CVE-2026-90200 — fs/ntfs3: fix integer overflow in MFT cluster validation
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: fix integer overflow in MFT cluster validation In ntfs_init_from_boot(), the boot sector's MFT cluster numbers are validated against the volume size with: if (mlcn * sct_per_clst >= sectors || mlcn2 * sct_per_clst >= sectors) goto out; mlcn and mlcn2 are u64 fields read directly from the boot sector. sct_per_clst is bounded above by 4096 (true_sectors_per_clst() plus the is_power_of_2() check below it), but the multiplication is done in u64 and wraps when mlcn (or mlcn2) is large enough -- e.g. mlcn near 2^62 with sct_per_clst == 4 wraps to 0, which compares below any non-zero 'sectors', so the check is bypassed and the malformed record is accepted. The accepted mlcn is then used unchanged in sbi->mft.lbo = mlcn << cluster_bits; In practice the resulting reads fail at the block layer (sb_bread() returns NULL via grow_buffers()'s check_mul_overflow() guard), so today this manifests as mount failing in odd places rather than as something more dangerous, but the validation step is still wrong and there is no reason for callers to rely on the block layer to catch a value that should never have been accepted in the first place. Use check_mul_overflow() to compute the two sector positions and fail the mount if either multiplication wraps; this preserves the existing semantics (mlcn * sct_per_clst >= sectors) instead of switching to division (mlcn >= sectors / sct_per_clst), which would tighten the check at edge cases where 'sectors' is not a multiple of sct_per_clst. The check_*_overflow() style is the one ntfs3 already uses for similar on-disk arithmetic in fs/ntfs3/run.c.
Who exploits it and how urgent it is
A 0–100 score combining confirmed exploitation, ransomware and APT use, public exploits, EPSS and severity.
How the score was calculated
- EPSS 0.2% (30-day exploitation probability)+2
The score orders the patch queue; it does not replace your asset context (internet exposure, criticality, compensating controls).
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the sources call it.
Remediation
Fixes and mitigations documented by the sources — linked to the original advisory.
No fix documented by the sources we poll. That does not mean none exists: check the vendor advisory.
First 24 hours
Ordered from the record’s own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found. A rule-generated starting point.
- Identify exposed assets running the affected vendor/product/version combinations (Linux Linux).
- No fix documented in the sources: reduce exposure and monitor the vendor advisory.
- Search available logs for exploit probes, errors and authentication anomalies.
Affected scope
Vendor, product and versions as the sources word them.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux | ≥ 82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 and < f77a8d9fdf58e298b36564a44c27fadc617bdd28≥ 82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 and < 805cc5554b13d045dce9b03c13eaf015418739fd≥ 82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 and < dc6d85de7e2656e56e10ff5ba514f2583a4f612b≥ 82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 and < 169383d8914b8fe03464a83540b5b6de3e7831af≥ 82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17 and < c510c63873103a5da6a498fe537bdb5d6f8d03a2version 5.15 | Vulnerable | CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
EPSS over time FIRST
Oct 15, 2026 → Oct 19, 2026 · 4 reading(s) · max 0.22%
Detection
Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not tested rules.
- Not enough vector or weakness data: use the affected application’s logs as a starting point.
Timeline
What happened to this CVE, newest first.
- 2026
- Record published
- Affected products added · linux/linux
- Source status changed · → Received
- Record created in this database
- CVE published
Source activity
Repeated readings are counted rather than listed.
- 1× References added · Oct 19, 2026 – Oct 19, 2026
- 1× Official description updated · Oct 15, 2026 – Oct 15, 2026
References
7 on the record
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc6d85de7e2656e56e10ff5ba514f2583a4f612b
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/c510c63873103a5da6a498fe537bdb5d6f8d03a2
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-h945-5whj-h8mc
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/169383d8914b8fe03464a83540b5b6de3e7831af
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/f77a8d9fdf58e298b36564a44c27fadc617bdd28
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90200
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/805cc5554b13d045dce9b03c13eaf015418739fd
Elsewhere on this site
Related CVEs (same products)
- Unknown CVE-2026-98866 sched/cache: Introduce task_struct->sched_cache_grp to fix UAF 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98867 dm-pcache: bound the logical key offset from persistent memory 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98868 dm-pcache: reject a kset that overruns its segment 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98856 kprobes: Skip disarmed probes when checking optkprobe overlap 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98857 ipvs: bound LBLCR and LBLC cache growth 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98858 io_uring: fix task_work add use-after-free with SQPOLL 1d
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No CVSS score published by NVD, the CNA, CISA or GitHub so far.
- No fixed version, patch or mitigation documented.
- No CISA SSVC assessment.
- No CWE classification.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record
Text assembled only from the fields above — no additional claims.
What should defenders know first?
CVE-2026-90200 is "fs/ntfs3: fix integer overflow in MFT cluster validation", rated Unknown. It affects Linux (Linux); versions are in the scope table. It is not in CISA KEV, which does not rule out exploitation. EPSS 0.22% estimates the probability of exploitation in 30 days; neither replaces your asset context. First verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run the affected versions, apply vendor fixes or mitigations, and preserve logs for review.
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