CVE-2026-97476 — rds: filter RDS_INFO_* getsockopt by caller's netns
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rds: filter RDS_INFO_* getsockopt by caller's netns The RDS_INFO_* family of getsockopt(2) options reads several file-scope global lists that are not per-netns: rds_sock_info / rds6_sock_info, rds_sock_inc_info / rds6_sock_inc_info -> rds_sock_list rds_tcp_tc_info / rds6_tcp_tc_info -> rds_tcp_tc_list rds_conn_info / rds6_conn_info, rds_conn_message_info_cmn (for the *_SEND_MESSAGES and *_RETRANS_MESSAGES variants), rds_for_each_conn_info (for RDS_INFO_IB_CONNECTIONS) -> rds_conn_hash[] The handlers do not filter by the caller's network namespace. rds_info_getsockopt() has no netns or capable() check, and rds_create() has no capable() check, so AF_RDS is reachable from an unprivileged user namespace. As a result, an unprivileged caller in a fresh user_ns plus netns can read the bound address and sock inode of every RDS socket on the host, the peer address of incoming messages on every RDS socket on the host, the peer address and TCP sequence numbers of every rds-tcp connection on the host, and the peer address and RDS sequence numbers of every RDS connection on the host. The rds-tcp transport is reachable from a non-initial netns (see rds_set_transport()), so a one-shot init_net gate at rds_info_getsockopt() would deny legitimate per-netns visibility to rds-tcp callers. Instead, filter at each handler by comparing the netns of the caller's socket to the netns of the list entry, or to rds_conn_net(conn) for connection paths. Only copy entries whose netns matches the caller. Counters (RDS_INFO_COUNTERS) are aggregate statistics and remain global. Reproducer (KASAN VM, rds and rds_tcp loaded): an AF_RDS socket binds 127.0.0.1:4242 in init_net as root. A child process enters a fresh user_ns plus netns and opens AF_RDS there, then calls getsockopt(SOL_RDS, RDS_INFO_SOCKETS). Before this change, the child sees the init_net socket. After this change, the child sees zero entries. Drop the rds_sock_count, rds_tcp_tc_count, and rds6_tcp_tc_count globals. v2 used them for the size precheck and lens->nr; v3 replaced the precheck with a per-ns count from a first pass over the list, so the globals have no remaining readers. The matching increments and decrements in rds_create()/rds_destroy_sock() and rds_tcp_set_callbacks()/rds_tcp_restore_callbacks() go away with them. Reported by the kernel test robot under clang W=1.
Who exploits it and how urgent it is
A 0–100 score combining confirmed exploitation, ransomware and APT use, public exploits, EPSS and severity.
How the score was calculated
- EPSS 0.2% (30-day exploitation probability)+1
The score orders the patch queue; it does not replace your asset context (internet exposure, criticality, compensating controls).
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the sources call it.
Remediation
Fixes and mitigations documented by the sources — linked to the original advisory.
No fix documented by the sources we poll. That does not mean none exists: check the vendor advisory.
First 24 hours
Ordered from the record’s own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found. A rule-generated starting point.
- Identify exposed assets running the affected vendor/product/version combinations (Linux Linux).
- No fix documented in the sources: reduce exposure and monitor the vendor advisory.
- Search available logs for exploit probes, errors and authentication anomalies.
Affected scope
Vendor, product and versions as the sources word them.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux | ≥ 639b321b4d8f4e412bfbb2a4a19bfebc1e68ace4 and < 64ca5839916176c3451f61a2c7178033423c67d7≥ 639b321b4d8f4e412bfbb2a4a19bfebc1e68ace4 and < 8b04dda272c30d46834bb03dd2895b08c090483b≥ 639b321b4d8f4e412bfbb2a4a19bfebc1e68ace4 and < f05142d0eeaa6e8227511c88e10a2b8fe7a78fc4≥ 639b321b4d8f4e412bfbb2a4a19bfebc1e68ace4 and < 65fae4b42269dbea7e3842ae4dd0786162c6248e≥ 639b321b4d8f4e412bfbb2a4a19bfebc1e68ace4 and < 093f172296d32499ffac7809629b206178776eb6≥ 639b321b4d8f4e412bfbb2a4a19bfebc1e68ace4 and < c4081e49ebe0e3160c4b70ec7639494792dee206≥ 639b321b4d8f4e412bfbb2a4a19bfebc1e68ace4 and < c96a5209dda666004b8ee1ed7f0d493d09a4f200version 2.6.30 | Vulnerable | CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
EPSS over time FIRST
Oct 15, 2026 → Oct 16, 2026 · 2 reading(s) · max 0.17%
Detection
Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not tested rules.
- Not enough vector or weakness data: use the affected application’s logs as a starting point.
Timeline
What happened to this CVE, newest first.
- 2026
- Record published
- Affected products added · linux/linux
- Source status changed · → Received
- Record created in this database
- CVE published
Source activity
Repeated readings are counted rather than listed.
- 1× Official description updated · Oct 15, 2026 – Oct 15, 2026
References
7 on the record
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4081e49ebe0e3160c4b70ec7639494792dee206
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/093f172296d32499ffac7809629b206178776eb6
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/c96a5209dda666004b8ee1ed7f0d493d09a4f200
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/f05142d0eeaa6e8227511c88e10a2b8fe7a78fc4
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/65fae4b42269dbea7e3842ae4dd0786162c6248e
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/64ca5839916176c3451f61a2c7178033423c67d7
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b04dda272c30d46834bb03dd2895b08c090483b
Elsewhere on this site
Related CVEs (same products)
- Critical CVE-2026-99999 ipv4: validate checksum_start before completing checksum 2d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98432 ipv4: free inet_opt and ireq_opt after an RCU grace period 2d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98424 wifi: cfg80211: undo netns switch if renaming the wiphy fails 3d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98425 wifi: mac80211: don't warn when an IBSS has no channel to scan 3d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98426 wifi: mwifiex: fix IRQ leak using wrong index in MSI-X error path 3d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98427 net/sched: codel: bound the dropping loop per dequeue call 3d
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No CVSS score published by NVD, the CNA, CISA or GitHub so far.
- No fixed version, patch or mitigation documented.
- No CISA SSVC assessment.
- No CWE classification.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record
Text assembled only from the fields above — no additional claims.
What should defenders know first?
CVE-2026-97476 is "rds: filter RDS_INFO_* getsockopt by caller's netns", rated Unknown. It affects Linux (Linux); versions are in the scope table. It is not in CISA KEV, which does not rule out exploitation. EPSS 0.17% estimates the probability of exploitation in 30 days; neither replaces your asset context. First verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run the affected versions, apply vendor fixes or mitigations, and preserve logs for review.
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