CVE-2026-89966 — mm/hugetlb_cma: fix null nodemask dereference in hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/hugetlb_cma: fix null nodemask dereference in hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio alloc_buddy_hugetlb_folio_with_mpol() can pass a NULL nodemask to alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio() as a fallback to allocate from all nodes. If order is gigantic, alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio() propagates the NULL nodemask down to hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio() via alloc_gigantic_frozen_folio(). Additionally, hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio() previously attempted allocation on hugetlb_cma[nid] without verifying if nid is included in the caller's nodemask. Adding a node_isset(nid, *nodemask) check ensures the initial preferred node allocation honors the memory policy / nodemask. However, hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio() dereferences the nodemask in node_isset(nid, *nodemask) and for_each_node_mask(node, *nodemask), leading to a null pointer dereference kernel panic when nodemask is NULL. Fix this by checking if nodemask is NULL in hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio() and defaulting it to cpuset_current_mems_allowed. Enclose the allocation attempts within the cpuset seqcount retry loop so that if the cpuset changes concurrently during allocation, the attempts are retried using the updated nodemask. This ensures that the initial node check and fallback loop safely honor the task's cpuset without violating cpuset constraints or causing NULL pointer dereferences or unexpected allocation failures. From a userspace perspective, this bug allows an unprivileged user to crash the kernel (trigger a panic) by requesting a gigantic hugepage allocation with MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY on a system where CMA is only configured on a subset of NUMA nodes. This can be reproduced by booting a VM with two NUMA nodes, restricting CMA to Node 1 (e.g., hugetlb_cma=1:1G default_hugepagesz=1G hugepagesz=1G hugepages=0), and running a program that allocates a 1GB hugepage area without reserving, restricts allocation to Node 0 using mbind() with MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY, and triggers a page fault: void *ptr = mmap(NULL, 1UL << 30, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_HUGETLB | MAP_HUGE_1GB | MAP_NORESERVE, -1, 0); unsigned long nodemask = 1; /* Node 0 */ mbind(ptr, 1UL << 30, MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY, &nodemask, sizeof(nodemask) * 8, 0); memset(ptr, 0, 1UL << 30); /* Trigger fault */ This results in a NULL pointer dereference: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio+0x75/0x120 Call Trace: <TASK> only_alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio.isra.0+0x2c/0x160 alloc_surplus_hugetlb_folio+0x6d/0x100 alloc_hugetlb_folio+0x3c5/0x660 hugetlb_no_page+0x3d9/0x650
Who exploits it and how urgent it is
A 0–100 score combining confirmed exploitation, ransomware and APT use, public exploits, EPSS and severity.
How the score was calculated
- EPSS 0.2% (30-day exploitation probability)+1
The score orders the patch queue; it does not replace your asset context (internet exposure, criticality, compensating controls).
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the sources call it.
Remediation
Fixes and mitigations documented by the sources — linked to the original advisory.
No fix documented by the sources we poll. That does not mean none exists: check the vendor advisory.
First 24 hours
Ordered from the record’s own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found. A rule-generated starting point.
- Identify exposed assets running the affected vendor/product/version combinations (Linux Linux).
- No fix documented in the sources: reduce exposure and monitor the vendor advisory.
- Search available logs for exploit probes, errors and authentication anomalies.
Affected scope
Vendor, product and versions as the sources word them.
EPSS over time FIRST
Oct 15, 2026 → Oct 19, 2026 · 4 reading(s) · max 0.20%
Detection
Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not tested rules.
- Not enough vector or weakness data: use the affected application’s logs as a starting point.
Timeline
What happened to this CVE, newest first.
- 2026
- Record published
- Affected products added · linux/linux
- Source status changed · → Received
- Record created in this database
- CVE published
Source activity
Repeated readings are counted rather than listed.
- 1× References added · Oct 19, 2026 – Oct 19, 2026
- 1× Official description updated · Oct 15, 2026 – Oct 15, 2026
References
4 on the record
Elsewhere on this site
Related CVEs (same products)
- Unknown CVE-2026-98866 sched/cache: Introduce task_struct->sched_cache_grp to fix UAF 2d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98867 dm-pcache: bound the logical key offset from persistent memory 2d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98868 dm-pcache: reject a kset that overruns its segment 2d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98856 kprobes: Skip disarmed probes when checking optkprobe overlap 2d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98857 ipvs: bound LBLCR and LBLC cache growth 2d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98858 io_uring: fix task_work add use-after-free with SQPOLL 2d
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No CVSS score published by NVD, the CNA, CISA or GitHub so far.
- No fixed version, patch or mitigation documented.
- No CISA SSVC assessment.
- No CWE classification.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record
Text assembled only from the fields above — no additional claims.
What should defenders know first?
CVE-2026-89966 is "mm/hugetlb_cma: fix null nodemask dereference in hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio", rated Unknown. It affects Linux (Linux); versions are in the scope table. It is not in CISA KEV, which does not rule out exploitation. EPSS 0.20% estimates the probability of exploitation in 30 days; neither replaces your asset context. First verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run the affected versions, apply vendor fixes or mitigations, and preserve logs for review.
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