CVE Database

KTM System e-BOK does not implement any limit or timeout on consecutive login attempts, allowing an attacker to perform unlimited authentication requests. This lack of rate‑limiting enables efficient brute‑force attacks against user accounts. When combined with vulnerability CVE-2026-35097, where passwords are restricted to a six‑digit numeric format, this becomes a critical issue, as such passwords can be brute‑forced in a relatively short time. This issue was fixed in the patch published in June 2026.

An Improper Authorization vulnerability exists in PayloadCMS version 3.84.1 due to insufficient access control on the account unlock operation.

Capgo before 12.128.2 contains a credential validation vulnerability in the POST /functions/v1/private/validate_password_compliance endpoint that is callable using only the public Supabase key without authentication. The endpoint is CORS-permissive with wildcard origin allowance and lacks rate limiting, enabling attackers to perform password spraying and credential stuffing attacks to compromise user accounts.

AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code. An attacker who had reached the 2FA verification step, such as after successfully completing the password-authentication stage, could submit an unlimited number of OTP guesses. This could enable brute-force guessing of a valid code and bypass the intended second authentication factor, resulting in unauthorized account access. The patch introduces per-user failed-OTP tracking, blocks verification after 30 failed attempts for one hour, clears the counter after a successful OTP verification, and provides administrator recovery actions to purge affected lockouts.

Mercusys AC12G (EU) V1 with firmware AC12G(EU)_V1_200909 enables WPS 2.0 by default with a weak lockout policy (60-second lockout after 10 attempts).

Uncontrolled resource consumption in the Wireless Control Module (WCM) of the Indian Motorcycle Scout Bobber + Tech 2025 model year allows an adjacent-network attacker with write access to the in-vehicle network to permanently immobilize the motorcycle. The WCM enforces a brute-force lockout on the immobilizer authentication algorithm, but the lockout counter is reachable by any unauthenticated message, has no session binding, and does not reset on power cycle. An attacker can deliberately trip the lockout with a small number of crafted frames, leaving the bike un-startable until dealer service. Specific thresholds have been withheld pending vendor remediation.

Improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts vulnerability in Turkiye Electricity Transmission Corporation (TEİAŞ) Mobile Application allows Brute Force. This issue affects Mobile Application: from 1.6.2 before 1.13.

Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.

HCL AION is affected by a vulnerability where adequate protections against brute-force attempts are not enforced. This may allow repeated authentication attempts, potentially leading to unauthorized access or account compromise under certain conditions.

OPNsense is a FreeBSD based firewall and routing platform. Prior to 26.1.7, a logic flaw in the OPNsense lockout_handler allows an unauthenticated attacker to continuously reset the authentication failure counter for their IP address. By interjecting a crafted username containing a success keyword ("Accepted" or "Successful login") between normal brute-force attempts, an attacker can prevent the failure counter from ever reaching the lockout threshold. This vulnerability is fixed in 26.1.7.

** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** An improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts vulnerability in the web management interface of Zyxel WRE6505 v2 firmware version V1.00(ABDV.3)C0 could allow an adjacent attacker on the LAN to brute-force the password and bypass authentication.

Improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts (CWE-307) in pgAdmin 4. pgAdmin enforces MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS only inside its custom /authenticate/login view. Flask-Security's default /login view, which is registered automatically by security.init_app() and is reachable on every server, never consulted the User.locked field: pgAdmin's User model relied on Flask-Security's UserMixin.is_locked() (which always returns 'not locked') and Flask-Login's is_active (which only checks the active column, not locked). An attacker who triggered an account lockout via /authenticate/login could therefore obtain a session by re-submitting valid credentials directly to /login, defeating the brute-force-protection control for accounts using the INTERNAL authentication source. The same bypass also means that login attempts via /login are never rate-limited, so an attacker can perform an unbounded online password-guessing attack against INTERNAL accounts regardless of MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS. Fix overrides User.is_active and User.is_locked() so the locked column is enforced on every authentication path. LDAP, OAuth2, Kerberos, and Webserver users are not reachable by this bypass because they have no local password and are rejected by Flask-Security's LoginForm.validate before the locked check; the lockout itself is also internal-only (the /authenticate/login view filters by auth_source=INTERNAL). This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.15.