CVE Database

Nokogiri is an open source XML and HTML library for the Ruby programming language. Prior to 1.19.4, Nokogiri::XML::NodeSet#[] (and its alias #slice) checked the requested index against the node set's bounds using a 32-bit-truncated copy of the index. A large negative index could pass the check and then be used at full width, reading outside the node set's storage. On CRuby this is an out-of-bounds read that typically crashes the process; on JRuby it is not memory-unsafe but returns an incorrect node. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.19.4.

In EmberZNet v9.0.2 and earlier, malformed OTA requests can drive the OTA server parser into out-of-bounds reads. A limited amount of data from RAM is read back to the requester. The size and location of this data is limited. These requests must come from a device that has already joined the network. Only devices supporting the OTA Server cluster may be impacted.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: conntrack_irc: fix possible out-of-bounds read When parsing fails after we've matched the command string we should bail out instead of trying to match a different command. This helper should be deprecated, given prevalence of TLS I doubt it has any relevance in 2026.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: validate advertising TLV before type checks tlv_data_is_valid() reads each advertising data field length from data[i], then inspects data[i + 1] for managed EIR types before checking that the current field still fits inside the supplied buffer. A malformed field whose length byte is the last byte of the buffer can therefore make the parser read one byte past the advertising data. KASAN reported the following when a malformed MGMT_OP_ADD_ADVERTISING request reached that path: BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in tlv_data_is_valid() Read of size 1 Call trace: tlv_data_is_valid() add_advertising() hci_mgmt_cmd() hci_sock_sendmsg() Move the existing element-length check before any type-octet inspection so each non-empty element is proven to contain its type byte before the parser looks at data[i + 1].

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: validate skb length in MCC handlers The RFCOMM MCC handlers cast skb->data to protocol-specific structs without validating skb->len first. A malicious remote device can send truncated MCC frames and trigger out-of-bounds reads in these handlers. Fix this by using skb_pull_data() to validate and access the required data before dereferencing it. rfcomm_recv_rpn() requires special handling since ETSI TS 07.10 allows 1-byte RPN requests. Handle this by validating only the DLCI byte first, and validating the full struct only when len > 1.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: bnep: reject short frames before parsing A BNEP peer can send a short BNEP SDU. bnep_rx_frame() reads the packet type byte immediately and, for control packets, reads the control opcode and setup UUID-size byte before proving that those bytes are present. bnep_rx_control() also dereferences the control opcode without rejecting an empty control payload. Use skb_pull_data() for the fixed fields in bnep_rx_frame() so a NULL return gates each dereference. Split the control handler so the frame path can pass an opcode that has already been pulled, and keep the byte-buffer wrapper for extension control payloads. For BNEP_SETUP_CONN_REQ, name the UUID-size byte before pulling the setup payload. struct bnep_setup_conn_req carries destination and source service UUIDs after that byte, each uuid_size bytes, so the parser now documents that tuple explicitly instead of leaving the pull length as an opaque multiplication. Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in bnep_rx_frame.isra.0+0x130c/0x1790 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c0f7908 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 1-byte region [ffff88800c0f7908, ffff88800c0f7909) Read of size 1 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0xb3/0x140 (?:?) print_address_description+0x57/0x3a0 (?:?) bnep_rx_frame+0x130c/0x1790 (net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c:306) print_report+0xb9/0x2b0 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x1ba/0x3a0 (?:?) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) kasan_addr_to_slab+0x21/0x60 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?) process_one_work+0xfce/0x17e0 (kernel/workqueue.c:3200) worker_thread+0x65c/0xe40 (?:?) __kthread_parkme+0x184/0x230 (?:?) kthread+0x35e/0x470 (?:?) _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?) ret_from_fork+0x586/0x870 (?:?) __switch_to+0x74f/0xdc0 (?:?) ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 (?:?)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in mlx5_query_nic_vport_mac_list mlx5_query_nic_vport_mac_list() sizes its firmware command buffer using the PF's log_max_current_uc/mc_list capabilities. When querying a VF vport with a larger configured max (via devlink), the firmware response can overflow this buffer: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mlx5_query_nic_vport_mac_list+0x453/0x4c0 [mlx5_core] Read of size 4 at addr ff1100013ffc8a12 by task kworker/u96:2/385 CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 385 Comm: kworker/u96:2 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6+ #1 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009) Workqueue: mlx5_esw_wq esw_vport_change_handler [mlx5_core] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xa0 print_report+0x176/0x4e4 kasan_report+0xc8/0x100 mlx5_query_nic_vport_mac_list+0x453/0x4c0 [mlx5_core] esw_update_vport_addr_list+0x2e3/0xda0 [mlx5_core] esw_vport_change_handle_locked+0xa1f/0x1060 [mlx5_core] esw_vport_change_handler+0x6a/0x90 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x87f/0x15e0 worker_thread+0x62b/0x1020 kthread+0x375/0x490 ret_from_fork+0x4dc/0x810 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> Fix by querying the vport's own HCA caps to size the buffer correctly. Refactor the function to allocate and return the MAC list internally, removing the caller's dependency on knowing the correct max.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: guard timestamp cmsgs to real error queue skbs skb_is_err_queue() treats PACKET_OUTGOING as the sole marker for an skb from sk_error_queue. That assumption is not true for AF_PACKET sockets: outgoing packet taps are also delivered to packet sockets with skb->pkt_type == PACKET_OUTGOING, but their skb->cb is owned by AF_PACKET instead of struct sock_exterr_skb. If such an skb is received with timestamping enabled, the generic timestamp cmsg path can read AF_PACKET control-buffer state as sock_exterr_skb::opt_stats. With SO_RXQ_OVFL enabled, the packet drop counter overlaps opt_stats. An odd drop count makes the path emit SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS with skb->len and skb->data. For non-linear skbs this copies past the linear head and can trigger hardened usercopy or disclose adjacent heap contents. Keep skb_is_err_queue() local to net/socket.c, but make it verify that the PACKET_OUTGOING marker is paired with the sock_rmem_free destructor installed by sock_queue_err_skb(). AF_PACKET receive skbs use normal receive ownership and no longer pass as error-queue skbs, while legitimate sk_error_queue entries keep the PACKET_OUTGOING marker and sock_rmem_free ownership.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix buffer over-read in rtw_update_protection rtw_update_protection() is called with a pointer offset into the ies buffer but the full ie_length is passed, causing a potential buffer over-read.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/ethosu: fix IFM region index out-of-bounds in command stream parser NPU_SET_IFM_REGION extracts the region index with param & 0x7f, giving a maximum value of 127. However region_size[] and output_region[] in struct ethosu_validated_cmdstream_info are both sized to NPU_BASEP_REGION_MAX (8), giving valid indices [0..7]. Every other region assignment in the same switch uses param & 0x7: NPU_SET_OFM_REGION: st.ofm.region = param & 0x7; NPU_SET_IFM2_REGION: st.ifm2.region = param & 0x7; NPU_SET_WEIGHT_REGION: st.weight[0].region = param & 0x7; NPU_SET_SCALE_REGION: st.scale[0].region = param & 0x7; The 0x7f mask on IFM is inconsistent and appears to be a typo. feat_matrix_length() and calc_sizes() use the region index directly as an array subscript into the kzalloc'd info struct: info->region_size[fm->region] = max(...); A userspace caller supplying NPU_SET_IFM_REGION with param > 7 causes a write up to 127*8 = 1016 bytes past the start of region_size[], corrupting adjacent kernel heap data. Fix by applying the same & 0x7 mask used by all other region assignments.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: Bound root directory content to block size __tb_property_parse_dir() does not check that content_offset + content_len fits within block_len for the root directory case. When rootdir->length equals or exceeds block_len - 2, the entry loop reads past the allocated property block. Add a bounds check after computing content_offset and content_len to reject directories whose content extends past the block.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: Validate XDomain request packet size before type cast tb_xdp_handle_request() casts the received packet buffer to protocol-specific structs without verifying that the allocation is large enough for the target type. A peer can send a minimal XDomain packet that passes the generic header length check but is shorter than the struct accessed after the cast, causing out-of- bounds reads from the kmemdup allocation. Plumb the packet length through xdomain_request_work and validate it against the expected struct size before each cast.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: Limit XDomain response copy to actual frame size tb_xdomain_copy() copies req->response_size bytes from the received packet buffer regardless of the actual frame size. When a short response arrives, this reads past the valid frame data in the DMA pool buffer into stale contents from previous transactions. Use the minimum of frame size and expected response size for the copy length.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Bound VBIOS record-chain walk loops [Why & How] All record-chain walk loops in bios_parser.c and bios_parser2.c use for(;;) and only terminate on a 0xFF record_type sentinel or zero record_size. A malformed VBIOS image missing the terminator record causes unbounded iteration at probe time, potentially hundreds of thousands of iterations with record_size=1. In the final iterations near the BIOS image boundary, struct casts beyond the 2-byte header validated by GET_IMAGE can also read out of bounds. Cap all 14 record-chain walk loops to BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD (256) iterations. The atombios.h defines up to 22 distinct record types and atomfirmware.h has 13. Assuming an average of less than 10 records per type (which is reasonable since most are connector- based) 256 is a generous upper bound. (cherry picked from commit 95700a3d660287ed657d6892f7be9ffc0e294a93)

Out of bounds read and write in Blink>InterestGroups in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.197 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical)