CVE-2026-98302 — net: fddi: skfp: fix NULL deref when setting the MAC address while down
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: fddi: skfp: fix NULL deref when setting the MAC address while down skfp_ctl_set_mac_address() calls ResetAdapter() unconditionally, without checking netif_running(). ResetAdapter() first calls card_stop(), which sets smc->hw.hw_state to STOPPED, and then mac_drv_clear_tx_queue(), which walks the two transmit queues: for (i = QUEUE_S; i <= QUEUE_A0; i++) { queue = smc->hw.fp.tx[i] ; ... t = queue->tx_curr_get ; smc->hw.fp.tx[] is only populated by init_tx(), which is reached from skfp_open() through init_smt() -> init_fddi_driver() -> init_fplus() -> init_mac() -> init_tx(). The private area is allocated and zeroed by alloc_fddidev(), so on an interface that has never been brought up both queue pointers are still NULL. The hw_state test at the top of mac_drv_clear_tx_queue() does not catch this, because card_stop() has just set STOPPED; the function proceeds into the loop and dereferences NULL. ResetAdapter() does call init_smt() itself, but only after the queues have been cleared. Setting the MAC address on a down interface therefore oopses: ip link set dev fddi0 address 02:00:00:00:00:01 BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mac_drv_clear_tx_queue+0x68/0x2c0 [skfp] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000010 by task ip/302 Call Trace: <TASK> mac_drv_clear_tx_queue+0x68/0x2c0 [skfp 6c01d4bab63c36978bd0a7d7e90837adb44cc37b] ResetAdapter+0x29/0x100 [skfp 6c01d4bab63c36978bd0a7d7e90837adb44cc37b] skfp_ctl_set_mac_address+0x57/0x80 [skfp 6c01d4bab63c36978bd0a7d7e90837adb44cc37b] netif_set_mac_address+0x1e4/0x2c0 do_setlink+0x684/0x2680 </TASK> Address 0x10 is the offset of tx_curr_get, the third pointer in struct s_smt_tx_queue, on 64-bit. mac_drv_clear_rx_queue(), which ResetAdapter() calls immediately afterwards, dereferences smc->hw.fp.rx[QUEUE_R1] in the same way behind the same ineffective hw_state test; the transmit queue merely crashes first. Both are covered by the guard below. Skip the adapter reset when the interface is down. dev_addr_set() is left unconditional, so the new address is still recorded in dev->dev_addr. Nothing is lost by not resetting the adapter here: skfp_open() deliberately re-reads the factory address on every open, read_address(smc, NULL); eth_hw_addr_set(dev, smc->hw.fddi_canon_addr.a); and the comment above it states this is done to discard exactly such an address override across a close/open cycle. An address set while the interface is down could not have survived the following open even before this change, so the guard removes no working behaviour. Guarding the hardware side of ndo_set_mac_address() with netif_running() is established practice; skge_set_mac_address() has done so since commit 2eb3e621c4e0 ("skge: set mac address bonding fix"). Guarding the reset as a whole, rather than NULL-checking the queues, is also what the rest of the driver expects. After a previous open/close the queue pointers are stale but non-NULL, so there is no crash, yet ResetAdapter() goes on to call smt_online() and STI_FBI() ("Enable Board Interrupts") while skfp_close() has already called free_irq() - the adapter would be brought back online with no handler installed. The only other ResetAdapter() caller is skfp_interrupt(), which by construction runs only while the device is open. Found by automated driver testing against an emulated SysKonnect FDDI adapter under a KASAN-enabled 7.0.0 kernel. Triggering it requires CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Who exploits it and how urgent it is
A 0–100 score combining confirmed exploitation, ransomware and APT use, public exploits, EPSS and severity.
How the score was calculated
- EPSS 0.2% (30-day exploitation probability)+1
The score orders the patch queue; it does not replace your asset context (internet exposure, criticality, compensating controls).
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the sources call it.
Remediation
Fixes and mitigations documented by the sources — linked to the original advisory.
No fix documented by the sources we poll. That does not mean none exists: check the vendor advisory.
First 24 hours
Ordered from the record’s own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found. A rule-generated starting point.
- Identify exposed assets running the affected vendor/product/version combinations (Linux Linux).
- No fix documented in the sources: reduce exposure and monitor the vendor advisory.
- Search available logs for exploit probes, errors and authentication anomalies.
Affected scope
Vendor, product and versions as the sources word them.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and < 835903bea770ad96ab4322e18d98e00f8e0b39c3≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and < 5fd0f401b3eee95c93daa35ef99cb03d676031f0≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and < 731db6110b3148331ed8d5d11a564bfd520721d9≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and < 822903ed991971780db1db1be31a4f00e2b13e30≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and < 616ba18b2cfb72b7bea214bdd72df2485b2e37dc≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and < d6f63fdb298d546a47790cb373db65462c264d04≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and < 438131e7ae847e907d345bf504d7e25585561b5c≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and < 7c8810c2e69c3d9ca6df870b40ae9218e50b4fb1 and 1 moreversion 2.6.12 |
Vulnerable | CVE Program (cve.org) e CISA ADP |
EPSS over time FIRST
Oct 13, 2026 → Oct 15, 2026 · 3 reading(s) · max 0.18%
Detection
Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not tested rules.
- Not enough vector or weakness data: use the affected application’s logs as a starting point.
Timeline
What happened to this CVE, newest first.
- 2026
- Record published
- Affected products added · linux/linux
- Source status changed · → Received
- Record created in this database
- CVE published
Source activity
Repeated readings are counted rather than listed.
- 1× Official description updated · Oct 13, 2026 – Oct 13, 2026
References
8 on the record
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/5fd0f401b3eee95c93daa35ef99cb03d676031f0
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/d6f63fdb298d546a47790cb373db65462c264d04
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/822903ed991971780db1db1be31a4f00e2b13e30
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/438131e7ae847e907d345bf504d7e25585561b5c
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/835903bea770ad96ab4322e18d98e00f8e0b39c3
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c8810c2e69c3d9ca6df870b40ae9218e50b4fb1
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/731db6110b3148331ed8d5d11a564bfd520721d9
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/616ba18b2cfb72b7bea214bdd72df2485b2e37dc
Elsewhere on this site
Related CVEs (same products)
- Critical CVE-2026-99999 ipv4: validate checksum_start before completing checksum 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98432 ipv4: free inet_opt and ireq_opt after an RCU grace period 1d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98424 wifi: cfg80211: undo netns switch if renaming the wiphy fails 2d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98425 wifi: mac80211: don't warn when an IBSS has no channel to scan 2d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98426 wifi: mwifiex: fix IRQ leak using wrong index in MSI-X error path 2d
- Unknown CVE-2026-98427 net/sched: codel: bound the dropping loop per dequeue call 2d
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No CVSS score published by NVD, the CNA, CISA or GitHub so far.
- No fixed version, patch or mitigation documented.
- No CISA SSVC assessment.
- No CWE classification.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record
Text assembled only from the fields above — no additional claims.
What should defenders know first?
CVE-2026-98302 is "net: fddi: skfp: fix NULL deref when setting the MAC address while down", rated Unknown. It affects Linux (Linux); versions are in the scope table. It is not in CISA KEV, which does not rule out exploitation. EPSS 0.18% estimates the probability of exploitation in 30 days; neither replaces your asset context. First verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run the affected versions, apply vendor fixes or mitigations, and preserve logs for review.
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