CVE Database

A vulnerability could allow an authenticated attacker to write files to arbitrary locations on the system.

A path traversal vulnerability could allow an authenticated attacker to read arbitrary files on the system.

MLflow 3.17.1 and earlier contains a path traversal vulnerability in the FileStore tracking backend that allows unauthenticated attackers to control filesystem paths by submitting a crafted trace ID containing traversal sequences to the POST /api/3.0/mlflow/traces endpoint. Attackers can exploit FileStore.start_trace() to write trace_info.yaml, request_metadata, and tag files with attacker-controlled metadata outside the intended experiment trace directory, subject to the server process's filesystem permissions. FileStore is the default tracking backend before MLflow 3.7.0 and opt-in thereafter (the default changed to a SQLite database), so deployments in the earlier part of the affected range are vulnerable without special configuration while later ones are affected only when FileStore is explicitly selected.

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Apache Camel Azure Files component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The Camel remote-file consumers poll a directory on a remote server and build the absolute remote path of each file by concatenating the configured directory with the file name reported in the server's directory listing. That concatenation (FtpUtils.absoluteFilePath and GenericFileConsumer) applied no lexical normalization and no check that the result stayed inside the directory being polled, and the resulting path became the operand for every subsequent remote operation on the file: retrieval (FtpOperations.retrieveFile / SftpOperations, reached from GenericFileConsumer where the retrieve name is taken verbatim from GenericFile.getAbsoluteFilePath), deletion when delete=true (GenericFileDeleteProcessStrategy), and renaming when move, preMove, moveFailed or readLock=rename is configured (GenericFileProcessStrategySupport and GenericFileRenameExclusiveReadLockStrategy). Neither isValidFile nor isMatched performed any containment check. A listing entry that is not a single path segment therefore resolved to a path outside the configured polling directory, causing Camel to read, delete or rename files outside it using the endpoint's own credentials. A listing name is not route-controlled data. It is supplied by the remote server, and the FTP control channel carries no integrity protection at all, so an on-path attacker can rewrite a LIST response without holding any credentials; a compromised, malicious or multi-tenant server, or a server backed by a virtual filesystem, can emit such a name directly. Retrieval is reachable in a default consumer configuration, since the remote consumers download every listed file; deletion and renaming additionally require one of the disposition options above, all of which are common. Escape from the directory Camel was configured to poll is unconditional, while escape from the server's own account boundary additionally depends on whether that server confines the account. The jailStartingDirectory option, which is documented as restricting Camel to the starting directory and is enabled by default, governed producer writes and, since the localWorkDirectory containment work, consumer downloads to the local work directory - but it did not constrain this remote operand, so its name and description claimed a boundary that was not enforced here. The same entry point had already been recognised on the local side: the localWorkDirectory download path was constrained so that a remote file name containing parent-directory segments could not resolve outside the local work directory. The remote operand was the remaining half of that surface. This artifact provides the azure-files scheme. Its consumer derives from the same RemoteFileConsumer base class and composed the remote path through a plain concatenation helper, so it inherited the same unconstrained resolution. Reaching it requires a listing name that is not a single path segment, which the Azure Files REST service does not normally return; the exposure was corrected on the same basis as the other remote-file consumers rather than from a demonstrated proof of concept against this scheme. Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.22.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x stream reached end of life and does not receive this fix; users on it should move to a supported releases stream.

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Apache Camel SMB component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.2.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The Camel remote-file consumers poll a directory on a remote server and build the absolute remote path of each file by concatenating the configured directory with the file name reported in the server's directory listing. That concatenation (FtpUtils.absoluteFilePath and GenericFileConsumer) applied no lexical normalization and no check that the result stayed inside the directory being polled, and the resulting path became the operand for every subsequent remote operation on the file: retrieval (FtpOperations.retrieveFile / SftpOperations, reached from GenericFileConsumer where the retrieve name is taken verbatim from GenericFile.getAbsoluteFilePath), deletion when delete=true (GenericFileDeleteProcessStrategy), and renaming when move, preMove, moveFailed or readLock=rename is configured (GenericFileProcessStrategySupport and GenericFileRenameExclusiveReadLockStrategy). Neither isValidFile nor isMatched performed any containment check. A listing entry that is not a single path segment therefore resolved to a path outside the configured polling directory, causing Camel to read, delete or rename files outside it using the endpoint's own credentials. A listing name is not route-controlled data. It is supplied by the remote server, and the FTP control channel carries no integrity protection at all, so an on-path attacker can rewrite a LIST response without holding any credentials; a compromised, malicious or multi-tenant server, or a server backed by a virtual filesystem, can emit such a name directly. Retrieval is reachable in a default consumer configuration, since the remote consumers download every listed file; deletion and renaming additionally require one of the disposition options above, all of which are common. Escape from the directory Camel was configured to poll is unconditional, while escape from the server's own account boundary additionally depends on whether that server confines the account. The jailStartingDirectory option, which is documented as restricting Camel to the starting directory and is enabled by default, governed producer writes and, since the localWorkDirectory containment work, consumer downloads to the local work directory - but it did not constrain this remote operand, so its name and description claimed a boundary that was not enforced here. The same entry point had already been recognised on the local side: the localWorkDirectory download path was constrained so that a remote file name containing parent-directory segments could not resolve outside the local work directory. The remote operand was the remaining half of that surface. This artifact provides the smb scheme. Its consumer walks the share listing on its own rather than through RemoteFileConsumer, skipping only the exact "." and ".." entries, so a name carrying traversal segments in any other form was concatenated unchecked. Reaching it requires a server that emits a listing name which is not a single path segment, which a conforming SMB2 implementation does not do; the exposure was corrected on the same basis as the other remote-file consumers rather than from a demonstrated proof of concept against this scheme. Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.22.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x stream reached end of life and does not receive this fix; users on it should move to a supported releases stream.

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Apache Camel Mina SFTP component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.18.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The Camel remote-file consumers poll a directory on a remote server and build the absolute remote path of each file by concatenating the configured directory with the file name reported in the server's directory listing. That concatenation (FtpUtils.absoluteFilePath and GenericFileConsumer) applied no lexical normalization and no check that the result stayed inside the directory being polled, and the resulting path became the operand for every subsequent remote operation on the file: retrieval (FtpOperations.retrieveFile / SftpOperations, reached from GenericFileConsumer where the retrieve name is taken verbatim from GenericFile.getAbsoluteFilePath), deletion when delete=true (GenericFileDeleteProcessStrategy), and renaming when move, preMove, moveFailed or readLock=rename is configured (GenericFileProcessStrategySupport and GenericFileRenameExclusiveReadLockStrategy). Neither isValidFile nor isMatched performed any containment check. A listing entry that is not a single path segment therefore resolved to a path outside the configured polling directory, causing Camel to read, delete or rename files outside it using the endpoint's own credentials. A listing name is not route-controlled data. It is supplied by the remote server, and the FTP control channel carries no integrity protection at all, so an on-path attacker can rewrite a LIST response without holding any credentials; a compromised, malicious or multi-tenant server, or a server backed by a virtual filesystem, can emit such a name directly. Retrieval is reachable in a default consumer configuration, since the remote consumers download every listed file; deletion and renaming additionally require one of the disposition options above, all of which are common. Escape from the directory Camel was configured to poll is unconditional, while escape from the server's own account boundary additionally depends on whether that server confines the account. The jailStartingDirectory option, which is documented as restricting Camel to the starting directory and is enabled by default, governed producer writes and, since the localWorkDirectory containment work, consumer downloads to the local work directory - but it did not constrain this remote operand, so its name and description claimed a boundary that was not enforced here. The same entry point had already been recognised on the local side: the localWorkDirectory download path was constrained so that a remote file name containing parent-directory segments could not resolve outside the local work directory. The remote operand was the remaining half of that surface. This artifact provides the mina-sftp scheme, an alternative SFTP implementation whose consumer derives from the same RemoteFileConsumer base class and therefore inherited the same unconstrained resolution. Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.22.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x stream reached end of life and does not receive this fix; users on it should move to a supported releases stream.

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Apache Camel FTP component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The Camel remote-file consumers poll a directory on a remote server and build the absolute remote path of each file by concatenating the configured directory with the file name reported in the server's directory listing. That concatenation (FtpUtils.absoluteFilePath and GenericFileConsumer) applied no lexical normalization and no check that the result stayed inside the directory being polled, and the resulting path became the operand for every subsequent remote operation on the file: retrieval (FtpOperations.retrieveFile / SftpOperations, reached from GenericFileConsumer where the retrieve name is taken verbatim from GenericFile.getAbsoluteFilePath), deletion when delete=true (GenericFileDeleteProcessStrategy), and renaming when move, preMove, moveFailed or readLock=rename is configured (GenericFileProcessStrategySupport and GenericFileRenameExclusiveReadLockStrategy). Neither isValidFile nor isMatched performed any containment check. A listing entry that is not a single path segment therefore resolved to a path outside the configured polling directory, causing Camel to read, delete or rename files outside it using the endpoint's own credentials. A listing name is not route-controlled data. It is supplied by the remote server, and the FTP control channel carries no integrity protection at all, so an on-path attacker can rewrite a LIST response without holding any credentials; a compromised, malicious or multi-tenant server, or a server backed by a virtual filesystem, can emit such a name directly. Retrieval is reachable in a default consumer configuration, since the remote consumers download every listed file; deletion and renaming additionally require one of the disposition options above, all of which are common. Escape from the directory Camel was configured to poll is unconditional, while escape from the server's own account boundary additionally depends on whether that server confines the account. The jailStartingDirectory option, which is documented as restricting Camel to the starting directory and is enabled by default, governed producer writes and, since the localWorkDirectory containment work, consumer downloads to the local work directory - but it did not constrain this remote operand, so its name and description claimed a boundary that was not enforced here. The same entry point had already been recognised on the local side: the localWorkDirectory download path was constrained so that a remote file name containing parent-directory segments could not resolve outside the local work directory. The remote operand was the remaining half of that surface. This artifact provides the ftp, ftps and sftp schemes, all of which are affected. The reporter demonstrated the issue end to end against an ftp endpoint, driving a Camel route with a malicious server whose LIST response named a file outside the polled directory. Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.22.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x stream reached end of life and does not receive this fix; users on it should move to a supported releases stream.

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in PT Norther Lights Production MapSVG mapsvg-lite-interactive-vector-maps allows Path Traversal.This issue affects MapSVG: from n/a through 8.16.1.

Omnigent 0.3.0 before 0.14.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows authenticated users to escape the workspace by setting os_env.cwd on nested sub-agents. Attackers can upload a bundle whose sub-agent uses an absolute or parent-traversing working directory, bypassing root-only validation in bundles.py, to read and write host files as the runner user.

WhoDB 0.104.0 before 0.135.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows remote attackers to read and write arbitrary host files by running DuckDB filesystem functions through the query editor. Attackers can log in to a DuckDB file without credentials and use read_text, read_blob, COPY ... TO or ATTACH to steal session.key and stored database credentials or overwrite files.