CVE Intelligence
Medium Cryptography

CVE-2026-79981 — DNS resolver reuses a single UDP source port for all queries, easing off-path answer spoofing

The DNS stub resolver in subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c binds one UDP socket per configured server when the resolver context is initialised (dns_resolve_init_locked() -> register_dispatcher() -> dns_dispatcher_register()), with the local port left at 0 so the stack picks an ephemeral port exactly once. dns_write() then sends every subsequent query from that same socket without re-binding, so the source port is constant for the lifetime of the resolver context while only the 16-bit transaction identifier (ctx->queries[i].id, drawn with sys_rand16_get()) varies per query. RFC 5452 section 9.2 requires both to vary; with a fixed port, an off-path attacker has to guess only the identifier. The stable port is cheap to learn. Any single observed query reveals it permanently, and it can also be found by probing the ephemeral UDP range: subsys/net/ip/connection.c answers unmatched unicast UDP with an ICMP port-unreachable, so the resolver's socket is the one port in that range that stays silent. Acceptance of a reply is decided solely by get_slot_by_id() matching the transaction identifier and a CRC-16 of the queried name — the reply's source address is never checked (dispatcher_cb() does ARG_UNUSED(addr)), so forged answers need not even be spoofed to appear to come from the configured server; they only need to reach the resolver's port. An attacker with UDP reachability to the device (same LAN, Wi-Fi or mesh segment, or a globally routable device address) can therefore flood answers for a predictable query name across the 16-bit identifier space during a query window and race the legitimate server. A win makes the application resolve an attacker-chosen address, and with CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_CACHE enabled the forged record is retained for its attacker-chosen TTL. The attack still requires winning that race, and applications that validate TLS certificates for the resolved endpoint are largely protected. The fix draws a fresh local port before each query to a server that has nothing outstanding: dns_randomize_source_port() unregisters the dispatcher, closes and reopens the socket, and re-registers it bound to port 0 so the system selects a new port, raising the per-query guessing space from roughly 16 to roughly 31 bits. Multicast DNS and LLMNR are excluded because their ports are protocol-fixed. The behaviour is controlled by CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_RANDOMIZE_SOURCE_PORT (default y).

Published Oct 23, 2026 · Updated Oct 26, 2026 · Sources: CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP, NIST National Vulnerability Database · CNA: zephyr

Who exploits it and how urgent it is

A 0–100 score combining confirmed exploitation, ransomware and APT use, public exploits, EPSS and severity.

No exploitation signal in the sources consulted so far.
How the score was calculated
  • EPSS 0.1% (30-day exploitation probability)+0
  • Technical severity (medium)+3

The score orders the patch queue; it does not replace your asset context (internet exposure, criticality, compensating controls).

Triage

Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the sources call it.

Exploitation
Not confirmed
Not in CISA KEV — an absence of record, not proof it is unexploited.
EPSS FIRST
0.12%
ahead of 2% of scored CVEs · Oct 29, 2026
Affects
Zephyrproject
Zephyr
CVSS base
6.5
Medium · 2 source(s)

Remediation

Fixes and mitigations documented by the sources — linked to the original advisory.

No fix documented by the sources we poll. That does not mean none exists: check the vendor advisory.

First 24 hours

Ordered from the record’s own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found. A rule-generated starting point.

  1. Identify exposed assets running the affected vendor/product/version combinations (Zephyrproject Zephyr).
  2. The attack is network-based and needs no privileges: restrict exposure (ACLs, VPN, WAF) until patched.
  3. No fix documented in the sources: reduce exposure and monitor the vendor advisory.
  4. Search available logs for exploit probes matching the vulnerability class (cryptography), errors and authentication anomalies.

Affected scope

Vendor, product and versions as the sources word them.

VendorProductVersionsStatusSource
Zephyrproject Zephyr ≥ 1.8.0 and < 4.5.0 Vulnerable CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP

Attack characteristics

The CVSS vector, decoded. It describes the attack, not your exposure to it.

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Every base score collected

Sources score independently and may disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.

ScoreVersionSeverityExpl.ImpactScored by
6.5 CVSS 3.1 Medium 2.2 4.2 vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org via NIST National Vulnerability Database
6.5 CVSS 3.1 Medium — — zephyr via CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N (score shown at the top: vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org)

Weakness MITRE

Weakness class according to MITRE’s CWE catalog.

CWE-330 · Use of Insufficiently Random Values

Other CVEs with this weakness →

EPSS over time FIRST

Oct 24, 2026 → Oct 29, 2026 · 6 reading(s) · max 0.20%

Detection

Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not tested rules.

  • Prioritize edge telemetry for the network-reachable component (proxy, WAF, IDS/IPS).
  • Check TLS negotiations and unexpected certificates in the component’s traffic.
web/proxy/WAF logsnetwork IDS/IPS

Timeline

What happened to this CVE, newest first.

  • 2026
  • Source status changed · Received → Awaiting Analysis
    Oct 26, 2026 · NIST National Vulnerability Database
  • Source status changed · Published → Received
    Oct 23, 2026 · NIST National Vulnerability Database
  • Record published
    Oct 23, 2026
  • CVSS changed · 6.5
    Oct 23, 2026 · CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP
  • Source status changed · → Published
    Oct 23, 2026 · CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP
  • Record created in this database
    Oct 23, 2026 · CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP
  • CVE published
    Oct 23, 2026 · zephyr

Source activity

Repeated readings are counted rather than listed.

  • 1× Official description updated · Oct 23, 2026 – Oct 23, 2026

References

2 on the record

Elsewhere on this site

Zephyrproject
every CVE for this vendor
Cryptography
same class
CWE-330
other pages naming this weakness

Related CVEs (same products)

  • High CVE-2026-82961 Unvalidated pin index in GPIO syscall handlers allows out-of-bounds kernel writes from user mode 1d
  • Medium CVE-2026-82962 Out-of-bounds write in Zephyr Ethernet L2 when adding the link-layer header to a forwarded packet 1d
  • Medium CVE-2026-82389 Bluetooth Classic HFP AG wipes an object still linked in the SDP request list on connect failure, causing a NULL dereference 3d
  • High CVE-2026-81038 Bluetooth OTS server discloses uninitialized stack memory in failed Calculate Checksum responses 3d
  • Medium CVE-2026-81039 Bluetooth Host connection reservation leak when multiple connectable advertising sets share an identity 3d
  • Medium CVE-2026-82388 Use of a released HFP HF object after a failed RFCOMM connect in the Bluetooth Classic host 3d

Not in any source we poll

Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.

  • No fixed version, patch or mitigation documented.
  • No CISA SSVC assessment.
  • No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
  • No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
  • No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.

Answered from this record

Text assembled only from the fields above — no additional claims.

What should defenders know first?

CVE-2026-79981 is "DNS resolver reuses a single UDP source port for all queries, easing off-path answer spoofing", rated Medium. It affects Zephyr (Zephyrproject); versions are in the scope table. It is not in CISA KEV, which does not rule out exploitation. CVSS 6.5 describes technical severity. EPSS 0.12% estimates the probability of exploitation in 30 days; neither replaces your asset context. First verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run the affected versions, apply vendor fixes or mitigations, and preserve logs for review.

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