CVE Database

Hermes WebUI before 0.51.307 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to circumvent local-origin IP restrictions on onboarding endpoints by supplying a spoofed X-Forwarded-For header with a loopback address. Attackers can exploit this bypass to perform server-side request forgery against internal services including cloud metadata endpoints, overwrite LLM provider configuration and API keys with attacker-controlled values, or initiate OAuth device-code flows to obtain persistent access tokens stored in auth.json.

An issue was discovered in Canonical ADSys upstream versions through v0.16.2. During Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificate auto-enrollment via the vendored Samba client script (internal/policies/certificate/python/vendor_samba/gp/gp_cert_auto_enroll_ext.py), ADSys utilizes a plaintext HTTP connection (http://) instead of a secure HTTPS connection (https://) to request the CA certificate from the Active Directory Certificate Services server (GetCACert). An unauthenticated network attacker positioned between the managed Ubuntu host and the configured AD CS CA hostname can conduct a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack. By intercepting the plaintext HTTP request, the attacker can supply an arbitrary, attacker-controlled Root CA certificate. Because the system automatically accepts this certificate and registers it into the local system trust store via update-ca-certificates, this results in system-wide trust store poisoning. Consequently, TLS clients utilizing the operating system trust store on the affected machine will accept rogue certificates for arbitrary domains, enabling persistent decryption and interception of subsequent TLS connections. This issue is resolved in version v0.16.3.

ProxySQL is a proxy for MySQL and its forks, as well as PostgreSQL. In versions 2.0.0 through 3.0.8, the ProxySQL MySQL frontend accepts the `PROXY UNKNOWN <addr> <addr> <port> <port>\r\n` PP1 frame as a well-formed PROXY protocol header. The HAProxy PROXY protocol v1 specification says that when the protocol token is `UNKNOWN`, the receiver MUST ignore any address fields that follow it, because the proxy has declared it cannot determine the client identity. ProxySQL parses those address fields anyway via `sscanf` and writes the spoofed source address into the session's `addr.addr` field. From there it flows directly into the query-rule matcher, where the `client_addr` predicate decides routing and ACL. When `mysql-proxy_protocol_networks = '*'` (the default), any TCP peer can send a PP1 frame and choose any source IP claim. With that, any `mysql_query_rules` row pinned to a `client_addr` value is forgeable: the attacker writes the address they want to match into the PP1 line, and ProxySQL routes their query as if it came from that address. In practice this is a routing and ACL bypass. Real deployments use `client_addr` for read-write splitting (internal apps go to the primary, public traffic to read replicas), per-app schema pinning, and query-filter rules (DDL allowed only from admin CIDR, public queries blocked from dangerous patterns). An attacker that can reach the frontend port can forge their way into any of those routes. Version 3.0.9 patches this issue.