b1ebcd152e7f05
- github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279
- github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/next-auth@5.0.0-beta.32
- github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/9f7a97fade9b1319bb9ac19fc9828d62e0a2a852
- github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/@auth/core@0.41.3
Elsewhere on this site
Related CVEs (same products)
- Critical CVE-2026-73420 NextAuth.js: Email normalizer validates the address before Unicode normalization, allowing a homoglyph @ bypass Aug 13, 2026
- Critical CVE-2026-73421 NextAuth.js: Configuration errors can cause existence-based auth checks to fail open (auth object populated with an error) Aug 13, 2026
- High CVE-2026-73418 NextAuth.js: getToken() throws an uncaught exception on malformed Bearer authorization headers Aug 12, 2026
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No fixed version, patch or mitigation documented.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record
Text assembled only from the fields above — no additional claims.
What should defenders know first?
CVE-2026-73419 is "NextAuth.js: OAuth state, nonce, and PKCE check cookies are not bound to the provider that created them", rated Medium. It affects Core (@auth); versions are in the scope table. It is not in CISA KEV, which does not rule out exploitation. CVSS 6.8 describes technical severity. EPSS 0.25% estimates the probability of exploitation in 30 days; neither replaces your asset context. First verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run the affected versions, apply vendor fixes or mitigations, and preserve logs for review.
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